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Purpose – This chapter compares the stability of the U.S. Dual Banking system's two bank groups, national and state banks, in light of the current financial crisis. The goal of the chapter is to answer three distinct questions: first, is there a difference in the (balance sheet) fragility between the two groups and, second, to what extent has the balance sheet fragility of both groups changed after the escalation of the financial crisis beginning in August 2007? Building on that, the third question asks to whether or not the respective regulatory agencies of both bank groups are responsible for these changes in balance sheet fragility in light of the financial crisis.

Methodology – To answer these questions the chapter uses U.S. Call Report data containing full quarterly balance sheets and P&Ls of all U.S. commercial banks over the period 2005–2008. Anecdotal evidence as well as univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference methodology focusing on the immediate pre-crisis period Q1/2005–Q3/2007 and the crisis period Q3/2007–Q4/2008 are applied.

Results – Highly significant and robust results show that, ceteris paribus, national banks reduced their potential balance sheet fragility after the escalation of the crisis in August 2007 by reducing lending and liquidity creation stronger than state banks. Anecdotal evidence supports the empirical findings. Although both FDIC and OCC did not anticipate the adverse effects of the crisis, the OCC publicly showed an earlier reaction to liquidity-related problems than the FDIC.

Originality – The chapter is the first of its kind to analyze bank fragility around the escalation of the financial crisis and the role of the regulatory agencies. The chapter holds especially interesting policy implications in the light of the current discussion about the future regulation of the banking markets.

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the dissemination of structural arrangements relating to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement within the field of banking organizations in Brazil. The paper is part of the research results to understand the dynamics of institutionalizing CSR, which is understood as a movement of capitalism displacement. The structural arrangements under study are: the specific areas created to address the CSR topic, social balance sheet and links on CSR in organizational websites ‐ considered as “tests” to include organizations in the movement. It was found that there is an isomorphic movement in the field where the major banks take the tests, having the arrangements ‐ and soon the large banks joined the movement, adopting different stances. Wholesale banks, however, have still to do the same thing, which ratifies the process as a search for legitimacy, the core argument of the theory.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how much liquidity banks create and how liquidity creation changed over time in the MENA countries and to examine the soundness of banks in these countries based on the CAME rating system, in addition to investigating the relationship between CAME ratios and liquidity creation of these banks.

The study regresses the CAME ratios together with other control variables to model liquidity creation. The robustness of the results is evaluated by using a different measure of liquidity creation and by excluding the observations of the Islamic banks.

The results show that the CAME rating system, as an indicator of bank soundness, is negatively related to bank liquidity creation. Specifically, capital adequacy, management efficiency and earning ability ratios affect the on-balance sheet components of liquidity creation, while asset quality ratio affects its off-balance sheet component.

The paper offers insights to regulators and banks managers in terms of better understanding of the negative relationship between CAME rating system and bank liquidity creation.

This paper sheds more light on the relationship between bank soundness and liquidity creation by using the ratios of the CAMEL rating system as an indicator of bank strength and soundness.

Librarians and corporate information center managers operate in worlds where speaking the language of finance is one of the requisites for the key to the executive washroom. But too few of us know how the basic documents of financial decision making are assembled or how to interpret them to determine the operating health of our organizations. This is not a failure we alone experience; most managers begin in nonfinancial positions. Much of the bewilderment of the world of fiscal nuances can be dispensed with when we understand some fiscal basics, like how to read a balance sheet.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the significant clustering of defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze announcements during 2001‐2006 is motivated at least in part by accounting concerns due to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's pending adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 (SFAS 158).

Using logistic regression models, the paper compares 147 “freeze firms” with a matched sample of firms that did not announce a DB plan freeze. Empirical models control for other DB plan motives including as a response to stricter contribution requirements under the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and improving the firm's competitive position.

The potential SFAS 158 impact is significantly associated with firms' decisions to freeze their DB plans. Firm profitability is also significantly associated with the freeze decision. However, there is no significant association between cash flow positions or pension plan contributions and the freeze decision.

It is possible that economic conditions adversely affecting the funded status of DB plans also motivate the freeze decision. While this study controls for the economic environment, economic factors could exacerbate the potential effect of SFAS 158.

This paper considers potential effects of accounting policy by examining its influence on real management actions and has consequences for a variety of stakeholders including investors, creditors, and, importantly, pension beneficiaries and workers, as DB plans represent implicit contracts between firms and their employees.