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Internal auditors should consider the risks pertinent to an auditee when planning the work. Internal auditors may select a procedures‐driven approach or a risk‐driven approach. In a procedures‐driven approach, the audit procedures are chosen without full consideration of the risks present. Rather, the internal auditor may use procedures because they are commonly employed or because they were used on the last examination of the auditee. In a risk‐driven approach, specific procedures are planned only after consideration of the risks. A risk‐driven approach is generally more effective and efficient than a procedures‐driven approach because the internal auditor′s efforts are focused on areas with relatively more risk.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how auditors’ pricing decisions are affected by their clients’ offshore trading activities, which are comprehensively measured through a textual analysis technique.

The authors identified a sample of 32,264 firm-year observations from publicly listed firms in the US during 2004 to 2015. The authors then used multivariate regressions to examine the effect of offshore trading activities on audit fees. In the regression models, the authors also control for a series of factors that are documented to influence audit pricing.

The authors find that offshore trading activities are positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that offshore activities are likely to increase a client firm’s business risk and/or the extent of client complexity. The authors also find that auditors charge higher audit fees only to firms purchasing inputs produced by their own assets overseas but not to firms buying inputs produced by local firms overseas. Moreover, the association between offshore trading activities and audit fees is more pronounced for offshore activities that are in countries with high trading centrality, for Big 4 auditors, or for auditors with industry expertise.

This paper extends the literature on the consequences of offshore activities by providing evidence on how auditors react to offshore activities. Moreover, it contributes to the audit fee literature. Prior studies largely focus on client-level determinants, while this study complements this line of literature by identifying firm’s offshore activities as an important risk indicator, which is perceived by auditors in their pricing decisions. A firm’s offshore activity is unique because the risk implication of the offshore activities depends not only on factors within the firm, but also on factors outside the firm in foreign nations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how audit fees change in responding to the financial crisis of 2008. It also examines auditors’ perceived risk and how they priced the risk in the financial crisis.

Using a sample of 20,930 firm-year observations, this paper examines the change of audit fees before, during and after the financial crisis, as well as the relationship between audit fees and restatements. Furthermore, this study investigates whether this relationship between audit fees and restatements strengthened during the financial crisis.

The paper finds that audit fees increase as a result of the macro-systemic risks from the crisis. It also finds that there is a significantly positive relationship between audit fees and restatements, which is a proxy of risk factors related to poor financial reporting quality and poor audit quality. However, the results show that there is no significant change of the fees–restatements relationship in the financial crisis period.

The main limitation of this study is that no definite answer can be provided for the question that whether auditors believe that poor audit quality and audit failures are leading up to the financial crisis. The test rejects the alternative hypothesis. However, it does not necessarily prove the null hypothesis is true.

This paper contributes to the current literature by analyzing not only the impact of the financial crisis on audit fees, but also how the accounting profession views its own role in the financial crisis.

Product market competition may have various impacts on audit fees. On the one hand, according to the agency theory, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between management and shareholders. For clients with higher product market competition, auditors will lower the level of engagement risk assessment and reduce the required level of audit evidence, and hence audit fees will be lower. On the other hand, according to the audit risk model, product market competition will increase client business risk and audit engagement risk. Moreover, for clients with competition advantage, client business risk and audit engagement risk will be lower, and hence a lower audit fee. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

In this paper, the authors collect financial accounting data and audit fee data from CSMAR database. Our sample selection starts with all available observations on the Chinese listed companies during 2006–2011. Since there is a big difference in accounting practices between financial companies and other industries, the authors delete observations on financial companies. The authors further remove observations with missing data, yielding 6,709 observations for the final analysis. To define the industry, the authors use the first two digits of standard industry classification code set by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In order to reduce the effect of extreme observations, the authors also truncate the data at 1 and 99 percent. The authors use the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) and the natural logarithm of the number of listed companies within the industry to measure product market competition intensity. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of revenues of the client firm among the total revenues of all public companies, i.e. HHI = ∑ i = 1 N ( s i / S ) 2 . N is the number of listed companies in the industry, S_i is the revenues for an individual firm and S is the total revenues of all public companies within the same industry. A higher HHI score indicates fewer companies dominate the industry and hence lower intensity of competition in the product market. The second measure of industry competition intensity is LNN, the natural logarithm of the total number of public companies in the same industry of a client firm. A larger value of LNN indicates a larger number of competitors in the industry, and a higher level of competition intensity. Following the literature (Kale and Loon, 2011), the authors use Lerner index (or price-cost margin (PCM)) to measure the listed company’s competitive advantage. It is actually a measure of a firm’s power to influence product prices in the industry. The authors adopt the Peress (2010) method to estimate Lerner index as net operating income, divided by sales, i.e. PCM=(Sales–COGS–Selling expenses–Administrative expenses)/Sales. A higher value of PCM indicates more product pricing power and a higher competitive advantage of a company. The authors also use Lerner index ranking (R_PCM) to measure the competitive advantage of a company in the industry. The authors sort PCM values in ascending order in each industry and divide into ten groups. Then, the authors assign a value from one to ten to each listed company within each group in each industry. A higher R_PCM value represents higher market power and higher competitive advantage of a company. Based on Simunic (1980) framework, the authors develop the following model to test the relationship between product market competition, competition advantage and audit fees: LNAF_it=β₀+β₁ PMC_it+β₂ SIZE_it+β₃ INV_it+β₄ REC_it+β₅ GROWTH_it+β₆ PRELOSS_it+β₇ LEV_it+β₈ QUICK_it+β₉ OPIN_it+β₁₀ IBIG4_it+β₁₁ DBIG10_it+β₁₂ SWITCH_it+β₁₃ LOCATE_it+β₁₄ STATE_it+∑β YearDummies+ε_it.

Using a sample of 6,709 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2007–2011, the authors find that the product market competition intensity has a negative impact on audit fees, which means that agency cost effect is dominant in audit pricing at industry level. In addition, a company’s competitive advantage in the industry has a significant and negative impact on audit fees, which means that business risk effect also plays a critical role in audit pricing of individual engagement. The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.

The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the effect of corporate governance variables and fraud litigation on audit fees both before and after the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002.

The paper utilizes a sample of firms that had litigation proceedings filed against them for fraudulent financial reporting, and compare these firms to a sample of non‐fraud firms in the pre‐and post‐SOX period. First, the authors examine indicators of audit fees using the Simunic model. Next, the authors develop a logistic regression model with corporate governance variables and other financial control variables in order to identify the characteristics of firms that are accused of fraud in the pre‐and post‐SOX period.

The paper identifies specific components of corporate governance that are positively related to audit fees and which subsequently aid in classifying companies subject to fraud litigation. The most successful logistic regression model for 2005 (post‐SOX) is 64.4 per cent accurate in distinguishing firms litigated for fraud, while the most successful model for 2001 (pre‐SOX) is 61.4 per cent accurate in distinguishing such firms.

The research design and findings assist in providing additional evidence about the association between the effectiveness of the corporate governance structure and the external auditor in assessing the risk of fraud.

One of the major components of an audit plan is risk assessment. Risk factors vary among organizations, and internal auditors must review their own organizational cultures to determine audit exposure. In order to minimize the risk, the internal audit department must develop an audit plan that ensures a maximum coverage of the areas to be audited. Presents the second phase of a study which aims to identify the relevant risk factors and rank the relevant auditable activities in terms of their riskiness. Develops a mathematical model that will ensure maximum audit coverage, using data from a local hospital. Suggests that the results of this research offer a practical alternative for audit managers.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the implementation of risk management as a tool for internal audit activities, focusing on unexpected effects or uncertainties generated during its application.

Public and confidential documents as well as semi-structured interviews are analysed through the lens of actor-network theory to identify the effects of risk management devices in a Finnish municipality.

The authors found that risk management, rather than reducing uncertainty, itself created unexpected uncertainties that would otherwise not have emerged. These include uncertainties relating to legal aspects of risk management solutions, in particular the issue concerning which types of document are considered legally valid; uncertainties relating to the definition and operationalisation of risk management; and uncertainties relating to the resources available for expanding risk management. More generally, such uncertainties relate to the professional identities and responsibilities of operational managers as defined by the framing devices.

The paper offers three contributions to the extant literature: first, it shows how risk management itself produces uncertainties. Secondly, it shows how internal auditors can assume a central role in the risk management system. Thirdly, it develops Callon's framing/overflowing framework with the notion that multiple frames are linked and create unexpected dynamics, and applies it to the study on the effects of risk management tools in an internal audit context. It shows how, despite recurring attempts to refine risk management, further uncertainties are continuously produced, thus providing an empirical illustration of how reframing and overflowing intertwine in a continual process.

This study aims to investigate whether accounting-related litigation is associated with a break in the client’s earnings string and the auditor’s response to a break in the earnings string.

The authors use regression models on a sample of publicly-traded USA companies with earnings strings.

The authors find that clients’ earnings string breaks are associated with increased accounting litigation risk and audit fees. The results are more prevalent for larger breaks.

The findings suggest auditors anticipate string breaks by clients which implies that audit fee research should consider earnings string characteristics in the fee models.

The auditor’s access to private information allows them to anticipate string breaks and potential increase in litigation risk.

An earnings string break represents a convergence of concerns highly relevant to the auditor: more users relying on the financial statements with greater expectations, increased likelihood of losses to those users, an environment where the likelihood of misstatement may increase, and explicitly stated professional responsibilities in response to the latter. Despite that, and a rich earnings string literature, prior studies have not directly examined auditors’ response to a client’s string break.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of voluntary non-financial reporting on the evaluation of audit risk from the auditors’ viewpoint in a post-crisis period. Furthermore, this paper analyses whether auditors perceive that voluntary non-financial reporting impacts audit risk differently for old clients as compared with new clients.

This study is conducted on a sample of Italian audit firms through a paper-based questionnaire. Both Big4 and non-Big4 audit firms have been included in the sample.

Results show that integrated reporting is perceived to be the most relevant reporting method and intellectual capital statement the least relevant. Surprisingly, empirical findings over the sample period show that auditors do not perceive statistically significant differences between old and new clients.

Auditors can identify opportunities to adapt their assessment model to include voluntary non-financial report information. Moreover, they can use different assessment models regarding the research variables in the case of new and old clients.

Empirical findings highlight the growing role of voluntary non-financial reporting in the auditors’ perception of their client’s audit risk. All the observed voluntary non-financial reporting forms, except for intellectual capital, are considered as relevant by auditors in the evaluation of their client’s audit risk when compared to an indifference point. In addition, findings reveal that female auditors perceive a reduced gap in the relevance between integrated reports and intellectual capital reports compared to their counterparts.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of capital market liberalization on audit reporting and pricing. The authors use the announcement of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program in China as a shock to capital market liberalization.

The authors use the difference-in-differences method to study the difference in changes in the frequency of modified audit opinions and audit fees between the treatment group and the control group.

This study finds that capital market liberalization increases reputational and litigation risks for auditors and leads to more conservative audit reports. In addition, capital market liberalization stimulates the management of eligible firms to improve the information environment, helps to reduce information asymmetry and decreases audit fees. Specifically, the authors identify the channels of active foreign institutional investors as a new governance mechanism through which capital market liberalization impacts eligible firm and auditor decisions.

This study complements the literature by showing that capital market liberalization may bring a new and strong governance mechanism for eligible firms and auditors.

This study may provide new references for active foreign institutional shareholders as a new and strong governance mechanism in weak institutional regimes such as China, auditors’ optimization decisions when litigation risks increase and management’s improvements in the information environment under the monitoring of foreign institutional shareholders.

Overall, this study contributes to the literature by showing that capital market liberalization can bring a new governance mechanism for the management of eligible firms and auditors in a weak institutional environment. Foreign institutional shareholders may be superior to the domestic market forces and other corporate governance in the role of monitoring the management of eligible firms and auditors.