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Purpose – This study examines the relationship between Big Four audit firm country-level market shares and audit fees across a sample of nine emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan.

Design/methodology/approach – First, auditor market share is calculated as a percentage of client sales based on all publicly traded companies in each of the sample countries during the period 2002–2005. Next, Audit Analytics is used to obtain audit fee data for a set of foreign companies listed on a primary U.S. exchange. A final sample of 483 client-year observations is included in the audit fee regression analysis.

Findings – After controlling for other factors related to audit pricing, Big Four auditors with dominant country-level market shares earn a fee premium of approximately 27% over competitor firms.

Originality/value – These results suggest that individual Big Four firm reputations, as measured by fee premiums, are not homogeneous across countries. Rather, it appears the largest audit firms are associated with quality-differentiated services and thus earn higher fees. Although accounting research tends to classify large international accounting firms into a pool of the “Big Four,” these findings indicate that it is important to consider each firm's market share in specific geographic locations when examining questions related to auditor reputation and pricing.

Audits are a means of reducing the information asymmetry between managers and investors. If the quality of the audit is in question, outside investors may face a larger informational disadvantage. We test the hypothesis that this informational disadvantage is manifested in the implied volatilities associated with the equity options of the audited firms. We find that volatilities increased for Andersen audited firms relative to firms audited by other Big Five accounting firms. This finding is consistent with the view that auditors help lessen the information asymmetry problem and that some of this reduction is accomplished by auditor reputation.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

This chapter investigates whether earnings management activities increase the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report. We have carried out this study with a sample of Spanish companies for the period 2001–2009. Previous research on the issue is not only scarce but also suffers from methodological pitfalls. In all cases, researchers have followed a matched sample approach without considering the implications of such approach for the statistical analysis. Despite its great popularity among researchers in accounting, the use of matched-based sampling is susceptible to produce technical errors in the statistical analysis. The main problem consists in the generalization of results obtained with a nonrandom sample to the whole population of firms. Our results do not show a significant relationship between EM and qualified audit reports. We have also addressed whether the international financial crisis has affected our results and concluded that Spanish companies seem to have used EM during the crisis to push down earnings, probably expecting to take advantage of the positive earnings surprises during the postcrisis period. Nevertheless, the financial crisis has not changed the nature of the EM-qualified opinions relationship.

The confidence in the qualifications and independence of the audit activities and professionals has been lost due to the financial scandals that have arisen over time. These scandals in the accounting and auditing fields caused both enterprises and investors to suffer from large amounts of losses and thus the need for reliable financial statements and corporate governance increased.

Both investors and decision-makers need independent assurance to achieve transparent, reliable, and impartial financial information. The fulfillment of this requirement is possible through independent auditing activity and independent audit firms. Business management shall carry out the selection of independent auditors based on various criteria (fee, reputation, audit team, relations, etc.). In addition, it may also be necessary to periodically change an independent audit firm due to rotation or other reasons (fee, disputes, relationships, etc.).

In this study, a ranking of the importance level of the evaluation criteria, for the selection and change of the independent audit firm in an enterprise in Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 in Turkey, was conducted. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which is one of the multicriteria decision-making techniques, was used for ranking. In the hierarchy established for the selection of the independent audit firm, the main criteria of the “audit fee” and the “reputation and qualifications of the audit firm” have been established. According to the findings obtained as a result of binary comparisons, the first four ranks among sub-criteria are “provision of international service,” “quality of technical expertise of audit firm,” “industry expertise of audit firm,” and “suitability of fee offered by audit firm.”

For the change of audit firm, four main criteria “audit fee,” “disputes arising during the audit process,” “relations with the audit firm,” and “rotation” are taken into consideration. For sub-criteria, first four criteria were “rotation of independent audit firm,” “rotation of independent auditor,” “audit firm’s inability to adequately practice proactive audit approaches,” and “inadequate communication.”

National differences in the demand for voluntary external audits have been linked to multiple factors, such as differences in a country's rate of growth, access to external credit, and institutional quality. Audits, however, also have a psychological cost, whose intensity is genetically and culturally hereditary. Using a sample of 3,072 private firms across 34 industries in seven countries, including five countries or regions from the former Soviet Comecon, we find that a country's share of firms choosing to undergo external audits is negatively related to the prevalence of carriers of the G allele in the mu-opioid receptor gene's A118G polymorphism, also known as the “social sensitivity” gene. Furthermore, the relationship between the prevalence of the social sensitivity gene and audits is fully mediated by a national culture's degree of collectivism. The results are statistically and economically highly significant and remain robust to the introduction of a set of confounding factors at the firm and country levels. Our results have practical relevance in recognizing psychological diversity when conducting audits and, more generally, preventing burnout in the workplace.

This chapter is about the reorganisation of the auditing firms in the Post-Sarbanes Oxley Era, in the light of quality concern. The chapter opens up with definitions of related concepts. The importance of audit quality is emphasised in the second section. Discussion on the factors associated with audit quality is the following part. The need for reorganisation of the audit firms follows and the chapter concludes with proposals section. The audit firms seem to be squeezed to catch up with both the national and international regulations. One of the ascertainments is that the audit firms all over the world need to cope with the standards; another is their obligation to provide high-quality audits. Globally speaking, the unwillingness of the profession to alter its habits and to sacrifice the profits historically earned is another obstacle to overcome. In the aftermath of the establishment of the Public Oversight Board in the late 2012, Turkish case follows with an almost 10-year gap.

A psychological contract (PC) reflects the relationship(s) between employees and their employers and involves a personal interpretation of the obligations and rewards between those parties. Within the auditing profession, while the actual “employers” of auditors are the auditing firms that pay the auditor’s salary, auditors engage in multiple functionally interdependent affiliations in which PCs are developed: auditor to auditor; auditor to the profession and its overseers; and auditors to the company being audited. Unfortunately, another party (society), which should be viewed as a critical part of the audit relationship, is often ignored. This paper poses the idea that the PCs existing between employees within auditing firms and between auditing firms and external parties may be important, but less recognized, underlying causes of the profession’s problems. Current auditor PCs appear to be internally contradictory and out-of-sync with the demands of the investing public and society in general. Suggestions are made about how PCs and relationships may be modified to be more attune to societal needs.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.