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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of the business rates retention scheme (BRRS) in England which transferred financial liability for backdated appeals to LAs. Under the original scheme, business rates revenue, mandatory relief and liability for successful appeals is spilt 50/50 between central government and local government which both share the rewards of growth and bear the risk of losses.

The research adopts a microanalysis approach into researching local government finance, conducting a case study of Leeds, to investigate the impact of appeals liability and reveal disparities in impact, through detailed examination of multiple perspectives in one of the largest cities in the UK.

The case study reveals that Leeds, despite having a buoyant commercial economy driven by retail and service sector growth, has been detrimentally impacted by BRRS as backdated appeals have outweighed uplift in business rates income. Fundamentally BRRS is not a “one size fits all” model – it results in winners and losers – which will be exacerbated if local authorities get to keep 100 per cent of their business rates from 2020.

LAs’ income is more volatile as a consequence of both the rates retention and appeals liability aspects of BRRS and will become more so with the move to 100 per cent retention and liability.

Such volatility impairs the ability of local authorities to invest in growth at the same time as providing front line services over the medium term – precisely the opposite of what BRRS was intended to do. It also incentivises the construction of new floorspace, which generates risks overbuilding and exacerbating over-supply.

The research reveals the significant impact of appeals liability on LAs’ business rates revenues which will be compounded with the move to a fiscally neutral business rates system and 100 per cent business rates retention by 2020.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and testing the impact, if any, of such compliance on mitigating of stock option fraud incentives.

A logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of board of directors, audit committee, ownership structure and other firm characteristics on the likelihood of stock option fraud. The analysis is based on the data for stock option grants obtained during the period from 2006 to 2009.

The results suggest that the rate of compliance with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance in Egyptian public‐held companies is low. Weak corporate governance allows executives to exercise greater influence over the board of directors and audit committee decisions. Furthermore, a low level of disclosure, duality of CEO, high percentage of insiders in board of directors, auditor turnover, and management ownership are among the factors that increase the likelihood of stock option fraud in the Egyptian setting.

The results are constrained by the proxies used to define stock option fraud. Additionally, the limited number of companies with stock option grants in Egypt might affect the results.

This paper provides insights into exposing stock option fraud by Egyptian public‐held companies and sheds light on the effective role of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. This would help policy setters to enhance compliance with the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and develop a comprehensive Shari'ah model of corporate governance that reduces stock option fraud.

Many corporate managers, with the aid of the board of directors, discovered that they could provide themselves with guaranteed or excessive compensation by manipulating the terms of stock option grants that were included in their compensation packages. This paper seeks to examine the legal, tax, and accounting issues that have evolved because of these suspect illegal activities.

The author presents the theory behind performance‐based compensation that is the basis for employee stock option grants. The author then examines regulations, judicial theory, and court cases to determine the current legal status of backdating, spring loading, or bullet dodging of executive stock option grants.

The current legal environment has made it difficult for executives to continue the practice of manipulating stock option grants without falling under the ire of regulators and shareholders. However, a question remains whether executives that manipulated stock option grants in the past will be found criminally liable for their acts.

The paper's review of the discourse on the legality of corporate executives enhancing their compensation packages shows the complexity of detecting and regulating this type of suspect activity.

This paper presents a contemporaneous discussion and data on legal and regulatory changes that resulted from management malfeasance of executive compensation.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.

Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.

The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.

These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.

This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.

Corporate misconduct carries significant social and economic costs, and therefore regulators and other stakeholders seek to deter it. Despite the significant costs and deterrence efforts, corporate misconduct is widespread and our understanding of it is limited. As argued in this chapter, one key reason for this is the lack of understanding of the benefits and penalties of misconduct for the companies and individuals involved, as well as the detection of such behavior. This chapter seeks to advance our understanding of corporate misconduct and builds on the rational choice model (RCM) – where the decision to engage in misconduct hinges on a calculation of the expected costs and benefit – and links it to research in organization theory and strategy. Specifically, it sets a research agenda at the intersection of organizational and strategic perspectives, to deepen our understanding of corporate misconduct and shed light on opportunities for empirical and theoretical research which can potentially aid in developing effective deterrence strategies.

Employers can be forgiven for a continuing sense of confusion over pension rights for part‐time workers. While UK tribunals and courts hand down decisions which limit rights to retrospective membership, the European Court of Justice seems to open the door to the maximum number of claims. This paper attempts to clarify the issues and to set out the realities for employers and their advisers.

Scandal is the disruptive publicity of alleged misconduct and it is important for organizations because of its severe consequences. Distinguishing between single-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct by a single actor, and multiple-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct of a similar type by multiple actors, we develop a framework for studying scandal dynamics that draws a distinction between how scandals start (single-actor or multiple-actor) and how they end (single-actor or multiple-actor). We focus specifically on spillover scandals (from single to multiple actors) and scapegoating scandals (from multiple to single actors) and identify several mechanisms that affect the likelihood of these two important types of scandals. We conclude by developing a research agenda that builds upon the central contribution of our framework: the distinction between single- and multiple-organization scandals and the transitions that result in spillovers and scapegoating.