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The 2008-2009 subprime mortgage crisis in the USA caused bankruptcies and closures of many financial institutions. Yet many CEOs of US financial institutions were awarded huge bonuses and pay packages despite the economic collapse, suggesting that their incomes were not in conjunction with those of the shareholders, indicating a serious agency problem. This issue raises the question as to whether stock option backdating, another example of an agency problem, was as prevalent as slack lending policies among these financial institutions. This paper aims to compare the relative magnitude of executive option backdating in financial and nonfinancial firms.

Using a sample of CEO stock option grants from 1995 to 2006, obtained from ExecuComp, the authors employ an event study around the grant dates of executive options. The authors compare the abnormal price movements between financial and nonfinancial firms.

The abnormal negative stock returns were found before the award dates for both groups of firms. The after-event abnormal returns of both groups of firms, however, show different trends. For nonfinancial firms, there is an immediate turnaround of the abnormal return movement right after the grants; that is, the price increases, indicating the occurrence of significant backdating events. For financial firms, however, there is no significant price rebound after the grant date. In fact, the price continued to decline throughout the after-event period.

The result shows that nonfinancial firms demonstrate significantly more option backdating behavior than financial firms.

The findings suggest that previous findings on prevalent backdating among all public listed firms are only partially correct. This paper shows that backdating behavior found in previous studies is indeed driven by nonfinancial firms. This unexpected finding contradicts the initial prediction of authors that option backdating may be more likely among financial firms.

Based on previous research, the authors recognize that generally the official grant dates of firms must have been set retroactively, as shown by Lie (2005). The findings, however, show that financial firms demonstrate only partial backdating behavior. This study opens a path for future research to further discover why financial firms exhibit less backdating behavior compared with nonfinancial firms, and if option backdating is not an issue for financial firms, why the share prices of these firms decline significantly prior to the grant date.

The purpose of this paper is to test for managerial opportunism, specifically the backdating of executive options, in Australia.

The paper analyses the return behaviour associated with a sample of 161 unscheduled options granted by Australian firms. Specifically, the authors test for differences between a subsample of grants that had late‐filed notices (and hence may be subject to backdating) versus those that had notices filed on‐time.

Consistent with backdating, it is found that these abnormal post‐grant returns persist for a sub‐sample of late‐filed grants but not for a sub‐sample of grants with same‐day filing. Furthermore – the authors find even stronger results for option grants made by firms with a history of late‐filing but for which no notice was filed with the Australian Securities Exchange. This paper is the first to demonstrate these effects in a setting subject to the IFRS requirement that the fair value (rather than the intrinsic value) of executive options be expensed.

This paper is the first to demonstrate these effects in Australia and further in a setting subject to the IFRS requirement that the fair value (rather than the intrinsic value) of executive options be expensed.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence in support of incentive and retention-based explanations for backdating.

The authors use matching-firm techniques and the bivariate logistic model.

Backdating firms tend to be younger and faster growing – the characteristics of firms with growing demand for skilled labor. Further, rather than experiencing poor performance, backdating firms tend to outperform matching firms in both prior- and post-backdating years.

The results suggest that backdating reflects a firm's demand for valuable employees rather than strictly a manifestation of agency problems, as evidenced by previous study.

This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.

The real activity manipulation measures are as follows: abnormal R&D expense, abnormal SG&A expense, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flow from operations. Using a sample of firms alleged to have backdated options during the period 1998-2006 and non-backdating one-on-one matched firms, a separate regression is run for each of the real activity manipulation measures (dependent variables) on backdating and other variables.

The authors report unusually low R&D and unusually low SG&A expenses among the backdating firms. They also find evidence of unusually high production costs among backdating firms compared to the matched firms.

The findings imply that backdating firms are more aggressive in the use of real activities to manipulate earnings and the use of real activities appears to be opportunistic.

The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the use of real activities manipulation by firms under investigation for fraud. The authors also add to the debate on whether the use of stock options as part of compensation aligns the interest of management with the interest of shareholders.

Recent findings show that CEOs tend to backdate their stock option grants so that a past date on which the stock price was particularly low is picked to be the grant date. Using cases now settled concerning a group of firms that were caught backdating, this paper aims to examine further whether backdating firms have higher levels of operating efficiency and corporate governance, lower levels of bankruptcy risk, more ability to increase shareholder wealth, and lower levels of market price risk. This paper also compares the characteristics of backdating firms during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and post-SOX periods.

This sample of backdater firms comprises those caught backdating who have settled their cases, according to data provided by Risk Metrics Group, a non-profit organization that keeps track of most securities class actions. A matched sample of 28 non-backdating, comparison-group firms was constructed to perform univariate and multivariate comparisons.

This study found that backdating firms on average have a higher price risk than non-backdating firms, and that increasing the percentage of shares owned by the major shareholders reduces the possibility of management conducting backdating activities.

No previous studies have used a sample of real backdating culprits. Previous studies have usually used likely backdating traits to identify a group of suspected backdaters. In contrast, the current study, by using a group of firms whose deliberate backdating behavior had led to lawsuits that have been settled in court, investigated the characteristics of known backdaters.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of two recent decisions in Ryan v. Gifford and In Re Tyson Foods, Inc. concerning stock options backdating, “spring‐loading,” and “bullet‐dodging.”

The paper summarizes the facts of the two cases, defines spring‐loading and bullet‐dodging, and explains how the court held in both cases that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged demand futility, that directors of the two corporations had shown bad faith and breached their duty of loyalty, and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment took precedence over the statute of limitations.

The paper finds that backdating of options is so egregious that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment and there is a substantial likelihood of director liability. A director who intentionally uses inside knowledge not available to shareholders in order to enrich employees while avoiding shareholder‐imposed requirements cannot be said to be acting loyally and in good faith as a fiduciary. The best practice for companies is only to grant options that are in strict compliance with their shareholder‐approved option plans as well as applicable accounting, tax, and disclosure rules, and on either fixed‐in‐advance dates or when the companies' insiders would be free to trade.

The paper provides a thorough explanation of two of the most important court decisions to date on stock options backdating, spring‐loading, and bullet‐dodging.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of the business rates retention scheme (BRRS) in England which transferred financial liability for backdated appeals to LAs. Under the original scheme, business rates revenue, mandatory relief and liability for successful appeals is spilt 50/50 between central government and local government which both share the rewards of growth and bear the risk of losses.

The research adopts a microanalysis approach into researching local government finance, conducting a case study of Leeds, to investigate the impact of appeals liability and reveal disparities in impact, through detailed examination of multiple perspectives in one of the largest cities in the UK.

The case study reveals that Leeds, despite having a buoyant commercial economy driven by retail and service sector growth, has been detrimentally impacted by BRRS as backdated appeals have outweighed uplift in business rates income. Fundamentally BRRS is not a “one size fits all” model – it results in winners and losers – which will be exacerbated if local authorities get to keep 100 per cent of their business rates from 2020.

LAs’ income is more volatile as a consequence of both the rates retention and appeals liability aspects of BRRS and will become more so with the move to 100 per cent retention and liability.

Such volatility impairs the ability of local authorities to invest in growth at the same time as providing front line services over the medium term – precisely the opposite of what BRRS was intended to do. It also incentivises the construction of new floorspace, which generates risks overbuilding and exacerbating over-supply.

The research reveals the significant impact of appeals liability on LAs’ business rates revenues which will be compounded with the move to a fiscally neutral business rates system and 100 per cent business rates retention by 2020.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and testing the impact, if any, of such compliance on mitigating of stock option fraud incentives.

A logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of board of directors, audit committee, ownership structure and other firm characteristics on the likelihood of stock option fraud. The analysis is based on the data for stock option grants obtained during the period from 2006 to 2009.

The results suggest that the rate of compliance with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance in Egyptian public‐held companies is low. Weak corporate governance allows executives to exercise greater influence over the board of directors and audit committee decisions. Furthermore, a low level of disclosure, duality of CEO, high percentage of insiders in board of directors, auditor turnover, and management ownership are among the factors that increase the likelihood of stock option fraud in the Egyptian setting.

The results are constrained by the proxies used to define stock option fraud. Additionally, the limited number of companies with stock option grants in Egypt might affect the results.

This paper provides insights into exposing stock option fraud by Egyptian public‐held companies and sheds light on the effective role of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. This would help policy setters to enhance compliance with the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and develop a comprehensive Shari'ah model of corporate governance that reduces stock option fraud.

Many corporate managers, with the aid of the board of directors, discovered that they could provide themselves with guaranteed or excessive compensation by manipulating the terms of stock option grants that were included in their compensation packages. This paper seeks to examine the legal, tax, and accounting issues that have evolved because of these suspect illegal activities.

The author presents the theory behind performance‐based compensation that is the basis for employee stock option grants. The author then examines regulations, judicial theory, and court cases to determine the current legal status of backdating, spring loading, or bullet dodging of executive stock option grants.

The current legal environment has made it difficult for executives to continue the practice of manipulating stock option grants without falling under the ire of regulators and shareholders. However, a question remains whether executives that manipulated stock option grants in the past will be found criminally liable for their acts.

The paper's review of the discourse on the legality of corporate executives enhancing their compensation packages shows the complexity of detecting and regulating this type of suspect activity.

This paper presents a contemporaneous discussion and data on legal and regulatory changes that resulted from management malfeasance of executive compensation.

This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.

Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.

The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.

These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.

This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.