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We present results of several experiments that deal with endogenous entry in auctions and auction valuation. One observation that is constant across all the experiments we report is that laboratory subjects have a difficult time evaluating potential gains from auctions. Even after they are given some experience with particular auctions, the uncertainty inherent in the auctions (the probability of winning as well as the potential gains from winning) makes it difficult for subjects to compare different auction mechanisms. This highlights the need for new experimental procedures to be used for testing theories that involve endogenous auction entry in the laboratory.

Motivated by both prior experimental work and by field observations, we consider the performance of two different sealed bid versions of the silent auction. These are important institutional alternatives to the more familiar ascending price silent auction. In a new series of laboratory experiments, we investigate the effects of the different institutions both on aggregate efficiency and upon aggregate revenue generation.

Outlines the principle of the Dutch auction, whereby the price begins at a high level and decreases by steps until a bid is made. Describes an integrated hardware and software system which uses Internet communications to enable remotely created bidders to participate in real‐time Dutch auctions and which meets the stringent requirement that synchrony be maintained among bidders’ terminals to ensure that each bidder has a fair chance to bid at the current offer price. Defines the principal functions of the system and characterizes its available resources. Illustrates implementation using a prototype design. Pays particular attention to bidder terminal synchronization, bidder authentication, and auction client security. Includes the possibility of a system variant using ISDN interconnect and PC‐based bidders’ terminals.

It is found that one unit root, common trend is shared by the quarterly auction price series of five frequently auctioned types of stamps. The common trends analysis provides specific, stationary linear combinations, or cointegrating portfolios, of the auction price levels. The quarterly returns for the system of cointegrated auction prices can be represented by an error correction model using past returns and cointegrating vectors. There is evidence of a positive relationship between changes in the common trend and leading changes in industrial production

Online auctions on the Internet have become popular. However, the communication techniques currently used in the online auction industry are primarily based on unicast technology. Unicast‐based online auctions suffer from unbearable delay of the communication between the auctioneer and bidders. Recently, multicast is changing the Internet environment, and is penetrating to the online auction field. This study describes a model for multicast‐based online auctions. The laboratory experiments demonstrate that the communication performance of multicast‐based online auctions is significantly better than that of traditional unicast‐based auctions.

Purpose – This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% auction versus a 100% free allocation of CO2 permits under the rules and parameters that mimic the EU ETS (imperfect competition, uncertainty in emissions' control, and allowing banking), with environmental targets more restrictive than the current ones but foreseeable for the near future.

Methodology/approach – Two experimental treatments were run to achieve our goal. Both included the rules and the parameters that parallel the EU ETS structure, the only difference being the rule for the primary allocation of permits.

Findings – Our experimental results indicate that the EU ETS has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions, achieving targets considerably more restrictive than the current ones at high efficiency levels, both with auctioned and free emission permits.

Practical implications – Concerns about undue scarcity, and corresponding high prices, in secondary markets generated by a primary auction market are not warranted under the proposed dynamic auction format. This adds arguments favoring auctioning over grandfathering as the rule for the initial allocation of emission permits in the EU ETS.

Originality/value of chapter – This study implements a theoretically appropriate auction format for the primary allocation of emission permits (the Ausubel (2004) auction) and incorporates a first attempt to include in the analysis measures of the risk preferences of subjects participating in emission permits experiments. These characteristics are for the first time implemented under a complex experimental design (including uncertainty of emission abatement, and banking), trying to parallel the EU ETS trading environment.

Many researchers suggest that investment bankers underprice IPOs. However, from 1989 to 1996, all Japanese IPOs were auctioned, reducing the role of underwriters. Initial returns of Japanese price-competitive IPOs are not found lower than underwriter-priced U.S. IPOs. Issue size, firm size, general market movements, insider sales levels, and underwriter quality are not highly related to initial returns under price-competitive auctions. However, there appears to be a strong partial adjustment phenomenon. Thus, price-competitive auctions did not result in significantly lower initial returns, but did reduce the impacts of many traditional variables found to significantly affect initial returns in U.S. underwriter-priced IPOs.

This paper addresses social interatcion and the formation of value beliefs in markets. It empirically examines value construction by analyzing rebidding behavior in online auctions, wherein individuals reassess the maximum price they would pay for a given product. Statistical analyses of more than 10,000 auctions containing more than 55,000 individual bids on the auction website eBay suggest that rebidding is positively associated with a lack of auction-internal price information and bidder inexperience. Analyses also suggest that engaging in rebidding is positively associated with an individual winning an auction. This work, therefore, helps to provide a deeper understanding about valuation, price formation, and the organization of markets. This work contributes to domains of research related to the construction of value and the emergence, evaluation, and legitimization of new products, services, and ideas.

We report an experiment conducted to gain insight into factors that may affect revenues in English auctions and lotteries, two commonly used charity fund-raising formats. In particular, we examine how changes in the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public component of bidding, and how changes in the distribution of values affect the revenue properties of each format. Although we observe some predicted comparative static effects, the dominant result is that lottery revenues uniformly exceed English auction revenues. The similarity of lottery and English auction bids across sales formats appears to drive the excess lottery revenues.

This paper aims to demonstrate that Facebook likes affect outcomes in nonprofit settings. Specifically, Facebook likes influence affinity to nonprofits, which, in turn, affects fundraising outcomes.

The authors report three studies that establish that relationship. To examine social contagion, Study 1 – an auction field study – relies on selling artwork created by underprivileged youth. To isolate signaling, Study 2 manipulates the number of total Facebook likes on a page. To isolate commitment escalation, Study 3 manipulates whether a participant clicks a Facebook like.

The results show that Facebook likes increase willingness to contribute in nonprofit settings and that the process goes through affinity, as well as through Facebook impressions and bidding intensity. The total number of Facebook likes has a direct signaling effect and an indirect social contagion effect.

The effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms is limited to nonprofit settings and only applies to short-term effects.

Facebook likes serve as both a quality signal and a commitment mechanism. The magnitude of commitment escalation is larger, and the relationship is moderated by familiarity with the organization. Managers should target Facebook likes at those less familiar with the organization and should prioritize getting a potential donor to leave a like as a step leading to donation, in essence mapping a donor journey from prospective to active, where Facebook likes play an essential role in the journey. In a charity auction setting, the donor journey involves an additional step of bidder intensity.

The approach the authors study is shown effective in nonprofit settings but does not appear to extend to corporate social responsibility more broadly.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first investigation to map Facebook likes to a seller’s journey through signals and commitment, as well as the only investigation to map Facebook likes to charity auctions and show the effectiveness of this in the field.