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This paper takes the finance-growth nexus further by looking at the relationship between bank competition, financial innovations and economic growth in Ghana. The purpose of this paper is to find the causality among bank competition, financial innovations and economic growth in Ghana.

The relationship between bank competition, financial innovations and economic growth was established through the framework of the endogenous growth model. In addition, the paper employed the bound testing ARDL cointegration procedures to enable us to establish both short-run and long-run relationship between bank competition, financial innovations and economic growth. Granger causality test were also estimated to determine the direction of causality.

The results showed that, in the long run, bank competition is positively related to economic growth while financial innovation is negatively related to economic growth. In the short run, bank competition is negatively related to economic growth. By the same token, financial innovation is positively related to economic growth in the short run. In terms of causality, the results showed that there is unidirectional Granger causality from bank competition to economic growth. However, there is bidirectional Granger causality between financial innovation and economic growth.

The study therefore, recommends for more regulations toward a more competitive banking system with more innovative products tailored toward mobilization of savings and investment to growth induced sectors of the economy.

This paper provides a time series perspective to the finance-growth nexus and highlights the potential contribution of effective banking development to the economic welfare of the Ghanaian citizens.

Amidst the backdrop of a wide array of structural developments that have revolutionized the competitive landscape of Indian commercial banking, this paper aims to empirically examine the role of two external monitoring mechanisms – competition and concentration on financial stability and further highlights the significance of bank-level heterogeneity in the nexus.

The study uses the Lerner index, defined through a translog specification, as a measure of market power. A system generalized method of moments technique accounts for the dynamic associations among the competition-concentration-stability nexus. The study further examines the moderating effect of ownership, size and capitalization on the nexus. The study also uses the Boone indicator and comments on the competition-bank stability relationship after controlling for bank governance.

The findings indicate that banks are less stable in a more competitive and higher concentrated environment. Exploring bank-level heterogeneity, first, the authors report that as competition increases, state-owned banks have greater incentives to undertake risky activities than private and foreign banks, which point to implicit sovereign guarantees that characterize the former. Second, the authors document an adverse influence of competition on the soundness of larger banks consistent with the “too-big-to-fail” assertion. Third, results corroborate the disciplinary role of regulatory capital and lend support to stricter capital norms under Basel III in a more competitive environment.

This paper is perhaps the first to capture competition and concentration in a single model; to reconcile conflicting evidence on competition-risk nexus; to shed light on the joint effect of competition and Basel accords for Indian banks.

The study of credit risk has been of the utmost importance when it comes to measuring the soundness and stability of the banking system. Due to the growing importance of Islamic banking system, a fierce competition between Islamic and conventional banks have started to emerge which in turn is impacting credit riskiness of both banking system.

Using the system GMM technique on 283 conventional banks and 60 Islamic banks for the period of 2006–2017, this paper explores the important impact of size and competition on the credit risk in 15 dual banking economies.

The authors found that as bank competition increases credit risk seems to be reduced. On the size effect, the authors found that big Islamic banks are less risky than big conventional banks whereas small Islamic banks are riskier than small conventional banks. The results are robust for different panel data estimation models and sub-samples of different size groups. The findings of this paper provide important insights into the competition-credit risk nexus in the dual banking system.

The paper is specifically focused on credit risk in dual banking environment and tries to fill the gap in the literature by studying (1) do the Islamic and conventional banks exhibit a different level of credit risk; (2) does competition in the banking system impact the credit risk of Islamic and conventional banks and finally (3) do the big and small banks exhibit similar levels of credit risk.

The number of US commercial banks has declined by about 50% over the last two decades. This change could lead to a potential decline in competition and a potential increase in market power in the agricultural banking market. The focus of this study is to examine whether the risk of failure and the performance of agricultural banks has been affected by bank consolidations.

The impact of bank competition on performance and financial stability of agricultural banks is studied using a Lerner index as a measure of market power. A Z-score is constructed to measure bank stability. Similarly, the return on assets (net income to total assets ratio), return on equity (net income to the total equity ratio), agricultural loan ratio and agricultural loan volume are used as performance measures for agricultural banks. Two-way fixed effect regression models are estimated to measure the impact of competition on financial stability and performance.

Results indicate that bank competition has a U-shaped effect on the probability of default and an inverted U-shaped effect on volume and proportion of agricultural lending. There also exists evidence of a positive but non-linear effect of bank market power on the profitability of agricultural banks.

There is limited literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability and performance of US agricultural banks. Agricultural banks hold more than 40% of US farm debt. A decrease in the number of banks or the level of competition in agricultural banking may cause an adverse effect on relationship lending. The key findings imply that bank regulatory strategies should focus on enhancing (reducing) competition in more (less) concentrated banking markets to improve the financial health and performance of agricultural banks.

This study investigates the interrelationships between efficiency, competition and risk in the Chinese banking industry.

Parametric stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate bank efficiency; the Lerner index is used as the competition indicator; accounting ratios and a translog function are used to measure different types of risk and finally, the three-stage least square estimator is used to investigate the interrelationships.

The results of this study show that the impact of competition on different types of risk is significant and positive, while there is a significant and positive impact of credit risk, liquidity risk and capital risk on bank competition. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the interrelationships between efficiency and competition are significant and negative. The authors do not find any robust interrelationships between different types of risk and different types of efficiency; the authors find that diversification and higher levels of profitability reduce bank credit risk. The results suggest that a higher developed banking sector reduces the level of bank competition in China.

This is the first piece of research that comprehensively investigates the interrelationships between different types of risk, competition and different efficiencies in China.

Despite the extensive debate on the impact of bank competition on risk-taking, there is no evidence of its role in procyclicality of loan-loss provisions (LLPs). The purpose of this study is to find out what is the role of competition in the procyclicality of LLPs.

Using over 70,000 bank-level observations in 103 countries in 2004–2015 and the LLPs model, this study interacts competition with business cycle to check what is the effect of competition on procyclicality of LLPs.

This study finds that intense competition is associated with more procyclicality of LLPs. Increased procyclicality of LLPs in a more competitive environment is binding for high-income countries. The opposite effect is shown for low-income countries.

Future research can be extended by testing the role of additional factors – such as regulations, supervision or institutional protection of shareholders' rights, in the association between procyclicality and competition.

The main message of this paper is that the competitive environment changes the procyclicality of LLPs. The results are important from the point of view of the COVID-19 pandemic because government interventions during lockdowns will affect competition in the banking industry and in other industries of the economy.

This paper contributes to the extant research in three dimensions. First, it shows that competition is an important factor behind procyclicality of LLPs. Second, it adds to the research on the links between competition and financial stability. Third, it shows that the link between competition and procyclicality of LLPs depends on the economic development of the country in which the banks are located.

This study sets out to examine the evolution of competitive conditions in the banking industries of 14 Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies for the period 1993‐2000.

The basis for the evaluation of competitive conditions is the extant oligopoly theory in the new industrial organization literature, specifically, the competition model developed by Panzar and Rosse.

The results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or monopoly over 1993‐2000 except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia. That is, banks earned their revenues as if operating under conditions of monopolistic competition in that period. An analysis of changes in competitive structure shows a higher degree of competition in the later years of the sample period. Large banks in transition countries are found to be operating in a relatively more competitive environment compared with small banks or, in other words, competition is lower in local markets compared with national and international markets.

The period under investigation corresponds to early years of the ongoing transition from central planning when these countries were lacking many market‐supportive institutions essential for efficient financial markets. Therefore, the results of this study should be interpreted with the necessary scholarly scrutiny.

The paper measures the level of market contestability that may have been facilitated by the recent liberalization and deregulation progress.

The paper is highly original. Although research on the bank competition in the USA and other developed countries is voluminous, research that focuses on transition economies is relatively scant.

This study aims to show the relationship between competition, financial stability and ownership structure of banks in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

This study uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators to generate research results. This study uses an unbalanced panel dynamic data set. It covers the period 2011 to 2017 in MENA banks.

This study implies that there is a significant and positive relationship between market power and the financial stability of banks in MENA countries. It explains a competitive market focus on credit risk, which turns them risky. From the bank’s ownership view, Islamic banks are in a less risky position which means Islamic banks are more stable than other ownership structures. On the other hand, government specialized institute displays their poor financial stability and risky from other ownership structures. Unfortunately, there is no significant impact of ownership structure on competition unless Islamic banks prove that they (Islamic banks) perform better in market power.

The empirical findings of this study suggest that MENA banks should improve the process of managing and monitoring the non-performing loan (loan segment business). It reduces the level of credit risk, which leads to achieving more profit. It also recommends that loan quality should improve immediately in this region for declining financial disruption. Based on the ownership structure, policymakers and stakeholders should adjust their risk and financial stability. Notably, the stakeholders can focus on Islamic banks in this region as this type of ownership structure showing superiority over other ownership structures.

This study is based on the latest data set and produced outcomes by using a GMM estimator. It also uses multiple measures of competition and risk variables to get robust results. Moreover, to the best of the knowledge, this study is the pioneer to examine the competition, risk (financial stability) and ownership structure of banks in the MENA countries.

Banks are institutions that inject money in the economy and help to boost it when there are problems in some markets, especially in productive sectors. In this way, analysing the competition in this sector is an important tool for policymakers as non-competitive behaviour could affect the financial system and economy. The purpose of this paper is to measure the degree of competition in the Ecuadorian private banking sector divided by size, from 2000 to 2015, using panel data collected by the official regulator institution.

The authors applied the model proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and its H-statistic using a reduced price and revenue equation estimated by pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects, random effects, feasible generalised fixed effects and panel correction standard errors (PCSE).

The authors show that given the presence of some problems in data such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the most appropriate technique is PCSE. The authors also found robust evidence supporting that large banks compete in a monopolistic market, small and medium-sized banks operate in monopolistic competition, and Ecuadorian small, medium-sized and large banks stay in long-run equilibrium.

This paper contributes to the actual literature of competition degree in two ways. First, different from traditional papers, we do not control by size; so, we divided the analysis by size, because in Ecuador and also in many developing countries, bank’s competition is different for each group of size because the levels of liquidity, risk and other indicators are different from one group to another. Second, we show the robustness of the results using a scaled and unscaled equation, using many controls and using five methods to contrast the competition degree.

Under the traditional franchise value paradigm, competition in banking markets is considered to be risk enhancing because of its tendency to raise interest rates on deposits. Taking a contrarian view, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) have argued that competition in the loan market can lead to lower interest rates and hence reduce bank risk-taking. Following these contradictory theoretical results, the empirical evidence on the relationship between risk and competition in banking has also been mixed. This paper analyses the competition–stability relationship for the Indian banking sector for the period 1999-2000 to 2012-2013.

Banking competition is measured using structural measures of concentration, namely, five-bank concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as well as a non-structural measure of competition – the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic. Panel regression methods are used to estimate the relationships.

Our results show that while concentration leads to lower levels of default, market and asset risks, it exacerbates the levels of capital and liquidity risks.

These results have interesting implications for banking sector policy in emerging economies. For instance, any strategy on entry of new banks has to be carefully coordinated with supervisory efforts and macro-prudential policy to derive the benefits of greater competition in the banking industry.

This is the first paper that analyses the competition – stability relationship using a large number of alternative measures for the banking sector, an emerging economy.