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Audit negotiations are impacted by many factors. This study aims to investigate how two such factors, communication of the National Office Accounting Consultation Unit (ACU) and the auditor’s approach, affect chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) willingness to adjust the financial statements and satisfaction with the auditor.

This study uses a 2 × 3 between-subjects experimental design. Participants are 169 highly experienced CFOs and financial officers. The experimental design crosses the two multi-dimensional auditor approaches found in the literature with two influence tactics used to communicate ACU involvement, as well as a control condition, with no communication of the ACU involvement.

Communicating the ACU’s involvement as a higher authority (similar to a boss) results in greater willingness to record an adjustment to the financial statements when auditors use a hands-off “compliance-officer” auditor approach, but lower willingness by CFOs to adjust the financial statements when auditors use an expert-advisor auditor approach as compared to when coalition tactics are used. Results also show that communicating the ACU as a higher authority negatively impacts a CFO’s satisfaction with the audit partner. Overall, these results highlight the importance of the auditor’s approach and communication of ACU involvement within the auditor–client relationship. The outcomes of this study are limited to situations where unexpected audit adjustments are found during the year-end process and thus cannot be discussed pre-emptively with clients.

This paper advances the understanding of how the multi-dimensional auditor’s approach can shape and limit the effectiveness of influence tactics. These factors are important, as auditors are tasked with maintaining not only quality audits but also client relationships. However, although rich in detail, factors other than auditor approach may have inadvertently been manipulated and are driving results.

The approach taken by the auditor with a client throughout the audit sets the stage during the auditor–client negotiations. Therefore, audit partners must consider their own approach with the client before communicating the ACU’s involvement as the auditor approach shapes and limits the tactics available for use. Using ill-suited tactics may undermine the client’s willingness to record an adjustment to the financial statements and cause undue harm to the auditor–client relationship.

This paper uses highly experienced CFOs and financial officers to examine how two common elements in the audit negotiation context can significantly affect the outcome to the financial statements and the relationship between the client and audit partner.

This study aims to examine the consequences of tax authorities’ use of concession-timing negotiation strategies on tax practitioners and their final proposed offers.

This is an experimental study conducted on tax practitioners using a design of 2 × 1, varying the tax authorities’ negotiation strategy (i.e. concession-gradual and concession-end strategies) across two levels.

The concessionary negotiation strategies adopted by tax authorities influence tax practitioners’ final proposed offers, their perceptions of fairness (i.e. distributive justice and procedural justice) and their aggressiveness of stance in tax audit negotiations.

This experimental study contributes to existing research on tax authority-tax practitioner negotiation models used during tax audits by providing the first evidence that concession timing matters. The study extends the negotiation model to include tax aggressiveness as a new variable and examines the indirect roles of fairness and offers in tax audit negotiations.

This study aims to explore the effect of negotiating audit differences on auditors’ internal control deficiency (ICD) severity assessments, an ensuing, non-negotiated judgment, in an integrated audit.

The experiment manipulates the client’s concession timing strategy as either immediate or gradual, holding the outcome constant. A total of 34 auditors (primarily managers) resolve an audit difference with the client.

The client’s concession timing strategy during the negotiation of an audit difference spills over to affect auditors’ severity assessment of a related ICD. Auditors judged the ICD severity to be higher (lower) in the immediate (gradual) condition. Client retention risk inferences mediate this effect.

The effect on auditors’ ICD severity assessments may not ultimately affect the audit report. Participants did not control their negotiation strategy, allowing the client’s negotiation strategy and the outcome to be held constant; it is possible that interactive effects between the client and auditor’s strategy might affect the study’s implications.

Features of the auditor–client negotiation process may influence auditors’ downstream, post-negotiation judgments and may therefore help to explain empirical evidence and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspection findings that show auditors often fail to identify an internal control material weakness after identifying a financial statement misstatement.

This paper expands current negotiation research by exploring the impact of inferences made based on counterparty concession strategy for downstream, non-negotiated judgments and current integrated audit research by identifying client retention perceptions as a driving factor of lower ICD severity assessments.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how audit partner rotation impacts the negotiation strategies client management intends to use to resolve a financial reporting issue.

An experiment that manipulates between participants on whether the audit partner rotates from the prior fiscal year (rotation versus non-rotation) is conducted to test the theoretical implications of rapport. Participants with a high level of business and managerial experience indicate their intended use of 25 reliable negotiation tactics that client management may use to resolve a financial reporting issue with the external auditor. These tactics underlie three distributive (contending, compromising, conceding) and two integrative (problem solving, expanding the agenda) negotiation strategies.

The results of the study indicate that client management is less contentious and more concessionary (i.e. accommodating) to a newly rotated audit partner, as compared to an audit partner that has established rapport with client management. Further, client management is more willing to intend using integrative and compromising (i.e. co-operative) negotiation strategies when negotiating with an audit partner with established rapport in contrast to a newly rotated audit partner.

These findings underscore the merits and costs of audit partner rotation in auditor-client management (ACM) negotiations and document that partner rotation affects not only auditor behaviour, but also the behaviour of client management.

This paper is the first that considers how developing and maintaining rapport impacts ACM negotiations. The study provides empirical evidence to further inform debates over auditor rotation.

This study aims to review the auditor-client relationship (ACR) literature spanning 1976 to 2019 to provide future research directions.

The study analysed 140 articles from the Web of Science database, authored by 259 scholars across 28 countries and published in 47 journals. It identified three major research streams to understand the ACR dynamics: auditor tenure, ACR attributes and auditor-client negotiation.

Three major findings emerged based on this review. First, few studies examine auditor-client negotiation relative to other streams; thus, it offers scope for further research. Second, given that various fields have used diverse frameworks as theoretical underpinnings in prior studies, continuing this trend can better portray ACR from multiple perspectives. Finally, despite strong international regulations on ACR aspects such as auditor independence, tenure and rotation, implementation in several countries warrants special considerations, specifically on legal enforcement and investor protection, given diverse cultures and country-level institutional environments.

This study contributes to the synthesis of existing and emerging research streams and provides future research suggestions.

This paper aims to report the findings of semi‐structured interviews with management, external auditors and audit committee members in Malaysia concerning the role of the audit committee in resolving auditor‐client disagreements.

An exploratory case study method was applied in seven publicly listed companies in Malaysia. In each company interviews were conducted with an audit committee chair/member, the finance manager/CFO and the external auditor.

The study finds that, when the issue is very material, the audit committee plays a mediating role as a third‐party intermediary who provides assistance to resolve the dispute. The authority of the committee to act as a mediator comes from its oversight responsibilities, its understanding and awareness of possible issues and the members' accounting and business expertise. Mediation techniques used include controlling the agenda, gathering information, advising and solving problems. With two exceptions, the interviews indicate that the audit committee does not take sides when helping to resolve a dispute. The outcome from the mediation process is generally a compromise solution.

The study is based on 21 interviews undertaken in Malaysia. Hence, the findings may not be generalizable to other cultures and jurisdictions. Further, while a number of mediation techniques used by audit committees are identified, the paper does not examine in‐depth the mediation processes used in resolving disagreements.

The study extends the auditor‐client negotiation literature by examining whether the audit committee plays a mediating role to help resolve disagreements. The findings demonstrate that audit committee effectiveness can extend beyond a pure oversight role to more active involvement in resolving contentious accounting issues.

The aim of this paper is to extend the prior auditing literature by examining audit engagement challenges arising during government tax compliance audits. The prior auditing literature has examined how audit engagement challenges have been resolved through auditor/auditee negotiations.

The empirical evidence for the paper was gathered during a participant observation study conducted by the primary researcher over a period of six years while working as an auditor for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) of the US Department of Treasury.

This paper discusses various challenges faced by government auditors and how these challenges were resolved. The path to resolution was not always clearly marked. Resolution depended a great deal on the individual auditor’s judgment, interpretation of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs), and the willingness of the auditee to change the methods and techniques they use in operating and reporting wine operations. Materiality was determined by compliance with the regulation criteria [CFRs and the US Code (USC)] – any non-compliance was considered to be material. Resolution of many of the challenges resulted in an increased payments of excise taxes or penalties by the auditee entities. In other cases, the audit agency allowed the auditees to agree to change or amend their practices to correct a violation or a lack of compliance with US federal government regulations. As such, while the difference in the role and status of the government tax compliance auditor as compared with the independent external auditor did not necessarily lead to a different set of audit procedures, the pattern of communications between the auditor and the auditee in a government tax compliance audit were quite different from an external audit of financial statements. The government tax compliance environment is often complex, but the auditor may draw on a number of sources of knowledge and communication: CFRs, USC, Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, national audit planning, national experts, winery management, local peers, local government supervision, legal counsel and other auditors.

The primary contribution of the paper lies in the fact that little or no prior research in auditing has been conducted using participant observation as a research methodology. The use of participant observation provides new perspectives on the resolution of audit engagement challenges and auditor/auditee communication and negotiation.

This paper has been written following the refusal of US Big Six firms to participate in a context‐based research project on the new‐client‐acceptance decision, in spite of their claims that current audit research is too far removed from the realities of practice. The paper aims to problematise the firms’ refusal, arguing that it exemplifies efforts at policing the development of academic knowledge on the part of gatekeepers who strive to make researchers work on technicalities, thereby mitigating the risk that research may tarnish the profession’s legitimacy. Insights into the social construction of the gatekeepers’ efforts at policing knowledge are provided by the multilateral negotiations with the firms, showing initial differences in gatekeepers’ boundaries of acceptable research, and subsequent between‐firm discussions that resulted in the firms’ joint decision to refuse participation.

This paper aims to hypothesise that demographic characteristics of managers play a significant role in performing their duties amongst which is financial reporting. This study aims to examine whether CEO characteristics, namely, tenure and financial expertise, are associated with audit report timeliness.

Data from companies listed on the Oman capital market between 2007 and 2011 and three proxies for audit report timeliness are used.

CEO tenure and CEOs with financial expertise are reported to be associated with timely audit reports. Supplementary tests also confirmed this result. In addition, it is suggested and documented that there is an interaction effect between CEO tenure and financial expertise concerning the timeliness of audit reports. The use of a two-stage least square analysis also supported the main results.

Hypotheses were tested using data from Oman with a relatively small sample size. Therefore, only a few characteristics of the CEO were considered and a more sophisticated approach of testing managers’ effect on company policies was unable to be used. In addition, the generalisability of the study findings should be made carefully.

This paper differs from prior studies, in that it extends the audit report timeliness literature by examining whether the CEO tenure and CEOs with financial expertise are associated with audit report timeliness. Findings demonstrate that CEO characteristics are important factors for a timely audit report.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the direct linkage between professional scepticism and auditor independence.

The study reviews the extant literature on professional scepticism, auditor independence, conflict of interest and unconscious bias.

Auditor independence is a fundamental antecedent to professional scepticism. However, auditor independence is impossible due to the auditor–client structure and conscious and unconscious personal bias. The threats to auditor independence are powerful incentives that reduce professional scepticism, making it difficult to exercise professional scepticism while making professional judgement.

An understanding of the direct link between professional scepticism and auditor independence is necessary to appreciate the context and meaning of professional scepticism in relation to the greater body of literature and ongoing concerns of audit regulators. This paper, which conceptualises the linkage between professional scepticism and auditor independence, provides a platform for future research to be conducted to examine the validity of the discussions and how a discourse in a moral framework embedded within accounting education may assist in improving auditor independence and professional scepticism.

It is insufficient for audit regulators to assess professional scepticism by audit outputs. Threats to independence should be brought into the assessment. To ensure auditor independence is not compromised, auditors should be made aware of the ethical dimensions of their decisions and reminded constantly to monitor virtue ethics behaviours.

This paper brings into mainstream accounting and auditing literature and research a psychological perspective of auditor independence in the discussion of professional scepticism that is seldom examined.