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The epithet “Austrian” in “Austrian economics” is applied to the work of economists as far apart in time as Carl Menger, whose Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre (Principles of Political Economy) first appeared in 1871, and Ludwig Lachmann, Israel Kirzner and Murray Rothbard, writing a century or more later. It would be vain to attempt to define Austrian economics by a set of beliefs, commonly held by its adherents. There is much to be said for following Zuidema (1987), who prefers to speak of “styles” rather than “schools”. This implies that there need be no clear‐cut dividing lines between Austrians and the rest of the economics fraternity and that not all those dubbed “Austrian” are necessarily “typically” Austrian all of the time. There certainly seems to be a style of reasoning that can be seen as specifically Austrian. Some of the components of a “style” mentioned by Zuidema are:

Emil Sax was an Austrian economist both in origin and theoretical background. He is often cited as one of the founders of modern theoretical public economics. An extensive account of his main ideas is given, along with some of the problems left unresolved in his theory.

This article does not pretend to represent an exhaustive survey of all the differences and similarities existing between Joseph Schumpeter and his fellow Austrians. To have carried out such a task would have required a detailed knowledge of the literature which was beyond that of the present writer. Instead, what is offered here is a particular interpretation of the major characteristics of Austrian economics, the relationship of Schumpeter to these, together with some fragmentary evidence in support of the views expressed. The article begins with a brief resumé of the leading personalities of the Austrian School of Economics. In the second section the suggestion that Schumpeter was not a true member of the Austrian School is examined. It is shown that the minor differences which did exist between Schumpeter and his colleagues on technical questions are more than outweighed by agreement on the substantive issues of their economic analysis. The third section deals with the attitudes of the Austrian School to questions of method while the remaining sections deal with the classical tradition in the theory of economic growth.

Menger′s Grundsätze is explored; the Aristotelian background of the discourse is probed, as is the problematic image of Menger sketched in the secondary literature as soon as it is confronted with this Aristotelanism and with the subjective value theory and the motif of time, error and uncertainty. The conflicting elements of this picture are pieced together.

This purpose of this paper is to introduce property researchers to the principles of Austrian economics and to consider their methodological relevance and potential for understanding the dynamics of property market processes.

This paper sets out the basic principles of the Austrian economics thesis, including an outline of the entrepreneurial discovery approach to market processes, a core precept of the Austrian thesis. It then relates the core assumptions of the Austrian school to the workings of the property market.

It is argued that the driving force of property market process is provided by the entrepreneurial and profit-seeking speculative activities of human agents as they are confronted with incomplete information in an uncertain property market context. Thus, Austrian economics offers a sound and practical alternative theoretical approach to the study of property market, which places the market within its socio-economic context.

In-depth examination of the provisions, assumptions, philosophical orientation and limitations of the Austrian tradition of economic thought toward a better understanding of the workings of the property market.

Austrian views on money and the gold standard are consonant with the general characteristics of the school. First, Austrians are concerned with the complete picture, with how a whole economic system and alternative sets of institutions function. They are alert to the question of unplanned order and of how the decentralised decisions and specialised activities of millions of people can mesh without central planning. They investigate how the market and prices function as a vast communications system and computer, transmitting information and incentives and so enlisting knowledge scattered over many millions of minds that would otherwise necessarily go to waste. They recognise why accurate economic calculation is impossible under socialism. Second, the Austrians appreciate the implications of incomplete, imperfect and scattered knowledge and also the implications of change and unpredictability in human affairs. They pay attention to disequilibrium, to processes as well as end positions, and to entrepreneurial altertness and creativity. Instead of supposing, for example, that cost curves and demand curves are somehow “given” to business decision makers, they recognise it as one of the functions of the competitive process to press for discovery of ways to get the cost curves down — if one speaks of such curves at all. Third, Austrians have certain methodological predilections. They reject the tacit view of economic activity as the result of interplay among objective conditions and impersonal forces. They take pains to trace their analyses back to the subjective perceptions, decisions and actions of individuals trying to cope with a complex and unpredictably changeable world; they recognise introspection as one legitimate source of the facts underpinning economic theory. (While thus practising methodological individualism, they do not subordinate the big question of system‐wide co‐ordination to an excessively narrow focus on the administration of individual firms and households.) Finally, although Austrians like to think of their economics as value‐free and not logically tied to any particular policy position, their insights into positive economics, coupled with plausible value judgements of a humanitarian and individualistic nature, undeniably do lead them to favour free markets.

Austrians are essentialists, one of their questions being what makes a thing good? Menger and Böhm‐Bawerk gave different answers to this question. Böhm‐Bawerk directed attention explicitly to the condition of knowing how to utilise a thing. Both Menger and Böhm‐Bawerk played down their difference. The goods characteristic added by Böhm‐Bawerk to the four characteristics formulated earlier by Menger is stressed to be of value to a better understanding of modern Austrianism. A paradox that arises (the consumer is sovereign in theory but not in practice) is solved.

This paper illustrates how two contemporary economic traditions - New Institutional and Austrian economics - may be used to add insight into the organization and governance of public sector investment programs. When combined, these frameworks offer a theoretical foundation that may be used for purposes of assessing relative levels of agency and transactions costs within different institutional settings. The insights provided suggest that one option for reducing these costs is to “outsource” the public sector investment function. The theories explored in the paper are not panacea for dealing with agency and transaction costs, but they do draw attention to key institutional characteristics that influence their size.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify definitions in economics.

To apply the insights of Austrian economics to terms widely used in the profession.

The authors find that the Austrian approach brings clarification to communication.

The authors know of no other such attempt. Therefore this paper presumably has some originality.

After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms focussing on property structures in the economy. This raised the issue of governance in the institutions that would constitute the structures in which production would have to take place. In particular, some Central European countries opted for mass privatisations of the means of production, on the face of it so as to have the people participate in the wealth of the nation. In fact, the wealth of the nation depends on the structures in which it is constituted. Dissipation of property rights will reduce the value of the nation's productive capital, whereas an intelligent structure that creates good governance structures at the same time, increases the value of the producing capital. This relatively simple insight lies at the heart of our understanding of how to analyse different processes of mass privatisation. This essay develops a theoretical framework by which different governance structures can be analysed. The framework consists of a blend of the economic theory of property rights, new institutional economics and Austrian economic theory.