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Regulators treat all non-audit services the same by using a broad-brush approach which is reflected in the study of total non-audit fees in the same analyses or different non-audit fees in isolation by prior studies. To know whether the non-audit services have different effects and hence, should be regulated separately, this paper compares their effects on audit report lag and examines whether they follow the implied hierarchy of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The effects of audit-related non-audit fees, tax fees and other non-audit fees are compared in an audit report lag model to determine whether they are the same statistically. Supporting tests for audit quality use discretionary accruals and the reporting of a small profit or small positive change in profit.

This paper finds that different non-audit fees do not have the same effects on report lag and partial support for the implied hierarchy of the Commission. Specifically, for large accelerated filers, audit-related fees and tax fees have the same negative effects on report lag but other non-audit fees are unrelated to report lag. Tests of audit quality suggest that auditors do not compromise audit quality.

Different non-audit services are unique in their spillover effects and deserve individual attention. Audit practitioners could be more comfortable in providing audit-related non-audit or tax services for audit clients since these services could facilitate audit work without compromising independence. On the other hand, they should be cautious about the provision of other non-audit services because the services do not enhance the efficiency of audit work and without such a benefit to audit clients, the provision may create issues of perceived independence.

Insight is limited by the types of disclosure of non-audit fees available and the lack of internal measures of audit efficiency.

The results provide deeper insight into the knowledge spillover theory and prior studies which implicitly assume all non-audit services having the same effect. The results suggest that the services should be regulated each on its own but not in a bundle. Last, this paper provides the first evidence that audit-related non-audit fees reduce report lag.

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of audit report lag and its association with governance mechanisms in the Islamic banking institutions in Malaysia.

The extent of audit report lag is defined by the number of days from a company’s financial year-end to the signature date on its audit report. The sample of the study comprises 112 observations of Islamic banking institutions’ financial reports for the period 2008-2014. A balanced panel data analysis is performed to analyse the association between the extent of audit report lag and governance mechanisms.

The findings show that the extent of audit report lag for the sample selected ranges from a minimum period of 7 days to a maximum period of 161 days, and the extent of audit report lag is approximately two months on average. A fixed effects analysis indicates that audit committee expertise and audit committee meeting have significant association with the extent of audit report lag. On the other hand, board independence, audit committee size and Shari’ah board expertise have insignificant association with the extent of audit report lag. In addition, one control variable (Islamic bank size) is found to be significantly associated with longer audit report lag.

The findings provide useful feedback for Malaysian policymakers on the past and current practices of financial reports and of governance mechanisms. The findings of the study would help the policymakers in monitoring the Islamic banking institutions’ compliance with financial reports submission requirements. The policymakers perhaps could relook into governance mechanisms that reduce the extent of audit report lag in the Islamic banking institutions and implement regulations to strengthen them.

Unlike the majority of prior studies that investigated the association between the extent of audit report lag and governance mechanisms, this study provides two contributions. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first piece of research that examined the association between governance mechanisms and the extent of audit report lag in Islamic banking institutions. Second, the study examined the association of new governance variable, namely, Shari’ah committee expertise which has not been previously examined in the literature of audit report lag.

This study aims to examine the effect on audit efficiency of outsourced internal audit function (IAF) providers with industry and/or firm-specific expertise. Drawing on relevant studies from external and internal audit literature, the authors assume that such IAF providers are associated with greater audit efficiency as proxied by audit report lag and audit fees.

Based on a sample of firms listed on the Omani capital market during 2005–2019, the pooled regressions are used to test the developed hypotheses. The authors use the market share approach to identify outsourced IAF industry expertise providers and tenure to measure the firm-specific expertise of outsourced IAF providers.

The authors find that industry outsourced IAF providers are not associated with shorter audit report lag and lower audit fees. The authors also find that firm-specific expertise outsourced IAF providers are associated with a greater reduction in audit report lag and audit fees. These conclusions are robust under a battery of analyses. The significant contribution of firm-specific expertise outsourced IAF providers to audit efficiency is incremental when abnormal audit report lag and audit fees analysis is conducted.

The results are the first to attest to the contribution of outsourced IAF with firm-specific expertise. They also show that industry expertise held by outsourced IAF providers does not contribute to audit efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate selected corporate governance attributes and financial reporting lag and their impact on financial performance of listed firms in Ghana.

The study uses 90 firm-year data for the period 2012–2014 for firms listed on the GSE. Each annual report was individually examined and coded to obtain the financial reporting lag. Descriptive analysis was performed to provide the background statistics of the variables examined. This was followed by regression analysis, which forms the main data analysis.

The descriptive statistics indicate that over the three years, the mean value of timeliness of financial reporting (ARL) is 86 days (SD 21 days), minimum is 55 days and maximum is 173 days. The regression analysis results indicate that financial reporting lag has a negative statistically significant relationship with firm performance. This negative sign indicates that when financial performances of companies are high (good news), companies have the tendency to disclose this situation early to the public.

Firms that are not timely in the financial reporting practices will find it difficult to attract capital as the delay will affect their reputation.

This study is one of the few to measure financial reporting lag and its impact on firm financial performance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the characteristics of a CEO, that is, tenure and financial expertise, could affect the timeliness of an audit report.

Research data gathered from listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the four-year period 2013-2016.

The results obtained from model fittings indicated that there is only a negative and significant relationship between CEO financial expertise and natural logarithm of audit report lag and no significant relationship observed between the former and two other indices of timely audit report. Moreover, no significant relationship was found between the CEO tenure and other three indices of timely audit report.

This paper is the first study, which developed the literature of timely audit report using CEO tenure effect and financial expertise tests for timely audit reports in Iran.

In this study the authors examine the nature and contents of key audit matters (KAMs), and the consequences of KAMs reporting on audit quality in the context of a developing country, Bangladesh. The authors’ proxies of audit qualities are discretionary accruals, small positive earnings surprise, audit report lag, earnings management via below the line items and audit fees.

The authors use content analysis of the KAMs for the period 2018–2021 to understand the nature and extent of KAMs reported by auditors in Bangladesh. The authors then use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of the number and content characteristics of KAMs on audit quality by using multivariate regression analysis.

Auditors in Bangladesh disclose a higher number of KAMs compared to other countries, disclose short descriptions of KAMs and industry generic KAMs. The authors document significant cross-sectional variations in the number and content characteristics of KAMs reported by auditors in Bangladesh. The authors’ pre-post analysis suggest that audit quality has improved after the adoption of KAMs. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that KAMs number and content characteristics are related to audit quality.

The authors’ findings imply that the KAMs reporting has the potential to play significant monitoring role in reducing the opportunistic behavior of managers. Hence, KAMs reporting can play a significant role in reducing the agency problem. For regulators, shareholders and corporate managers, the authors’ findings imply that if the audit quality is to be increased, the audit effort should be supported by an appropriate amount of audit fee.

The content characteristics of KAMs significantly influence managerial reporting behavior and affect the level of audit efforts.

Unlike developed countries (Gutierrez et al., 2018; Lennox et al. 2022), this study supports that KAMs reporting improves audit quality and control opportunistic behavior of managers in developing countries. The authors show that even though the KAMs disclosure quality is poor, it has the potential to improve financial reporting quality.

This study aims to investigate the effect of national culture (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation) on audit report lag.

The authors use two econometric approaches (ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression) using STATA software for a sample of 1,208 firm-year observations over the period of 2017–2018.

Using Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation), the authors find that masculinity and long-term orientation are positively associated with audit report lag, while uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with the same variable. Quantile regressions suggest that the adverse effect of masculinity on audit report lag is more prevailing for companies communicating companies' annual reports in a timely manner. Furthermore, the positive association between power distance and audit report lag exists only under tardy disclosure regime. Quantile regressions also confirm that the negative (positive) effect of uncertainty avoidance (long-term orientation) on audit report lag is maintained under different timely disclosure regime. Additional analysis conducted with respect to legal system shows that individualism becomes a significant predictor of audit delays with a significant negative effect for common law countries, while uncertainty avoidance has a positive effect on the same variable in civil law countries characterized by high level of discretion and secrecy.

The results of this study suggest that national culture as an informal institution may complement formal institutions (e.g. financial markets) in promoting timely disclosure. For instance, foreign investors may view high uncertainty avoidance scores, in common law emerging economies, as an indicator of transparency and timely disclosure.

This study adds to the extant literature a further understanding of the impact of cultural dimensions on timely disclosure, as proxied by, audit report lag. The use of quantile regression approach shows how different timely disclosure regime may affect the association between masculinity, power distance and audit report lag.

Recent studies regarding auditor experience generally focus on auditor overall experience in accounting, auditing, finance and related fields (Hardies et al., 2014), auditor sector and domain experience (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Hammersley, 2006), auditor experience as CPA (Ye et al., 2014; Sonu et al., 2016) or big N experience (Chi and Huang, 2005; Gul et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2016) or auditors’ international working experience (Chen et al., 2017). But there is little attention paid to where auditors obtained their experience from? And how do auditors with government experience affect audit quality (AQ)? This paper aims to present the effect of auditors with government experience on AQ.

The authors used Turkish publicly traded firms in Borsa Istanbul between the year 2008 and 2015 to test the hypothesis. The sample comprises 1,067 observations and eight years. Two main proxies of government experience are used in this paper. The first proxy is auditor’s government experience in the past. The second proxy is the continuous variable which is “the logarithmic value of the number of years of government experience”. Further, auditor overall experience in auditing, accounting, finance and other related fields are also used as a control variable. Audit reporting aggressiveness, audit reporting lag and discretionary accruals are used as proxies of AQ. Besides this, the authors adopted the model to estimate the probability of selecting a government-experienced auditor, and they presented the regression results with the addition of inverse Mills ratio.

The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors.

This study has some limitations. The authors used a small sample to test the impact of government-experienced auditors on AQ because of data access problems. Much data used in this study were collected manually. Earnings quality was calculated using only discretionary accruals. Real activities manipulation was not used as the proxy of AQ in this paper. The findings from emerging markets might not generalize to the developed countries because the Turkish audit market is developing compared to Continental Europe or USA.

The findings are considered for independent audit firms. Audit firms may employ new graduates and train them to offer more qualified audit work for their clients. The results do not mean that government-experienced auditors should not work in an audit firm, or that they should not establish an audit firm. It is clear that government-experienced auditors provide low AQ in terms of audit reporting aggressiveness, audit report lag and discretionary accruals. But as they operate more in the independent audit sector, they will become successful and provide qualified audit work. One other thing we can say is that it is perhaps better for government-experienced auditors to work in the tax department of independent audit firms.

This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature regarding the effect of auditor experience on AQ and concentrates on a different type of experience: Auditors with government experience.

This study investigates the association between interim audits and final audits. The authors focus on whether interim audits affect the audit time lag and the risk of restatement associated with final audits.

Two regression models are established to empirically test if an interim audit helps to reduce the audit time lag and the restatement risk on annual reports based on a sample of Chinese listed firms.

The authors find that performing interim audits helps to reduce the audit time lag. This result suggests that final audits can be completed more efficiently when interim audits are performed during the same period. The authors also find that the decision to audit interim reports is associated with a lower risk of restating annual reports. The lower risk of restatement in turn suggests more effective final audit results.

Together, the results from this study demonstrate that interim audits could benefit final audits, which highlight the value and importance of the continuous auditing.

Companies may be defendants in lawsuits that are unresolved at year-end. This paper aims to consider whether the financial statements of companies facing litigation claims (pending litigation) are more time-consuming to audit due to the complexity and subjectivity of contingent liabilities associated with pending litigation. The authors consider whether auditors tailor their approach to pending litigation based on two distinct factors in the Chinese business environment: the client’s government ownership status and the legal development of the region in which the company is based.

Data on litigation against companies and their audit report lags were obtained for 18,029 firm-year observations of Chinese companies from 2008 to 2017. The sample was subsequently divided based on whether the company was a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and based on whether the company was based in a region of China with a more-developed and more market-oriented legal system.

The overall results indicate that audits of companies with pending litigation take 2.9 days longer than those of companies without pending litigation. For companies with multiple pending claims, each additional claim is associated with 1.9 more days of audit report lag. These effects are weaker for SOEs and for companies in regions of China with less developed legal systems. The results are consistent with the idea that auditors tailor their response to pending litigation based on the risk profile of the client, including consideration of SOE status and regional legal development.

This paper is the first to consider the potential effect of pending litigation (including claims not disclosed or recognized in financial statements) on audit report lags and how environmental business factors can influence this relationship.