Emphasizes the need for coherence between the reward structure andthe organizational culture of effective schools. Provides a frameworkfor discussion which includes a…
Emphasizes the need for coherence between the reward structure and the organizational culture of effective schools. Provides a framework for discussion which includes a typology of rewards, including pecuniary, non‐pecuniary extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Analyses several pay‐for‐performance strategies, classified by permanency of increases (merit or incentive) and mode of distribution (individual or group). Explores the perceived advantages and disadvantages of various merit and incentive plans in support of effective schools. Suggests that more attention to a closer fit between compensation strategies, organizational strategies, and workforce behaviours is required to increase the positive effects of reward structures.
Ranked preference data arise when a set of judges rank, in order of their preference, a set of objects. Such data arise in preferential voting systems and market research…
Ranked preference data arise when a set of judges rank, in order of their preference, a set of objects. Such data arise in preferential voting systems and market research surveys. Covariate data associated with the judges are also often recorded. Such covariate data should be used in conjunction with preference data when drawing inferences about judges.
To cluster a population of judges, the population is modeled as a collection of homogeneous groups. The Plackett-Luce model for ranked data is employed to model a judge's ranked preferences within a group. A mixture of Plackett- Luce models is employed to model the population of judges, where each component in the mixture represents a group of judges.
Mixture of experts models provide a framework in which covariates are included in mixture models. Covariates are included through the mixing proportions and the component density parameters. A mixture of experts model for ranked preference data is developed by combining a mixture of experts model and a mixture of Plackett-Luce models. Particular attention is given to the manner in which covariates enter the model. The mixing proportions and group specific parameters are potentially dependent on covariates. Model selection procedures are employed to choose optimal models.
Model parameters are estimated via the ‘EMM algorithm’, a hybrid of the expectation–maximization and the minorization–maximization algorithms. Examples are provided through a menu survey and through Irish election data. Results indicate mixture modeling using covariates is insightful when examining a population of judges who express preferences.
A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).
The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.
Educational researchers have long been concerned with role stress among teachers. In education, research on the consequences of such role stress for teachers has largely…
Educational researchers have long been concerned with role stress among teachers. In education, research on the consequences of such role stress for teachers has largely concerned outcomes valued by individuals such as job satisfaction and reduced stress. Less research has focused on examining the effects of role stress on outcomes valued by the organization, such as employee commitment and employee retention. In examining the role stress‐outcome relationship, research suggests the importance of taking into consideration the work orientations of individuals as possible moderators of the role stress‐outcome relationship. Using a sample of elementary and secondary teachers, this study empirically examined, first whether three role stresses – role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload – are related to two individually and two organizationally valued states and second, whether teachers’ higher‐order need strength moderates these role stress‐outcome relationships. The study found that role stresses relate to individually‐ and organizationally‐valued outcomes among both elementary and secondary teachers.
The study reported on in this article examines how instructional leadership is exercised by superintendents in effective school districts. We employ concepts drawn from…
The study reported on in this article examines how instructional leadership is exercised by superintendents in effective school districts. We employ concepts drawn from school effectiveness studies and from organizational literature on coordination and control in an attempt to understand how superintendents organize and manage instruction and curriculum in these effective districts. Specific instructional management practices are examined within a framework of six major functions, setting goals and establishing expectations and standards, selecting staff, supervising and evaluating staff, establishing an instructional and curricular focus, ensuring consistency in technical core operations, and monitoring curriculum and instruction. Based on interviews with superintendents from 12 of the most instructionally effective school districts in California and analysis of selected district documents, we present descriptions of district‐level policies and practices that these superintendents use to coordinate and control the instructional management activities of their principals. Similarities and differences in the patterns of control and coordination found in these districts are highlighted. The implications of the findings are then examined in light of recent findings regarding coupling and linkages in schools. The results of this study suggest that superintendents in instructionally effective school districts are more active “instructional managers” than previous descriptions of superintendents would have led us to expect. In particular, coordination and control of the technical core appears more systematic in these districts. The results do not, however, provide a uniform picture of how instruction is coordinated and controlled. A wide range of both culture building activities and bureaucratic policies and practices were emphasized by the superintendents in this study as they exercised their instructional leadership roles.