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Article

Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Mahsa Noori-Daryan and Shib Sankar Sana

This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios. Demand depends on a price, refund and quality where the producer controls quality and the vendor proposes a refund policy to purchasers to encourage them to order more.

Design/methodology/approach

In the first scenario, the members seek to optimize their optimum decision variables under a centralized decision-making method while in the second scenario, a decentralized system is assumed where the members make a decision about variables and profits under a non-cooperative game. In the third scenario, a cost-sharing agreement is concluded between the members to provide a high-quality item to the purchasers.

Findings

The performance of the proposed model is investigated by illustrating a numerical example. A sensitivity analysis of some key parameters has been done to study the effect of the changes on the optimal values of the decision variables and profits. From sensitivity analysis, the real features are observed and mentioned in this section.

Originality/value

This research examines the behavior of partners in a green supply chain facing with a group of purchasers whose demand is the function of a price, greenery degree and refund rate. This proposed mathematical model is developed and analyzed which has an implication in supply chain model.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 15 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

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Article

Ata Allah Taleizadeh and Mahtab Sherafati

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Design/methodology/approach

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Findings

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

Originality/value

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 14 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

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Article

Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Mahshid Yadegari and Shib Sankar Sana

The purpose of this study is to formulate two multi-product single-machine economic production quantity (EPQ) models by considering imperfect products. Two policies are…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to formulate two multi-product single-machine economic production quantity (EPQ) models by considering imperfect products. Two policies are assumed to deal with imperfect products: selling them at discount and applying a reworking process.

Design/methodology/approach

A screening process is used to identify imperfect items during and after production. Selling the imperfect items at a discount is examined in the first model and the reworking policy in the second model. In both models, demand during the production process is satisfied only by perfect items. Data collected from a case company are used to illustrate the performance of the two models. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is carried out by varying the most important parameters of the models.

Findings

The case study in this research is used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed models, i.e. the EPQ model with salvaging and reworking imperfect items. The models are applied to a high-tech un-plasticized polyvinyl chloride (UPVC) doors and windows manufacturer that produces different types of doors and windows. ROGAWIN Co. is a privately owned company that started in 2001 with fully automatic production lines. Finally, the results of applying the different ways of handling the imperfect items are discussed, along with managerial insights.

Originality/value

In real-world production systems, manufacturing imperfect products is unavoidable. That is why, it is important to make a proper decision about imperfect products to reduce overall production costs. Recently, applying a reworking strategy has gained the most interest when it comes to handling this problem. The principal idea of this research is to maximize the total profit of manufacturing systems by optimizing the period length under some capacity constraints. The proposed models were applied to a company of manufacturing UPVC doors and windows.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 14 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

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Article

Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Moeen Sammak Jalali and Shib Sankar Sana

This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports.

Design/methodology/approach

In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models.

Findings

The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis.

Research limitations/implications

The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database.

Originality/value

The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 13 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

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