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This paper aims to examine the relation between managerial ability and stock price crash risk, conditional on managerial overconfidence. In addition, conditional on managerial overconfidence, the authors investigate the effect of managerial ability on firms’ choice of bad news hoarding channels, which result in a stock price crash.

Using a sample of 24,289 firm-years from companies listed on Compustat and CRSP from 1994 to 2018, the authors conduct panel regression analysis.

The authors find that managerial ability is positively associated with stock price crash risk only when managerial overconfidence is high. Furthermore, the authors find that managerial ability seems to exacerbate (attenuate) the bad news withholding by the overconfident managers using the earnings guidance (earnings management) channel. The authors find limited evidence that high-ability managers are likely to withhold bad news through the overinvestment channel and “other channels” when managers are overconfident. Finally, the authors find that the joint effect of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability on firms’ crash risk is more pronounced when there is a material weakness in firms’ internal controls, high investor belief heterogeneity and high information asymmetry. However, this effect appears to dissipate during the recent financial crisis in 2008.

This research reveals that managerial ability is costly to firms by engendering bad news hoardings and stock price crash risk when managers are overconfident. It also sheds light on how managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect managers’ choice of bad news withholding channels and stock price crash risk. Finally, the paper is of practical value to the board of directors in selecting the prospective executives.

In this study, the authors extend upon Brockman et al. (2008), who provide evidence that managers opportunistically accelerate bad news prior to share repurchases, but provide limited evidence that managers withhold good news until after repurchases. The authors examine management forecasts surrounding share repurchases in periods when companies must disclose detailed repurchase information. The authors argue these disclosures increase managers' legal and reputation risks of accelerating bad news, but have a lesser effect on delaying good news.

First, the authors examine whether managers alter the information released to the market before buying back shares by comparing managerial forecasts made within 30 days before the beginning of a repurchasing period with those made outside of this window. Second, the authors examine whether managers are more likely to provide good news forecasts, in terms of both magnitude and frequency, after buying back shares. Lastly, the authors examine the impact of CEO stock ownership on managerial forecasting behavior surrounding share buybacks.

Consistent with the authors’ hypotheses and contrary to Brockman et al. (2008), the authors find limited evidence that the likelihood or magnitude of bad news forecasts is greater in the period before share buybacks. Instead, the authors document that the frequency and magnitude of good news forecasts increase in periods following share buybacks and that these associations are positively moderated by managerial equity incentives. The authors also find that the withholding of good news is associated with lower average repurchase prices and greater repurchase volume. The authors further show that, when litigation risk is greater, managers are less likely to accelerate bad news prior to repurchases and more likely to withhold good news until after. Overall, the study results are consistent with managers balancing the benefits of opportunistic repurchase behavior with the costs.

This study contributes to the management forecast and share repurchase literatures by providing evidence consistent with managers opportunistically releasing earnings forecasts in the period after buying back shares. Most importantly, the authors show that after the rule revision, managers refrain from actively disclosing bad news that carry higher legal costs. Instead, they opt for the omission of good news to repurchase stocks at lower prices. The study results reconcile the conflicting evidence of Brockman et al. (2008) and Ge and Lennox (2011).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of New Zealand's statutory‐backed continuous disclosure regime enacted in December 2002 on the differential disclosure behaviour of New Zealand firms with good and bad earnings news.

This paper examines the level of information disclosure, analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion, abnormal returns and abnormal volumes for firms with good and bad news earnings announcements in a sample period surrounding reforms to New Zealand's continuous disclosure regime.

The authors find evidence that the pre‐announcement information flow was poorer prior to the reform for bad news firms compared to good news firms, in terms of greater analysts' forecast dispersion and a larger abnormal price reaction to the actual earnings announcement. Second, the reform reduced the asymmetry of information flow between good and bad news firms, with the differences in analysts' forecast dispersion and abnormal price reaction dissipating after the reform.

The findings suggest that the reforms to New Zealand's continuous disclosure regime have reduced managers' propensity to withhold bad news and improved the quality of information provided to investors by firms with bad earnings news.

This study improves our understanding of the impact of disclosure reform on the behaviour of managers in a market with relatively low liquidity and less litigation risk in comparison to larger and more developed markets.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how changes in the firm's information disclosure practices impact the way investors process macroeconomic news. Specifically, the authors examine the role of derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, in shaping invertors response to good and bad interest rate news. In addition, the authors examine whether the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies between firms with higher and lower earnings volatility.

This study uses data on all US public firms over the period from 1990 to 2019. The authors mainly apply multivariate regression and a difference-in-difference approach to test their hypotheses.

The results show a significant decrease in the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for users of interest rate derivatives following the adoption of SFAS 133. However, in contrast to this finding, the authors also find that the adoption of SFAS 133 has no impact on the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for nonusers of interest rate derivatives. Consistent with the ambiguity theory, the finding suggests that SFAS 133 indeed decreases investors’ uncertainty (ambiguity) about the cash flow implications of changes in the interest rate. The authors also find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher than lower earnings volatility. This implies that derivatives and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, are more important for firms with higher than lower earnings volatility. The finding is consistent with the idea that investors demand more accounting information when underlying earnings volatility is higher. In a set of additional analyses, the authors find that the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies depending on the level of analyst coverage and interest rate exposure. Specifically, the authors find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher interest rate exposure and lower analyst coverage.

The findings of this study help market participants including regulators and standard setters to understand the impact of mandatory disclosure practices on investors' reaction to macroeconomic news. Moreover, the findings of the study help managers to understand the influence firm-specific characteristics (e.g. earnings volatility, analyst coverage and interest rates exposure) on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to explore how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study contributes to the literature by providing the empirical evidence that derivatives instruments and hedging activities, as required by SFAS 133, affect investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. In doing so, the results provide insights about how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study shows that the cross-sectional variation in earnings volatility, analysts’ coverage and interest rate exposure affects the impact of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. The findings are not only the notable addition to the existing literature on the topic but also can aid to market participants including policy makers, regulators, standard setters and managers to understand the influence of firm-specific characteristics on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure. Finally, the findings contribute to the general debate about the effectiveness of SFAS 133 by showing that the adoption of SFAS 133 indeed decreases information ambiguity.

Increasing managerial ownership gives rise to the managerial opportunistic behaviors, among which bad news hoarding has attracted a lot of attention. Nevertheless, there always exists a threshold level at which the accumulated bad news releases abruptly, thereby resulting in corporate stock price crash risk. On the above arguments, this study aims to investigate the impact of managerial ownership on stock price crash risk of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Sample includes the 485 firm-year observations from companies listed on the TSE during the years 2012-2016 and the research hypothesis was tested using multivariate regression model based on panel data.

The results reveal that managerial ownership increases the corporate stock price crash risk. These findings are robust to an alternative measure of stock price crash risk, individual analysis of the research hypothesis for each year and endogeneity concern.

The current study is almost the first study, which has been conducted in emerging capital markets, so the findings of the study not only extend the extant theoretical literature concerning the stock price crash risk in developing countries including emerging capital market of Iran but also help policymakers, regulators, investors and users of financial reports to make informed decisions.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate tax aggressiveness on future stock price crash. It also tests the impact of corporate tax aggressivness in predicting stock price crash for a two-year forecast window.

The study sample consisted of 1,169 firm-years observations. The multivariate analysis uses three measures of stock price crash risk, as a dependent variable. The key variable is tax aggressiveness lagged by one period (one year) as all independent variables. As a robustness check, this paper uses alternate measures of earning management and a longer forecast window (two years) to predict stock price crash risk.

Tax aggressiveness activity is positively related to a firm-specific future stock price crash. Moreover, corporate tax aggressiveness predicts stock price crash risk for a long forecast window (two years). The findings are robust to a number of checks and have several policy implications.

The cost of continuing to accumulate bad news will be greater than the cost of revealing them. Thus, board of directors should encourage disclosure in order to reveal private news and then, to increase the amount of firm-specific information in returns. Another point is that tax aggressiveness behavior implies a risk to be perceived by the market as socially irresponsible, and may harm the firm reputation. This fact leads, in terms of portfolio management, to deter investment in firm-equity. Therefore, Investors should be cautious about the different risks of corporate tax aggressiveness.

The accounting system in France, as in most European countries, relies upon codified rules and government requirement. Thus, our results provide some evidence of the effectiveness of the French laws and regulations in preventing indirectly earnings management from affecting stock price crash risk.

French companies are among the heavily taxed in Europe which makes France a particularly suitable context for studying tax aggressiveness issues. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in the french context, that document a signifcant and positive relation between tax aggressiveness and future crash risk. It focuses on the important role of corporate tax planning as a means of withholding bad news and its consequences in inflating stock prices.

This paper examines how a firm's hierarchical complexity, which is determined by the way it organizes its subsidiaries across the hierarchical levels, can impact its stock price crash risk.

The authors employ a measure of hierarchical complexity that captures the depth and breadth of how subsidiaries are organized within a firm. This measure is calculated using information about firms' subsidiaries extracted from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) database that allows the authors to construct each firm's hierarchical structure. The data sample includes 2,461 USA firms for the period from 2012 to 2017 (11,006 firm-year observations). Univariate tests and panel regression are used for the main analysis. Two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression and various other tests are employed for robustness check.

The results show a positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and stock price crash risk. This relationship is amplified in firms with a greater number of subsidiaries that are hierarchically distanced from the parent company as well as in firms with a greater number of foreign subsidiaries in countries with weaker rule of law.

This paper is the first to investigate the impact hierarchical complexity has on crash risk. The results highlight the role that a firm's organizational structure can have on asset pricing behavior.

The paper aims to examine the link between firm‐level large share price movements, firm‐specific company announcements and corporate governance. Stock market regulation in the UK requires firms to disclose new price‐sensitive information immediately via official news providers. The paper investigates whether large share price movements are accompanied by firm disclosure. It also investigates whether corporate governance attributes influence the degree of disclosure by firms.

The disclosure measure is constructed by identifying the largest abnormal daily stock returns for sample firms, and then firm‐specific announcements in the three‐day window centred on the abnormal return day are searched. Corporate governance variables known to influence disclosure practice are then collected and tested to ascertain whether they influence disclosure for positive and negative (good and bad announcements) abnormal returns.

Large share price movements are accompanied by an official share price movement in 45.2 per cent of cases. This rises to 62.9 per cent when new analyst or newspaper articles are included as potential drivers of the abnormal share price return. The higher the proportion of non‐executive directors and CEO/chair duality lead to a higher incidence of bad news disclosure, suggesting increased scrutiny works. The higher the level of CEO and board ownership the lower the level of disclosure. Finally, institutional ownership concentration appears to negatively influence the level of disclosure.

Higher levels of corporate governance are shown to lead to better firm disclosure. At the same time, the authors find that in almost 40 per cent of large abnormal share price returns no information has come to the market to drive the share price. Thus, the paper has important messages for regulators, who need to investigate why prices often move a long way without accompanying news. Shareholders, particularly institutions, should ensure high levels of disclosure by company directors.

The determinants that contribute to reducing stock price crash risk have garnered attention from scholars and practitioners. However, our understanding of the relationship between board diversity and stock crash risk, as well as the contextual factors that influence this relationship, remains limited. To address this gap, this study aims to investigate how different attributes of board diversity affect stock price crash risk, particularly under conditions of higher performance hazard and ownership concentration.

Using a two-stage least squares fixed-effects estimator, the authors analyze a panel data set of 1,792 firm-year observations across 282 firms listed on the KOSPI200 from 2010 to 2019.

Relation-oriented diversity reduces future stock price crash risk, particularly when firms experience performance shortfalls and have concentrated ownership structures, but task-oriented diversity has no significant effects. The results imply that only relation-oriented diversity strengthens governance mechanisms by curtailing managerial bad news withholding behaviors, and the role of relation-oriented diversity in reducing stock crash risk becomes more crucial when firms have higher performance hazard and concentrated ownership.

This study makes crucial contributions as follows: the authors contribute to the stock crash risk literature by shifting the focus from how to when board diversity matters in assessing stock crash risk; the authors extend the board diversity research and enhance scholarly understanding of the effects of board diversity on corporate governance by highlighting that not all aspects of board diversity improve firm governance mechanisms; and the authors widen the lens from a single attribute to multiple attributes of diversity to reveal the effects of diversity on boards in assessing future crash risk.

The authors examine the joint effect of the country-wide legal institutions and product market competition on stock crash risk in a large sample of international firms.

In the study, the authors examine whether the country-level institutional factors affect product market competition's impact on stock crash risk. Specifically, the authors characterize country-wide institutional quality with individual governance indices developed in earlier studies and also adopt the worldwide board reforms as a proxy for the change in firms' governance environment.

The authors find that strong institutions mitigate the positive relationship between product market competition and stock crash risk in the international setting. In addition, the authors find that institutional quality moderates the effect of product market competition on stock crash risk via the information channel, i.e. although firms in competitive industries manage and report earnings more aggressively, strong institutions or board reforms, curtail managers' incentive to do so.

The authors’ findings lend support to the dark side of product market competition with a broader sample from 35 countries. In light of this, when earlier studies consider firms from competitive (concentrated) industries as having less (more) severe agency problems, future studies should consider the agency costs associated with product market competition for both the US firms and non-US firms. Furthermore, when it is debatable that regulators are self-interested, captured, uninformed and thus the regulations and institutions may not be fully effective as a result, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of institutions in ex ante mitigating agency conflicts associated with product market competition.