Search results

Companies may be defendants in lawsuits that are unresolved at year-end. This paper aims to consider whether the financial statements of companies facing litigation claims (pending litigation) are more time-consuming to audit due to the complexity and subjectivity of contingent liabilities associated with pending litigation. The authors consider whether auditors tailor their approach to pending litigation based on two distinct factors in the Chinese business environment: the client’s government ownership status and the legal development of the region in which the company is based.

Data on litigation against companies and their audit report lags were obtained for 18,029 firm-year observations of Chinese companies from 2008 to 2017. The sample was subsequently divided based on whether the company was a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and based on whether the company was based in a region of China with a more-developed and more market-oriented legal system.

The overall results indicate that audits of companies with pending litigation take 2.9 days longer than those of companies without pending litigation. For companies with multiple pending claims, each additional claim is associated with 1.9 more days of audit report lag. These effects are weaker for SOEs and for companies in regions of China with less developed legal systems. The results are consistent with the idea that auditors tailor their response to pending litigation based on the risk profile of the client, including consideration of SOE status and regional legal development.

This paper is the first to consider the potential effect of pending litigation (including claims not disclosed or recognized in financial statements) on audit report lags and how environmental business factors can influence this relationship.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze the impact of governance internal mechanisms on audit report lag. The characteristics of governance used in this study are selected by looking at recent literature review.

Governance internal mechanisms were proxied by the audit committee and director's board characteristics. To test the impact of these characteristics, the authors used a sample of 47 Tunisian companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange (BVMT) during the period from 2014 to 2019. The generalized method of moments (GMM) method of dynamic panel multivariate analysis was used to analyze this study.

The results showed that most corporate governance attributes have a significant effect on audit report lag. Specifically, the audit committee diligence and the audit committee expertise have significant and positive effect on audit report lag. But the diligence of the board has significant and negative effect on audit report lag. However, this study finds no evidence that the audit committee independence, the size, independence and diligence of director's board are associated with the audit report lag. In addition, the results of this study also show that there is a significant effect of some control variables such us gender and performance.

The findings of this article will help to fill the knowledge gap in relation with this research issue in developing countries especially in Tunisian context, because this investigation exposed more than ever the vital role of auditor on the audit report lag. This research will make investors and stakeholders aware of the importance of governance mechanisms put in place in firms to reduce audit report delays in emerging markets, like Tunisia. Then, this work can help researchers and encourage them to deeply and broadly investigate this issue on other emerging markets.

This study extends the existing literature by examining the relationship between different mechanisms of corporate governance and audit delay in an emerging context and which has been very little explored in this sense namely in the Tunisian context. On the empirical level, the study contributes by using a dynamic panel that has not been mentioned much in previous research. Dynamic panel models include lagged dependent variables. The presence of these variables makes it possible to model a partial adjustment mechanism.

This paper examines the relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag. Accounting outsourcing may reduce misstatement risk, reducing the amount of audit effort necessary and thereby decrease audit lag. Alternatively, outsourcing may increase the amount of coordination necessary between the auditor, client management and the outside accounting service provider and thereby increase audit lag.

The accounting outsourcing/audit lag relationship is examined among closed-end mutual funds. These funds often outsource their accounting functions and disclose the names and services provided by any company providing services to the fund. These disclosures permit a consistent measurement of whether the fund outsources their accounting functions or performs them in-house.

This paper finds a positive relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag; outsourcing funds have audit lags that are two to three days longer than those not outsourcing their accounting. The results are robust to different specifications, controls for the distinctive characteristics of closed-end funds and consideration of endogeneity.

Closed-end funds could consider the increased time necessary to complete the audit when deciding whether to outsource their accounting functions.

By identifying a unique setting in which outsourcing data can be consistently obtained and analyzed (i.e. closed-end funds), this is the first study to empirically evaluate the relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag.

This paper is motivated by the Financial Markets Authority’s (FMA) investigation into reporting delays of New Zealand issuers. The purpose of this paper is to provide regulators with systematic evidence on firm specific characteristics associated with reporting delay. The paper examines the audit report lag (ARL), the financial report lag and the corresponding interim report lags for a large sample of New Zealand listed firms.

Because of the small sample we report bivariate correlations. Together with OLS regression, we examine the association between reporting delay and firm characteristics (e.g., size, complexity, governance) that capture the supply and demand for timely audited financial reports. We choose a period immediately prior to the FMA enforcement of reporting delays to capture the voluntary choice of reporting timeliness by managers.

The audit lag (i.e. balance date to preliminary announcement to the NZX) is longer than the report lag (i.e. preliminary announcement date to the issuance of the report to the NZX). We find that audit risk factors (leverage and finance firms) and busy reporting period are associated with longer audit lag. Whereas, having a Big 4 auditor and an interim review reduces annual audit lag. Investor demand factors are associated with a shorter report lag. Firms with a loss and more segments have a shorter report lag, while firms with high market to book ratio have a longer report lag. These are consistent with agency and proprietary cost explanations. The interim report lag is only seven days shorter than the annual lag. The determinants of annual report lag provide weak explanations for the interim report lags.

Although all listed companies are sampled, the small sample size reduces the power of the analysis and may limit finding significant results at conventional levels.

The factors associated with reporting delays could be used by regulators as red flags to identify abnormal reporting delays. Interim reporting lags appear excessively relative to annual report lags. Therefore, regulators should investigate the reasons for the lack of timeliness of interim reports.

Report timeliness is an important, but often overlooked, component of accounting quality. The major social implication is that timely reporting reduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and other stakeholders. Making better, timelier decisions ought to increase the wealth and welfare of investors and other stakeholders.

There are many studies on reporting delay. However, prior evidence on reporting delay in New Zealand is pre-IFRS and pre-recent regulatory reforms (such as the formation of the FMA). Hence, our contribution is to provide more contemporary-relevant evidence. We also distinguish between ARL and the financial report lag and found that different firm characteristics drive these lags. We also examine the interim reporting lag.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze the factors that affect an auditor’s efficiency in completing the audit process proxied by audit report lag. The factors used in this study are selected by looking at the characteristics of the company and the characteristics of an auditor.

Company characteristics were proxied by the audit committee effectiveness, financial condition, accounting complexity and profitability, whereas auditor characteristics were proxied with auditor reputation, audit tenure and auditors industry specialization. Populations of this study were all manufacturing companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2014–2016. Based on the purposive sampling method, the number of samples obtained from 231 companies was 77. Multiple linear regression method was used to analyze this study. Hypothesis testing was done by statistical t-test (partial).

The results showed that partially variables of the audit committee effectiveness and profitability had a significant negative effect on audit report lag while the variable financial condition had a significant positive effect on audit report lag. Meanwhile, variables of the accounting complexity, auditor reputation, audit tenure and auditors’ industry specialization did not show significant influence on audit report lag.

This study tests both company’s and auditor’s characteristic on audit report lag that as far as authors know never been tested simultaneously.

This study investigates the consequences of the key audit matter (KAM) disclosure requirement by considering two salient audit proxies: audit fees and audit report lag. This investigation is relevant because most auditors worldwide are required to expand their audit report including discussion on key matters faced in the audit engagement. However, the emerging literature on the implications of KAM is inconclusive.

Using a distinctive dataset of 601 year-observations for firms listed on the Omani capital market over 2012–2019, this study employs pooled panel data regression with robust standard error.

Results indicate that auditors increased their fees considerably during the period of KAM but substantially shortened audit report lag. Conversely, using the KAM period as a sample, the authors find marginal or insignificant evidence for the effect of the number of KAM on both proxies. In additional analyses, this study shows that entity-level risk KAM is associated with higher fees and shorter audit report lag, while KAM related to account-level risk does not have the same effect. Interestingly, it is observed that KAM disclosure is strongly associated with higher fees and high-quality audit even when the auditors issue their report in a shorter time.

This study contributes to the limited research examining the consequences of KAM in emerging markets. It is also the first to show that KAM is associated with shorter audit report lag.

Regulators treat all non-audit services the same by using a broad-brush approach which is reflected in the study of total non-audit fees in the same analyses or different non-audit fees in isolation by prior studies. To know whether the non-audit services have different effects and hence, should be regulated separately, this paper compares their effects on audit report lag and examines whether they follow the implied hierarchy of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The effects of audit-related non-audit fees, tax fees and other non-audit fees are compared in an audit report lag model to determine whether they are the same statistically. Supporting tests for audit quality use discretionary accruals and the reporting of a small profit or small positive change in profit.

This paper finds that different non-audit fees do not have the same effects on report lag and partial support for the implied hierarchy of the Commission. Specifically, for large accelerated filers, audit-related fees and tax fees have the same negative effects on report lag but other non-audit fees are unrelated to report lag. Tests of audit quality suggest that auditors do not compromise audit quality.

Different non-audit services are unique in their spillover effects and deserve individual attention. Audit practitioners could be more comfortable in providing audit-related non-audit or tax services for audit clients since these services could facilitate audit work without compromising independence. On the other hand, they should be cautious about the provision of other non-audit services because the services do not enhance the efficiency of audit work and without such a benefit to audit clients, the provision may create issues of perceived independence.

Insight is limited by the types of disclosure of non-audit fees available and the lack of internal measures of audit efficiency.

The results provide deeper insight into the knowledge spillover theory and prior studies which implicitly assume all non-audit services having the same effect. The results suggest that the services should be regulated each on its own but not in a bundle. Last, this paper provides the first evidence that audit-related non-audit fees reduce report lag.

This paper aims to examine whether audit committee ownership affects audit report lag. Independent audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, to ensure that financial statements are both credible and released to external stakeholders in a timely manner. To date, however, the extent to which audit committee ownership strengthens or compromises member independence, and hence, influences audit report lag, has remained unexplored.

This paper hypothesizes that audit committee ownership is associated with audit report lag. Further, the author hypothesize that both the financial reporting quality and the going concern opinions of a firm mediate the effect of audit committee ownership on audit report lag.

Using data from Australian listed companies, the author find that audit committee ownership increases audit report lag. The author further document that financial reporting quality and modified audit opinions rendered by external auditors mediate this positive relationship. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns emanating from firms’ deliberate decisions to grant shares to the audit committee members.

The study contributes to both the audit report timeliness and the corporate governance literatures, by documenting an adverse effect of audit committee ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact hosting the Super Bowl has on audit completion and financial reporting timeliness for companies headquartered in Super Bowl hosting cities.

Using 16 years of financial reporting data, this study uses the Super Bowl and related activities, combined with required filings during “busy season,” as a natural experiment to examine how audit firms navigate short-term, exogenously imposed but anticipated, audit team capacity constraints.

Companies headquartered in a city hosting the Super Bowl, during busy season, have longer audit report lags (by approximately three days, in comparison to non-hosting busy season audits) and less timely securities and exchange commission (SEC) (10-K) filings. The authors find no evidence that Super Bowl hosting affects audit fees or earnings announcement timeliness.

When confronted with anticipated capacity shocks, audit firms take longer to complete the audit, absorbing the financial costs of the delay and maintaining audit quality, resulting in less timely financial reporting.

This study demonstrates the costs of Super Bowl-related inefficiencies and contributes to our understanding of how auditors navigate capacity shocks. This study provides evidence that auditors can effectively manage business risk and continue to facilitate providing timely and accurate information to financial statement users in the face of a capacity shock.

The purpose of this study is to examine audit report lags and audit report deadline margins. It specifically examines whether audits of large accelerated filers are completed within a shorter period as compared with regular accelerated filers due to the introduction of new deadline filing requirements by the SEC. The paper also examines whether large accelerated filers have shorter audit report deadline margins.

Using a sample of 7,129 firm-year observations over the period 2007-2013, an OLS regression model is applied by regressing audit report lags and audit report deadline margins on an indicator variable for large accelerated filers and a set of control variables.

Results indicate that audits of large accelerated filers have shorter audit report lags as compared with regular accelerated filers. Also, large accelerated filers have shorter audit report deadline margins as compared with regular accelerated filers. These results suggest that even though large accelerated filers’ audits are more complex by nature, auditors of these firms are under more pressure to complete their audits and issue their clients’ audit reports on time.

While the control variables included in the models are all based on established theories and validated in prior research, there may still be some control variables that were excluded from the study’s models. Also, these results cannot be generalized beyond firms that are categorized as large accelerated filers or accelerated filers.

Public accounting firms should be prepared to devote more resources to large accelerated filers’ clients. Also, regulators might need to reconsider revising the filing deadline requirements for the new category of large accelerated filers by weighing the pros against the cons of these new deadlines, as it appears that auditors of large accelerated filers need more time to complete their audits.

This study uses a new measuring tool in addition to audit report lags, which is the ‘audit report deadline margin’.