Search results

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on how firm-specific and macroeconomic uncertainty affects shareholders’ valuation of a firm’s cash holdings. This extends previous work on this issue by highlighting the importance of the source of uncertainty. The findings indicate that increases in firm-specific risk generally increase the value of cash while increases in macroeconomic risk generally decrease the value of cash. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash. The authors extend the analysis to financially constrained and unconstrained firms.

The authors test the hypothesis that the marginal effect of cash holdings on excess stock returns is sensitive to uncertainty. To compute this marginal effect, the authors adopt and extend the approach of Faulkender and Wang (2006) to the authors’ more elaborate model.

The findings indicate that different sources of uncertainty affect the value of cash holdings differently. Findings indicate that increases in firm-specific risk generally increase the value of cash while increases in macroeconomic risk generally decrease the value of cash. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash. The authors also extend the findings to financially constrained and unconstrained firms.

The findings indicate that the source of uncertainty firm-specific vs macroeconomic risk matters. The two sources of risk may have quite different effects on shareholders’ valuation of a firm’s cash holdings. Results from alternative sources of findings are new. These new findings are robust to alternative definitions of the unexpected change in cash.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies).

Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms.

Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms.

This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures.

Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between executive compensation linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm risk. It also explores the moderating role of CSR-linked compensation on the relationship between risk-taking incentives provided in executive compensation and firm risk.

This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and firm-fixed effects regressions to estimate the association between CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. Furthermore, it employs instrumental variable, propensity score matching and first-order difference approaches to address concerns about endogeneity and sample selection.

Benchmark results show that CSR-linked compensation reduces both total and idiosyncratic measures of risk. Further results indicate that CSR-linked compensation reduces firm risk only when risk is above the optimal level and has no significant effect when risk is below the optimal level. Additionally, tests show that CSR-linked compensation also mitigates the positive effect of Vega of executive compensation on risk and this mitigation effect is significant only when risk is above the optimal level.

The empirical results of this study show that boards can use CSR-linked compensation not only to induce higher social performance but also as a risk management tool to manage risk, especially when risk is above value increasing optimal levels. Furthermore, boards can use CSR-linked compensation to mitigate excessive risk-taking induced by option compensation.

This study contributes to the emerging literature on CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. To our knowledge, this is the first study that documents the direct risk-reducing effect of CSR-linked compensation and its mitigating effect on the relation between Vega of executive compensation and firm risk.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether abnormal returns to a fundamental signal (FS) strategy disappear after the publication of Abarbanell and Bushee (1998).

Using data on NYSE/AMEX firms from 1974 to 2012, this research estimates annual Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression of risk-adjusted buy-and-hold returns on the FSs after controlling for contemporaneous earnings changes and a proxy for market risk.

This paper finds that predictable hedge returns to the FSs substantially decrease and become statistically insignificant after the Abarbanell and Bushee’s publication date. This research also finds that the FSs have not lost their importance to equity valuation process; value relevance of the FSs has not diminished, and the FSs have retained their predictive ability over time. The evidence on changing information and trading environments appears to contribute to the disappearing abnormal returns to a FS strategy.

This paper adds to the growing body of literature on the persistence of pricing anomalies.