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The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

We investigate the association between attributes of the audit committee of a firm and the likelihood of negative events occurring in the firm’s life in Israel. The mandate of the audit committee in Israel is substantially different from its mandate in the US. The responsibilities of the committee in the US are divided between two committees in Israel, one of which deals with reviewing the financial statements and the other one, titled “audit committee,” is in charge of the remaining tasks of the US-type audit committee. This allows us a unique opportunity to focus on the roles of the audit committee other than reviewing the financial statements. Using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 2010–2014, we find that the larger the audit committee size, the larger the likelihood of negative events, consistent with the cumbersome workings and potential conflicts of interests characterizing a large committee. The percentage of directors with accounting and financial expertise on the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of negative events, in line with the value of such experts in tasks beyond reviewing the financial statements. The fraction of independent directors on the audit committee is not found to be significantly related to the likelihood of negative events. This is consistent with the notion that some independent directors are independent in form but not necessarily in substance, which is surprising in light of the comprehensive regulation regarding audit committee independence imposed by the Israeli regulator.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance characteristics on audit report timeliness in Malaysia. The corporate governance characteristics examined are board independence, audit committee size, audit committee meetings and audit committee members' qualifications.

Design/Methodology/Approach – The sample comprises of 703 Malaysian listed companies from Bursa Malaysia, for the year 2009. It excludes companies from the finance-related sector as they operate under a highly regulated regime under supervision by the Central Bank of Malaysia. Further, regression analysis was performed to examine the audit report timeliness determinants.

Findings – Results show that audit report timeliness is influenced by audit committee size, auditor type, audit opinion and firm profitability. However, no association was found between board independence, audit committee meetings, audit committee members' qualifications and audit report timeliness.

Research limitations/Implications – It is a cross-sectional study of the year 2009. Practical implications for policy makers are consideration of the minimum submission period for audit reports Regulators' support for firms to have larger audit committee sizes is also discussed.

Originality/Value – The study investigates the impact of corporate governance on audit timeliness in light of the recent amendments to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance made in 2007.

The research question we address in this paper is whether the effort invested by the internal auditor in the firm is associated with better firm performance. Our measure of effort is the number of audit hours invested in the firm, and firm performance is measured by the likelihood of a restatement of the firm's financial results. This study is the first to analyze this question, an endeavor made possible by a difference in disclosure requirements regarding internal audit effort between the US and Israel. Our analysis is conducted using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during the period 2010–2014. We expect that auditor effort is negatively associated with the likelihood of restatements of the firm's financial results. Indeed, our findings support this hypothesis. We also consider the association between restatements and two audit committee characteristics – the degree of independence and the degree of expertise of its members. However, these associations are not upheld by the data.

Accounting-based financial scandals caused by fraudulent financial reports negatively affect the financial markets and cause loss of confidence in investors. Financial reporting quality needs to be improved in order to build and maintain trust in financial markets. To increase the quality of financial reports, fraudulent financial reporting risks should be defined. At this point, regulators, practitioners, and researchers are in constant search.

There are improved approaches to the detection of financial reporting frauds in the literature. Many studies have been conducted on the “Fraud Triangle Theory” and the “Fraud Diamond Theory” approaches. The Fraud Triangle Theory argues that while fraudulent action is taking place in defining the elements of press, rationalization, and opportunity, the Fraud Diamond Theory approach argues that in order to achieve these three elements, the capability to carry out a fraud in individuals must be improved.

In this study, it is aimed to investigate the effect of Fraud Diamond elements on fraudulent financial reports. For the scope of the research, data of 26 companies from Manufacturing Industry enterprises operating in BORSA ISTANBUL between 2013 and 2017 were used. Financial reports of the companies are divided into two groups: (1) Fraudulent Financial Reports and (2) Non-Fraud Financial Reports. The hypotheses developed within the scope of the research were tested using the Logistic Regression analysis in IBM SPSS Statistic 20 program.

As a result of the study, it has been determined that there is a negative correlation between borrowing level, asset profitability, independent audit firm, auditor exchanges and institutionalization level, and fraudulent financial reports. It was understood that the change in assets and the size of the audit committee did not have any effect on the fraudulent financial reports.

A persistent and increasing pattern in cash holdings was notable in the aggregate behaviour of Indian corporations around the period from 2007–2008 to 2012–2013. Extant literature suggests that agency conflicts and financing frictions are important determinants of cash holdings. In this chapter the author aims to shed light on the role of corporate governance (CG) in the determination of cash holdings and examined how ownership structure, board and audit-related attributes (used as proxies for the nature of CG) impact cash holdings in the context of an emerging economy, like India. The author employed four different measures of cash and liquidity and 24 structural indicators of CG. Using principal component analysis, the author offers an exploratory inquiry into the dimensions of CG. Thereafter, multiple regression was used to delve into the association between cash holdings (the dependent variable) and CG. Using a sample of 58 top-listed companies the results revealed that the quality of firm-level CG is important in deciding corporate cash holdings. The author reported that firms with stronger CG tend to reduce cash balances and have higher capital expenditures, while in firms with entrenched managers having high cash reserves invest more in current assets. Firms also hold cash for financial flexibility and to take advantage of strategic opportunities as they present themselves. Parallel to this point is the fact that larger balances help firms to avoid uncertainty and hedge themselves against the difficulty of accessing external funds.

Board size has received significant attention among researchers and regulators. However, the advisory role of boards has not been studied much. In this study I examine the notion that investors value larger boards for their advisory capabilities. Prior studies examine board size in the context of monitoring role of corporate boards and find opposite effects on debt holders and equity holders. Using market-based measures of total firm performance, which take both equity and debt into account; I find that larger boards are associated with greater economic value added (EVA). Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2003 and controlling for various firm and industry characteristics, I also find that the board size is positively associated with firm productivity and various other efficiency measures such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Sales-Turnover ratio. I argue that firms with larger boards, valuing the advisory role of directors offer greater compensation to the directors. Overall the results indicate that large board size has a positive impact on firm's performance. The results are robust to alternative measures of firm performance and other key variables.

Corporate crime affects the stability of the international financial system and the business world system has made considerable efforts to fight all aspects of corporate crimes. Fraud and white-collar crime has increased considerably over the recent years and this trend is expected to continue.

This chapter defines corporate crime and its categories as well as considering the ways in which such crime occurs. This is set within the context of other failures such as Enron.

These crimes are considered in the context of ethical behaviour but it is reported that the various measures taken to dissuade these crimes at various levels just have not seems to reduce such crime.

In many respects this chapter introduces the contexts and acts as preparation for the other chapters in the book and so is not exhaustive in scope.

Since not all fraud and abuse is discovered and reported, the cost of fraud to businesses is hard to be estimated.

The chapter discusses the context in which corporate crime occurs.

Indian Companies Act (2013) and revised clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) provides for a major overhaul of corporate governance norms to be adopted by firms in India. Some of the key provisions of the act pertain to board subcommittees. Given this background, the chapter seeks to analyze the role of overall board composition and board subcommittees (audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) on firm performance. In addition, the relationship between ownership and firm performance is analyzed. The study documents that large listed companies in India that have constituted a nomination and remuneration committee have had positive influence on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ). Board subcommittees’ (i.e., audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) independence is positively associated with firm performance as measured by TQ. Overall, the board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, in the presence of a nomination and remuneration committee, board size is negatively associated with firm performance. This study offers insights for policymakers interested in analyzing corporate governance practices in terms of board subcommittees as evidenced from a developing economy such as India.