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The purpose of this paper is to estimate the cost of the internal control audit for small firms and assess whether the costs are scalable or, alternatively, whether they are higher in relation to firm size for small firms than for larger firms.

The method estimates the Section 404 audit fee premium for companies that became accelerated filers for the first time in 2006 and 2007. The authors use the estimated audit fee premium as a proxy for the premium that non‐accelerated filers would have to pay if they were required to obtain an internal control audit.

The main finding shows that the Section 404(b) estimated cost of the internal control audit divided by assets are significantly higher for non‐accelerated filers and first‐time filers than for those of larger firms.

One limitation of the study is that, while it shows that the costs of the Section 404 audit are not scalable to firm size, it does not prove that the costs of the audit exceed the benefits for non‐accelerated filers.

The finding that the costs are proportionately higher for small firms provides some evidence supporting the decision to permanently exempt non‐accelerated filers from Section 404(b).

The results show that smaller firms pay proportionately more for the Section 404 internal control audit than larger firms. This suggests that the revised AS no. 5 did not succeed in making the internal control audit completely scalable to firm size.

This study examines audit fee premiums from brand name, industry specialization, and industry leadership after the merger of two Big 6 audit firms, creating the Big 5 in 1998 in the Malaysian audit market. A sample of 679 companies listed at the main and second boards of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) are investigated for audit fee premiums. Industry specialization is determined on the basis of 20 per cent share of audit market calculated by the number of audited companies in the industry. Audit fee premiums are calculated based on the Simunic (1980) model of audit fees. Results show: that Big 5 audit firms obtain 65.4 per cent audit market share for all KLSE listed companies; that Big 5 audit firms earn higher audit fees than non‐Big 5; and that industry specialization does not generate audit fee premiums. The study finds evidence for audit fee premiums derived from industry market leadership. Results also reflect the competitiveness among Big 5 audit firms in the audit market especially following the merger of Big 6 audit firms.

This study aims to examine the association between corporate governance and audit fees using directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance premiums as a proxy for overall governance quality. The use of an overall governance measure that captures both structural and non-structural governance features may shed light on the association between governance and audit fees, which is known to be inconclusive in the literature.

The authors employ D&O insurance premiums as a proxy for governance quality that reflects both the structural features and non-structural features of governance. D&O insurance premiums are hand-collected from a proxy circular of Canadian firms. Multivariate regression analyses are used for testing.

The authors find a positive association between D&O premiums and audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees to firms with heightened corporate governance risk. Even after controlling for structural governance variables in the regression model, the authors find a significantly positive association between D&O premiums and audit fees.

The findings suggest that mandatory disclosures of D&O insurance policies can be useful for market participants. This study uses a relatively small sample of Canadian firms. A larger sample could strengthen the implications of the findings.

The findings suggest that structural features of governance may be insufficient to provide a full understanding of the impact of corporate governance on audit pricing and add to the understanding of the determinants of audit fees.

This study aims to examine whether national industry expertise in Italy is more dominant than local expertise. Prior studies from Australia, USA and UK show that audit fees for industry experts are priced at a higher premium at the local level than the national level. These countries have voluntary audit firm rotation, while Italy has mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). The authors predict that Italy has a stronger national than local level of industry expertise, to better retain and transfer industry expertise.

The authors compare audit fee premiums of national industry experts to local levels, using quantitative (multivariate tests) and qualitative (interviews) methodology.

Using hand-collected audit fees, the authors find that the audit fee premium for industry expertise is greater at the national level than the local level. The authors find corroborating results with audit hours. To provide further support, the authors conduct analysis for a neighboring country that does not have audit firm rotation. Using hand-collected data from Germany, the authors find that audit fee premiums from national industry expertise are no different from local industry expertise.

The present study study has theoretical and practical implications, for European Union countries, which recently adopted MAFR and for countries considering adoption in the future.

Because there is mixed evidence regarding Big N fee premiums across countries, the purpose of this paper is to re-examine the phenomenon of audit price differentiations in the market for auditing services in Thailand. Although Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) reviewed over 80 audit fee papers from 20 countries over 25 years, 13 of which were based in emerging economies, the understanding of the market for auditing services in Thailand remains limited. Because the Thai auditing market is also classified as a segmented market – i.e., a market that is less competitive for large-client firms and more competitive for small-client firms – this study tests audit price competition in an emerging audit market using Thailand as an example.

The traditional audit fee model is used to estimate audit fee premiums for a sample of over 300 non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2011.

Although the market for auditing services in Thailand is consistent with that described in Ferguson et al. (2013) – in which Big N audit firms dominate only the large-client segment – the results show that Big N auditors charge higher audit fees and earn higher fee premiums compared with non-Big N auditors in both the small- and large-client segments of the audit market.

The evidence from this study reveals the existence of Big N fee premiums across market segmentations. Audit price differentials between Big N and non-Big N firms in both small- and large-client market segments might concern regulators regarding competition in the audit market with respect to whether the Big N firms are charging uncompetitive audit fees. These findings also imply that audit pricing varies across countries and the Big N price deferential is typically larger in emerging markets than in more developed audit markets and that it might be inadequate to study single-country audit pricing. However, the question whether the Big N fee premium results from Big N product differentiation is not directly investigated in this study.

Because earlier studies focusing on audit fee premiums have been conducted using data from the USA and Australia, the findings add to the limited evidence regarding audit fee premiums in an emerging country such as Thailand.

The purpose of this paper is to provide more comprehensive analysis of the effects of Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) Act on both audit fee premium and auditor change in the US audit market.

The audit fee premium model is employed to track the trend in audit fee premium between 2000 and 2006 for small accelerated filers compared with large accelerated filers and non‐accelerated filers and how the change in auditor affected such trend around the enactment of SOX.

The results indicate a significant shift in audit fee premium during early years of SOX compliance especially for small accelerated filers compared with large accelerated filers or non‐accelerated filers. Such shift started to wind down during 2006 after the initial application of SOX requirements. Although clients who switched from big to non‐big auditors have experienced a slower increase in their audit fees, these fee savings are lower for small accelerated filers during 2004 and 2005 with the increasing demand for audit services in the US audit industry during these years.

The compliance costs of significant regulatory changes like SOX may be upfront loaded but their benefits are long‐term benefits in terms of higher quality of financial reporting and better internal controls over financial reporting. When analyzing the effects of such regulatory changes, practitioners and researchers should factor these costs and benefits over a sufficient time horizon.

More comprehensive analysis of SOX effects on the US audit industry not only in the short run during early compliance years, but also in the longer run after the initial setup process.

Using the most recent observations (2005‐2011) from a sample of UK listed companies, This paper aims to investigate whether Big 4 audit firms exhibit a “fee premium” and, if this is the case, whether the premium is related to the delivery of a better audit service.

Univariate tests, multivariate regressions and two methodologies that control for self‐selection bias are used to answer the proposed research questions. Data are collected from DataStream.

Findings provide consistent evidence about the existence of an “audit fee premium” charged by Big 4 firms while they do not highlight any significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor with respect to the audit quality proxies investigated.

Evidence from this paper might signal the need for legislative intervention to improve the competitiveness of the audit market on the basis that its concentrated structure is leading to “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients. Findings might also enhance Big 4 client bargaining power. However, as the paper analyses only one country, generalizability of the results might be a limitation.

This study joins two streams of the extant literature that investigate the existence of a “Big 4 audit fee premium” and different levels of audit quality among Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients. Evidence supports the concerns raised by the UK House of Lords in 2010 that the concentrated structure of the audit market could be the driver of “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients as it does not find differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients.

Purpose – This study examines the relationship between Big Four audit firm country-level market shares and audit fees across a sample of nine emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan.

Design/methodology/approach – First, auditor market share is calculated as a percentage of client sales based on all publicly traded companies in each of the sample countries during the period 2002–2005. Next, Audit Analytics is used to obtain audit fee data for a set of foreign companies listed on a primary U.S. exchange. A final sample of 483 client-year observations is included in the audit fee regression analysis.

Findings – After controlling for other factors related to audit pricing, Big Four auditors with dominant country-level market shares earn a fee premium of approximately 27% over competitor firms.

Originality/value – These results suggest that individual Big Four firm reputations, as measured by fee premiums, are not homogeneous across countries. Rather, it appears the largest audit firms are associated with quality-differentiated services and thus earn higher fees. Although accounting research tends to classify large international accounting firms into a pool of the “Big Four,” these findings indicate that it is important to consider each firm's market share in specific geographic locations when examining questions related to auditor reputation and pricing.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the market for audit services for publicly traded companies operating in the US for-profit (FP) healthcare sector. Complex national and local healthcare laws and regulations suggest the importance of assessing fee effects of joint nationallevel and city-specific expertise among auditors. Using cross-sectional OLS regression analysis, we find that joint expertise significantly affects audit pricing in the healthcare sector. We find a fee premium of 33.6 percent on engagements where auditors are both national and city-specific specialists. We also find that Big-4 auditor reputation is significantly priced over and above the effects of joint auditor expertise, and a significant positive association exists between audit and non-audit service fees-indicating the presence of knowledge spillover effects among healthcare company auditors.

Despite the extensive research on the determinants of audit pricing in both public and private settings, there is a lack of research about the differences in audit fees between voluntary audits and mandatory audits. The purpose of this paper is to address this gap.

First, a theoretical framework is developed to justify differences in audit pricing between voluntary and mandatory audits. Next, using a sample of Spanish private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) running from 2009 to 2014, the authors empirically test whether the fees charged for voluntary audits differ from those charged for mandatory ones. The authors also examine whether the premium observed among large auditors is persistent in the SME setting, and whether this premium differs depending on whether the audits are voluntary or mandatory.

Although a preliminary analysis does not report significant differences in pricing between voluntary and mandatory audits, additional analyses using samples restricted by company size show that voluntary audits are charged with a premium. The authors observe a premium related to large auditors, and find no significant differences in the audit pricing of Big 4 auditors depending on the mandatory/voluntary nature of the audit, but the premium associated with Middle-Tier auditors disappears in the voluntary setting.

This paper contributes to the previous literature by introducing the examination of differences in audit pricing between voluntary and mandatory audits. As far as the authors know, this is the first study to examine the differences in audit pricing between voluntary and mandatory audits. It also elaborates on studies on audit pricing in SMEs.

A pesar de la extensa investigación sobre los determinantes de los honorarios de auditoría tanto en el entorno de las empresas cotizadas como de las no cotizadas, existe poca investigación sobre las diferencias en los honorarios entre las auditorías voluntarias y las obligatorias. El presente estudio aborda esta carencia.

En primer lugar, se desarrolla un marco teórico que trata de justificar diferencias en el precio de la auditoría entre auditorías voluntarias y obligatorias. Después, usando una muestra de pymes españolas no cotizadas para el período 2009–2014, testamos empíricamente si los honorarios cargados en las auditorías voluntarias difieren de los cargados en las auditorías obligatorias. Examinamos también si la prima observada entre los grandes auditores en el entorno de las pymes es persistente, y si esta prima difiere en función de si la auditoría es voluntaria u obligatoria.

Aunque el análisis preliminar no reporta diferencias significativas en el precio de la auditoría entre auditorías voluntarias y obligatorias, análisis adicionales usando muestras restringidas por el tamaño de las compañías muestran que las auditorías voluntarias soportan una prima con respecto a las obligatorias. Observamos también una prima relacionada con los auditores grandes y medianos, y no encontramos diferencias significativas en el precio de la auditoría para las Big 4 en función de la naturaleza obligatoria/voluntaria de la auditoría, mientras que la prima asociada con los auditores medianos desaparece en el entorno voluntario.

El estudio contribuye a la literatura previa al introducir el análisis de las diferencias en el precio de la auditoría entre auditorías voluntarias y obligatorias. Hasta donde sabemos, éste es el primer estudio que examina las diferencias de precio entre ambos entornos. El estudio también extiende la literatura previa sobre los honorarios de auditoría en las pymes.