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This article attempts to examine audit committee composition and structure affecting and leading to enhanced audit committee performance, with due regard for the principles of good governance and international best practices. The article recommends the ideal composition and structure of the audit committee to assist committees to meet their requirements, to ensure optimal performance and to improve the effectiveness of their oversight of financial reporting and corporate governance. The framework developed could also be used as a guideline in the selection and recruitment process for audit committees. The requirements are based on the regulatory requirements of the King II Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (2002), the Companies Amendment Act 20 of 2004, the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (2006), the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), the JSE Limited requirements, the Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999) and the Sarbanes‐ Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA.

This study aims to investigate the effects of corporate board and audit committee characteristics and ownership structures on market-based financial performance of listed firms in Thailand.

It applies system GMM (generalized method of moments) as the baseline estimator approach, and ordinary least squares and fixed effects for robustness checks on a sample of 452 firms listed on the Thai Stock Exchange for the period 2000-2016.

Relying mainly on the system GMM estimator, the empirical results indicate some emerging trends in the Thai economy. Contrary to expectations for an emerging market and prior research findings, ownership structures, particularly ownership concentration and family ownership, appear to have no significant influence on market-based firm performance, while managerial ownership exerts a positive effect on performance. Moreover, as expected, board structure variables such as board independence; size; meeting and dual role; and audit committee meeting show significant explanatory power on market-based firm performance in Thai firms.

These findings are important for policymakers in constructing an appropriate set of governance mechanisms in an emerging market context, and for corporate entities and investors in shaping their understanding of corporate governance in the Thai institutional context.

Unlike previous literature on the Thai market, this study is the first to use the more advanced econometric method known as system GMM estimator for addressing causality/endogeneity issues in governance–performance relationships. The findings indicate new trends in the explanatory power of ownership structure variables on market-based firm performance in Thai-listed firms.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between external audit fees, and board and audit committee characteristics of 736 Malaysian listed firms. It is hypothesised that good corporate governance practices reduce auditors' risk assessments, resulting in lower audit fees. Drawing on the existence of a clearly identifiable ethnic domination of board membership and ownership of Malaysian listed firms, the study also posits that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees because of their weaker governance practices.

This study employs a cross‐sectional analysis of 736 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ending in 2003. Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the relationships proposed in the hypotheses.

Overall, the results of this study reveal that external audit fees are positively and significantly related to board independence, audit committee expertise, and the frequency of audit committee meetings. The study also finds a strong negative association between external audit fees and Bumiputera‐owned firms. An additional analysis into the internal governance structures of firms in the sample show that Bumiputera firms practice more favourable corporate governance practices compared to their non‐Bumiputera counterparts.

This study is a unique contribution in that it provides data on corporate governance practices in Malaysia for a large sample in the period after the corporate governance reforms taken by Malaysian capital market regulators and participants. Previous studies have shown that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees than non‐Bumiputera‐controlled firms. These studies have not tested theoretical explanations for this fee differential. A theoretical explanation provided in the current study is that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees than non‐Bumiputera‐controlled firms partially because of differences in corporate governance practices. The study finds conflicting results with previous research suggesting that corporate governance practices have changed in Malaysia since the amendments of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, 2001.

An increasing number of earnings restatements along with many allegations of financial statement fraud committed by high profile companies (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia) has eroded the public confidence in corporate governance, the financial reporting process, and audit functions. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 was an attempt to regain confidence and trust in corporate America and the accounting profession. The Act addresses corporate scandals and the perceived crisis in the auditing profession. Some of its provisions relate to the audit committee oversight function over corporate governance, financial reporting, internal control structure, internal audit functions, and external audit services. This study examines three types of audit committee disclosures: the annual report of the audit committee; reporting of the audit committee charter in the proxy statement at least once every three years; and disclosure in the proxy statement of whether the audit committee had fulfilled its responsibilities as specified in the charter. This study conducts a content analysis on audit committee disclosures of Fortune 100 companies.

This paper aims to explore how the presence of an audit committee is associated with other corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. board structure, ownership structure and quality of external audit. The present study evaluated whether the presence of the audit committee complements or substitutes other governance mechanisms in Palestinian companies. Moreover, the effect of investment opportunities on the relationship between the formation of the audit committee and the quality of the auditor was addressed.

The association between the formation of the audit committee and other governance variables was modelled as a binary logistic model. The sample comprising 44 firms listed on Palestine exchange for the period between 2013 and 2017, amounting to 220 firm-year observations.

Based on the investigation, the results have indicated that board independence, the distinction between the chairman and chief executive officer function, ownership concentration and audit quality enhance the chance of audit committee formation, implying complementary effect. Contrastingly, board size and board ownership serve as a substitute to audit committee formation. It has also been found that investment opportunities act as an effective moderating factor that strengthens the relationship between audit quality and the formation of the audit committee.

The study provides valuable insight into the interaction between multiple corporate governance mechanisms within the economy of Palestine where the external uncertainty is high and investment opportunities are constrained by the decisions of the occupying authority. The findings may help regulators and policymakers in Palestine alongside those of other countries with similar environmental features to revise and update their corporate governance codes to ensure that the best control can be achieved, subsequently attracting more foreign and domestic investments.

The primary objective of this paper is to examine the association between the seven human‐resource features (spanning three major themes: qualifications and credentials; business and initial public offering (IPO) launch experience; and diversity) of independent audit committee members and the level of underpricing.

A sample of 410 Singapore IPOs listing on the stock exchange of Singapore from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2006 was used.

Empirical results overall suggest no overwhelming association between the human‐resource features of IPO audit committees and underpricing. Rather, the findings suggest only some specific human‐resource features (e.g. presence of an independent audit committee member with accounting qualifications and credentials) are of significance. Others (e.g. gender diversity of independent audit committee members) have little or no association. Also, results do not suggest a major category of human‐resource features (i.e. qualifications and credentials, business and IPO launch experience, or diversity) is associated with underpricing. Time also does not appear to affect the results.

As human‐resource features tended to increase rather than lower an IPO's cost of capital, or had not influence at all, our findings generally do not support some policymakers' arguments for the introduction of mandated uniform audit committee structures. Rather, the results support flexibility to determine the properties of the audit committee.

This study is one of the first (particularly outside the USA) to investigate linkages between audit committee human‐resource features and underpricing. Whilst acknowledging some caveats associated with this study, such as focusing on a single nation, this paper contributes relevant insights to the debate about audit committee effectiveness.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of multiple large ownership structure (MLS) and audit committee activity (ACA) on audit pricing for a sample of UK listed companies.

One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and cross sectional multiple regression analysis of a sample of UK listed companies showed statistically significant differences in the audit fees, firm size and audit committee activities of these firms when they are categorised based on the number of MLS.

The study finds a significant negative relationship between audit fees and number of MLS, but a surprising positive relationship with ACA. The findings confirm the beneficial effects of more active institutional investors’ monitoring, but also show that increasing monitoring by audit committees is associated with increase in audit fees.

The results reported in this research are based on cross sectional data. It is likely that the result may be different if the issue is examined over a relatively longer period.

The study showed that monitoring intensity of the large shareholders can be captured through their number and not simply through their shareholding. It also confirms the suggestion in previous studies that audit committees’ members protect themselves from depletion in human capital, litigation and reputational risk by buying more audit related services from their auditors.

The study empirically examined the impact of multiple large ownership structure on audit pricing and thereby extends the practical and theoretical understanding on the monitoring roles of large shareholders as well as the audit committees.

This study aims to examine the role of audit committee attributes in non-financial information releases, with a focus on intellectual capital (IC) disclosures, following significant policy changes, mandating the audit committee function in Malaysia. The study argues that, given the changing informational needs of stakeholders and the ongoing discussion on integrated reporting, the role of the audit committee should extend to ensuring the overall quality of corporate reporting.

The study draws evidence from a sample of leading Malaysian companies based on their market capitalisation over a three-year period (2008-2010), a period subsequent to the recent policy changes. The extent and quality of IC information, as a surrogate of non-financial information, was measured and regressed against several audit committee attributes, such as audit committee size, independence, financial expertise and meetings, controlling the overall governance and firm-specific variables.

The findings show a strong positive role of the audit committee function in the overall amount of IC information as well as all three subcomponents of IC information (internal, external and human capital). The results are robust to controls for the overall governance and firm-specific attributes as well as different measures of IC information.

The results suggest that the role of the audit committee function extends to non-financial information communication such as IC. Policymakers in Malaysia should, therefore, build on the recent regulatory changes and encourage audit committees to ensure that the overall quality of corporate reporting processes include social, environmental, intellectual as well as financial capital of a firm.

This study considers the role of the audit committee in the wider corporate reporting process – drawing attention to its potential role in the espoused integrated business reporting. It also challenges the taken-for-granted assumption that restricts the role of the audit committee function to the traditional financial reporting process.