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Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

This study aims to examine the relationship between the individual auditor’s industry specialization and the audit report lag (hereafter ARD). Further, it explores whether changing in the audit reporting requirement (i.e. the adoption of ISA701) influences the auditor’s industry specialization effect on the ARD.

A large data set of companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm over the period 2010–2019 has been analyzed. Least squares regressions have been estimated to provide empirical evidence for the researched hypotheses.

The research findings indicate that the ARD is shorter for client firms audited by an industry specialist audit partner. Testing for the moderating role of changing in the auditing reporting regulation on the relation between the audit partner’s industry specialization and the ARD, the authors reveal that all client firms (except client firms with industry specialist audit partners) experienced an increase in the ARD. Overall, the baseline regression findings are found to be robust to the endogenous auditor choice and multiple measures of both the ARD and the auditor’s industry specialization.

This paper provides novel evidence on the relationship between the audit reporting lag and industry specialization from the individual auditor perspective, an issue that has hitherto been unexplored. The regression results further contribute to the upsurge debate about the consequences of changing in the audit reporting model by providing consistent support for the importance of industry specialization of the audit partner in minimizing costs derived from the former requirement.

This study aims to investigate the busy season contagion effects on other clients of the Big 4 auditor’s local office associated with the non-timely (NT) filing(s) by large accelerated filer (LAF) client(s) of the office. Specifically, the authors examine the influence such events have on the audit quality and timeliness of other clients of that office.

Using panel data of annual NT filings of LAF clients between 2006 and 2019, the authors apply the ordinary least squares regression technique to model audit reporting lag (ARL) and the logistic regression technique to model the probability of restatements.

Controlling for audit firm, industry and year-fixed effects, the authors find that a LAF NT filing reduces audit quality and audit timeliness of other clients of the office, as measured by restatement risk and ARL. The impact on ARL is most pronounced on the medium and small clients within the office. The deteriorated audit quality is observed for medium clients.

The results of this study have practical implications for auditors and regulators. They reveal the contagion effect in the auditor’s local office with the NT LAF client. The main limitation of the study is the lack of staffing utilization data to allow for drawing conclusions on causality.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to document the contagion effect of NT filings of LAF clients conducted at the auditor’s local office level.

This study aims to investigate whether auditors compromise their independence for economically important clients in family business settings.

The authors empirically examine the research question based on China for the years 2011 to 2020. The dependent variable is the auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions, which is a proxy for auditor independence. The authors use relative client audit fees as a proxy for client importance. To address endogeneity issues in the selection of family firms, the authors use the two-stage least squares regression model and, subsequently, the propensity score matching and Hausman firm fixed effect modeling.

This study reveals that the propensity to issue modified audit opinions is positively correlated with client importance. Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for their economically important family firm clients, whereas such evidence is not found for non-Big-N auditors. Results are consistent and robust to endogeneity test and sensitivity analysis.

This study enriches the literature on auditor independence and the effect of family firms’ ownership structure factors on audit reporting behavior for their economically important clients. Findings may prove useful for managers and practitioners interested in family business.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms use different earnings management approaches when facing financial difficulties and the effects of industry-specialist auditors in constraining those choices. The empirical results suggest that (1) firms with lower risk of business failure but with stronger incentives to adjust earnings upward tend to use real earnings management (REM) income-increasing approaches while (2) at the same time, using discretionary accruals for income-decreasing earnings management, due to constraints imposed by specialist auditors on the use of accrual-based earnings management (AEM). This is consistent with the findings of Chi et al., and the authors do not find similar evidence for the firms with higher risk of failure. Also, (3) regardless of the level of failure risk, firms turn to REM while interestingly, such REM behavior is effectively curbed by industry-leading specialist auditors (specialist auditors with the highest client market share) on financially distressed firms. These results extend the findings of Chi et al. (2011), suggesting that industry-specialist auditors have different tolerance levels for earnings management approaches by firms with different levels of business failure risk. That is, when auditing clients with higher risk of failure, specialist auditors are more likely to maintain higher audit quality through more stringent audit testing and use of more audit staff time to prevent an occurrence of audit failure.

The authors examine earnings management behavior across firms in Taiwan with different levels of business failure risk and the effects of audit partner industry specialization in constraining that behavior. Chi et al. (2011) studied low-risk firms with incentives to adjust earnings upward and found firms use REM when the auditors constrain AEM. The authors extend the work of Chi et al. and observe firms with different levels of failure risk.

The authors find (1) lower risk firms may use discretionary accruals to adjust earnings downward while the authors find no similar evidence for financially distressed firms, (2) lower risk firms may use REM when their industry-specialist auditors curb AEM and (3) the industry leaders among specialist auditors do the same for the financially distressed firms. The results demonstrate the extent to which industry-specialist auditors apply different tolerance levels for earnings management behaviors across firms with different levels of failure risk.

The study contributes to the literature in the following three ways: first, the authors fill a gap in the existing literature by comparing firms with higher risk of business failure to firms with lower risk of business failure to explore the possible difference in the two different kinds of earnings management behavior; second, the authors extend the findings of Chi et al. (2011) and examine whether specialist auditors, when auditing firms with higher risk of business failure, will input more audit effort to constrain their clients' use of REM and third, since business failures have a significant impact on the capital markets and any associated audit failures can have an even greater negative impact on investor confidence, the study provides information useful to auditors and regulators in the formation of salient policy regarding the use of REM by firms experiencing high risk of business failure.

The purpose of this study is to examine if partner cross-contagion in audit offices is associated with client reporting quality. To this end, the authors test if the presence in an audit office of a partner with a highly aggressive style is associated with the reporting quality of other partners’ clients. Partners with a highly aggressive style are identified by their tendency to approve favorable client reporting. The authors add to the existing literature that provides limited and equivocal evidence on audit office cross-contagion.

Partner style is determined in an estimation period from 2010 to 2014. Aggressive style is identified when partners tend to approve favorable client reporting, which is shown by a positive value for their clients’ median discretionary accruals. Partners are considered to exhibit a highly aggressive style if they have positive median client discretionary accruals within the 90th percentile. Cross-contagion analysis is then conducted in a test period from 2015 to 2019 by determining if the presence in an office of a partner with a highly aggressive style is associated with the reporting quality of other partners’ clients. Two measures of client reporting quality used. These are the accuracy of current-period accruals in predicting period-ahead cash flows and earnings management related to benchmark beating.

This study finds partner cross-contagion of highly aggressive style in Big 4 offices that is associated with lower client reporting quality for non-Metals and Mining industry clients. This cross-contagion only occurs when the contagious partner has a very high level of aggressive style. This study finds Big 4 partners are susceptible to aggressive style cross-contagion regardless of their own idiosyncratic style. The results of this study show more cross-contagion in small Big 4 offices and mitigation of cross-contagion for economically important clients. Cross-contagion in non-Big 4 offices is observed for Metals and Mining industry clients.

By determining style from partners’ past clients’ discretionary accruals, this study extends prior cross-contagion research that relies on restatements to identify style. This study examines several other cross-contagion issues not addressed in prior studies. These include differences in cross-contagion for Big 4 and non-Big 4 offices and for large and small Big 4 offices, partners’ susceptibility to cross-contagion and the influence of client importance.

The purpose of this study is to examine how auditors would react when there are exogenous negative shocks to their client portfolios.

Using a sample of 31,256 firm-year observations (2001–2016), the authors investigate whether industry shocks to a subset of an auditor’s clients distract the auditor and affect the professional skepticism applied in the audits of other clients.

The authors find that clients of distracted auditors are more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts, suggesting that auditors’ professional skepticism is compromised by distractive events. The cross-sectional analyses reveal that the negative impact of the distractive events on audit quality is more pronounced when the distracted auditors audit less important clients, face lower third-party legal liabilities and experience higher growth. Using an alternative measure of audit quality, the additional analysis shows that clients of distracted auditors exhibit a higher probability of restating their earnings in subsequent years. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that when distracted, auditors render lower quality audit.

The study complements recent work by Cassell et al. (2019), which shows that the 2008–2009 financial crisis affected the quality of the audits of nonbank clients of bank-specialized auditors. While Cassell et al. (2019) focus on one shock (financial crisis) to one industry (i.e. the financial services industry), the study examines more frequent shocks over a wide range of industries to identify the potential effects of distractive events, improving the generalizability of the findings to all industries and all auditors (specialist and nonspecialist) in nonrecession periods.

The paper aims to examine the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activity of audit firms.

Using hand-collected data on all Chinese audit firms’ CSR activities from 2007 to 2020, this study constructs two measures to proxy for audit firms’ CSR engagement: a dummy variable to indicate whether an auditor engages in CSR activities in year t and the frequency with which auditors conduct CSR activities in year t. The authors use ordinary least squares regression as a baseline methodology, along with the entropy balancing method and instrumental variable approach to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns.

The baseline results show that socially responsible audit firms provide higher quality audit services than their counterparts. In particular, the authors find that clients audited by socially responsible audit firms are less likely to receive an aggressively clean opinion. Moreover, the findings suggest that CSR activities related to community and employees are more relevant in improving audit quality compared with those related to other dimensions of CSR. Further analyses show that capital markets and audit clients react positively to audit-firm CSR activity. Audit firms engaging in CSR increase their audit inputs in response to risky clients, as compared with their counterparts. Finally, cross-sectional analyses show that the positive relationship is more pronounced for non-Big 4 and non-industry experts and is attenuated by within-firm geographic dispersion. In terms of client characteristics, the positive effect of audit-firm CSR is stronger when their clients face the higher financial risk or have lower CSR awareness than others. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the ethical view of audit-firm CSR engagement.

The study advances investors’ understanding of audit-firm CSR engagement and helps them evaluate the credibility of audited financial reports. Besides, the findings may also help guide the audit firms to conduct more CSR activities and help guide the audit clients to choose CSR audit firms.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study provides the first large-sample evidence by empirically examining the association between audit-firm CSR activity and audit service performance. Besides, this paper also explores audit-firm CSR activity from two competing perspectives, thereby providing a comprehensive understanding of this issue. Finally, this work responds to the call for more CSR research in emerging markets.

This rich descriptive study examines auditors' client risk assessment (i.e. “key audit matters”/critical audit matters) disclosures in expanded audit reports of 328 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies. The study compares auditor-identified client risks with corporate risk disclosures identified in audit committee reports, in terms of number and type of risks. The research also compares variation in auditor-identified client risks between individual Big 4 audit firms. In addition, the study examines auditor ranking of their client risks disclosed.

The study manually content analyses disclosures in audit reports and audit committee reports of a sample of 328 FTSE-350 companies with 2015 year-ends.

Audit committees identify more risks than auditors (23% more risks). However, auditor-identified client risks and audit-committee-identified risks are similar (80% similar), as are auditor-identified client risks between the individual Big 4 audit firms. Only ten (3%) audit reports rank the importance of auditor-identified client risks.

Sample is restricted to one year, one jurisdiction, large-listed companies and companies audited by Big 4 auditors.

The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

The paper mobilises institutional theory to interpret the findings. The findings suggest that auditor-identified client risks in expanded audit reports may demonstrate mimetic behaviour in terms of similarity with audit-committee-identified risks and similarity between individual Big 4 audit firms. The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

The purpose of this paper is to describe, illustrate and provide a deeper understanding of team composition and labor allocation in audit teams by quantifying the exact value of resources at different levels of the audit production. Audit teams have been considered as a black box in audit research. Therefore, this paper reports descriptive statistics on (levels and proportions of) hours and costs allocated to auditor ranks (and the number and value, i.e. billing rates, of auditors for different ranks and the entire team) to shed new light on audit teams.

This study uses a proprietary data set containing disaggregated information on hours, costs and billing rates for each team member in each of 908 audit engagements. The data are provided by a Swedish Big 4 audit firm. The study uses a purely descriptive approach and categorizes auditors into seven ranks. As size and the publicly listed status are crucial determinants of audit production, the paper splits engagements in public and private companies and reports statistics for size quartiles of both public and private clients.

The paper provides descriptive statistics for (1) client size, (2) audit team members, (3) audit hours, (4) audit costs, (5) proportion of audit hours, (6) proportion of audit costs, (7) billing rates and (8) variation of billing rates. Results show that compared to private clients, the audit firm allocates higher effort from auditors in higher ranks and lower effort from auditors in lower ranks to public clients. Another finding is that allocation varies with client size for private clients, but less so for public clients.

In an area with sparse literature, this descriptive study serves as a first step to improve our understanding and guide future research. It provides concrete support for previously known theory.