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To further promote application of BIM technology in construction of prefabricated buildings, influencing factors and evolution laws of willingness to apply BIM technology are explored from the perspective of willingness of participants.

In this paper, a tripartite game model involving the design firm, component manufacturer and construction firm is constructed and a system dynamics method is used to explore the influencing factors and game evolution path of three parties' application of BIM technology, from three perspectives, cost, benefit and risk.

The government should formulate measures for promoting the application of BIM according to different BIM application willingness of the parties. When pursuing deeper BIM application, the design firm should pay attention to reducing the speculative benefits of the component manufacturer and the construction firm. The design firm and the component manufacturer should pay attention to balancing the cost and benefit of the design firm while enhancing collaborative efforts. When the component manufacturer and the construction firm cooperate closely, it is necessary to pay attention to balanced distribution of interests of both parties and lower the risk of BIM application.

This study fills a research gap by comprehensively investigating the influencing factors and game evolution paths of willingness of the three parties to apply BIM technology to prefabricated buildings. The research helps to effectively improve the building quality and construction efficiency, and is expected to contribute to the sustainability of built environment in the context of circular economy in China.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

Promoting low-carbon in the construction industry is important for achieving the overall low-carbon goals. Public–private partnership is very popular in public infrastructure projects. However, different perceptions of low-carbon and behaviors of public and private sectors can hinder the realization of low-carbon in these projects. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate towards low-carbon goals, an evolutionary game model is constructed.

An evolutionary game model that considers the opportunistic behavior of the participants is developed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) under different scenarios are examined, and the factors that influence the willingness to cooperate between the government and private investors are investigated.

The results illustrate that a well-designed system of profit distribution and subsidies can enhance collaboration. Excessive subsidies have negative impact on cooperation between the two sides, because these two sides can weaken income distribution and lead to the free-riding behavior of the government. Under the situation of two ESSs, there is also an optimal revenue distribution coefficient that maximizes the probability of cooperation. With the introduction of supervision and punishment mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of private investors is effectively constrained.

An evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the field of low-carbon construction. Based on the analysis of the model, this paper summarizes the conditions and strategies that can enable the two sectors to cooperate.

The promotion of autonomous vehicles introduces privacy and security risks, underscoring the pressing need for responsible innovation implementation. To more effectively address the societal risks posed by autonomous vehicles, considering collaborative engagement of key stakeholders is essential. This study aims to provide insights into the governance of potential privacy and security issues in the innovation of autonomous driving technology by analyzing the micro-level decision-making processes of various stakeholders.

For this study, the authors use a nuanced approach, integrating key stakeholder theory, perceived value theory and prospect theory. The study constructs a model based on evolutionary game for the privacy and security governance mechanism of autonomous vehicles, involving enterprises, governments and consumers.

The governance of privacy and security in autonomous driving technology is influenced by key stakeholders’ decision-making behaviors and pivotal factors such as perceived value factors. The study finds that the governmental is influenced to a lesser extent by the decisions of other stakeholders, and factors such as risk preference coefficient, which contribute to perceived value, have a more significant influence than appearance factors like participation costs.

This study lacks an investigation into the risk sensitivity of various stakeholders in different scenarios.

The study delineates the roles and behaviors of key stakeholders and contributes valuable insights toward addressing pertinent risk concerns within the governance of autonomous vehicles. Through the study, the practical application of Responsible Innovation theory has been enriched, addressing the shortcomings in the analysis of micro-level processes within the framework of evolutionary game.

The purpose of this study is to explore the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors in complementary product markets. Drawing on the coopetition theory, the authors examined the evolutionary trends of the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors and explore the main influence factors.

The authors used Lotka–Volterra model to analyze the coopetition relationship between platform owners and complementors, including the evolutionary trends as well as the results. Considering the feasibility of sample data collection, simulation is used to verify the effects of different factors on the evolution of coopetition relationships.

The results show that there are four possible results of the competition in the complementary products market. That comprises “winner-take-all for platform owners,” “winner-take-all for complementors,” “stable competitive coexistence” and “unstable competitive coexistence,” where “stable competitive coexistence” is the optimal evolutionary state. Moreover, the results of competitive evolution are determined by innovation subjects’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rate, the initial market benefits of the two innovators and the overall benefits of the complementary product markets influence the time to reach a steady state.

The study provides new insights into the entry of platform owners into complementary markets, and the findings highlight the fact that in complementary product markets, platform owners and complementors should seek “competitive coexistence” rather than “winner-takes-all.” Moreover, the authors also enrich the coopetition theory by revealing the core factors that influence the evolution of coopetition relationships, which further enhance the analysis of the evolutionary process of coopetition relationships.

Lack of knowledge-sharing behavior (KSB) among construction project members hinders propagation of expertise, working methods, and lessons learned within an organization, and deprives the organization of a sustainable competitive edge. The present study investigates the combined effect of organizational antecedents of construction projects on members' KSB and provides a reference for developing management initiatives to motivate KSB.

Based on organizational theory and organizational behavior literature, five organizational antecedents associated with KSB from organizational culture and structure were identified. Subsequently, the authors used survey data from 152 organization members in Chinese construction enterprises to conduct the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and reveal configurations of organizational antecedents influencing KSB.

This study identifies five configuration paths that are sufficient for shaping the KSB of construction project members, integrated into two types of driving modes, namely “trust-driven” and “incentive-driven”. Relevant discussions can guide managers of construction project organizations to position the driving strategies of KSB that match different organizational scenarios or constraints.

By analyzing the configuration effects of organizational antecedents on KSB, novel clues are provided for governing the deficiency of KSB among construction project members. This contributes to the literature on knowledge transfer and organizational behavior. The findings provide actionable insights for improving knowledge flow in construction project organizations and designing KSB guidance regimes.

Trust is the glue that holds cooperative relationships together and often exists in an asymmetric manner. The purpose of this study is to explore how to mitigate the issue of losses or increased transaction costs caused by opportunistic behavior in a soft environment where trust asymmetry is quite common and difficult to avoid.

This study focuses on examining asymmetric trust between the government and the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Drawing upon both project realities and relevant literature, the primary conditional variables influencing asymmetric trust are identified. These variables encompass power perception asymmetry, information asymmetry, interaction behavior, risk perception differences and government-side control. Subsequently, through the use of a survey questionnaire, binary-matched data from both the government and the private sector are collected. The study employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to conduct a configurational analysis, aiming to investigate the causal pathways that trigger asymmetric trust.

No single conditional variable is a necessary condition for the emergence of trust asymmetry. The pathways leading to a high degree of trust asymmetry can be categorized into two types: those dominated by power perception and those involving a combination of multiple factors. Differences in power perception play a crucial role in the occurrence of high trust asymmetry, yet the influence of other conditional variables in triggering trust asymmetry should not be overlooked.

The findings can contribute to advancing the study of trust relationships in the field of Chinese PPP projects. Furthermore, they hold practical value in facilitating the enhancement of trust relationships between the government and the private sector.

Due to the cross-network effect, two-sided users communicate with each other, producing a coupling network. To study the spread of platform self-operation in two-sided users' marketing and purchasing tactics, this paper considers the differences in reputation acquired by platform-owned and third-party operating channels.

This study proposes a two-layer network with cross-network links: one layer represents the social network of consumers, while the other layer represents the competitive network of buyers. A closed system of differential equations, based on the binary dynamics of the stochastic network, is developed to study the trend and stability points of the platform self-operation dissemination. Then the overall benefits of platform are analyzed to unify the platform diffusion and pricing strategies.

The degree of difference in social influence and cross-network effects affect diffusion synergistically. Cross-network effects hinder diffusion when there is a significant difference of social influence between consumers and sellers but promote diffusion when there is little difference of social influence between consumers and sellers. Additionally, the network weights and reputation gap exhibit a nonlinear correlation with diffusion. For pricing strategy of the platform, it can achieve maximum profit when the pricing of self-operated goods and third-party-operated goods is equal.

This study considers the complex network architecture created by bilateral markets and the dynamic influence of group interactions on product. Additionally, this study takes reputation into account when considering the price and dissemination tactics of various operating channels, offering guidelines for platforms to control merchants and mediate disputes between various operating channels.

The proposed model aims to consider the flying hours as a criterion to initiate maintenance operation. Based on this condition, aircraft must be checked before flying hours threshold is met. After receiving maintenance service, the model ignores previous flying hours and the aircraft can keep on flying until the threshold value is reached again. Moreover, the model considers aircraft age and efficiency to assign them to flights.

The aircraft maintenance routing problem (AMRP), as one of the most important problems in the aviation industry, determines the optimal route for each aircraft along with meeting maintenance requirements. This paper presents a bi-objective mixed-integer programming model for AMRP in which several criteria such as aircraft efficiency and ferrying flights are considered.

As the solution approaches, epsilon-constraint method and a non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA-II), including a new initializing algorithm, are used. To verify the efficiency of NSGA-II, 31 test problems in different scales are solved using NSGA-II and GAMS. The results show that the optimality gap in NSGA-II is less than 0.06%. Finally, the model was solved based on real data of American Eagle Airlines extracted from Kaggle datasets.

The authors confirm that it is an original paper, has not been published elsewhere and is not currently under consideration of any other journal.

Drawing on the dynamic capability view (DCV), this research determines the suitable configurations of resilience strategies for sustainable tourism supply chain performance amidst “extreme” disruptive events affecting the entire supply chain.

This research applies a multi-study and multi-method approach. Study 1 utilizes in-depth interviews to identify a list of tourism supply chain sustainability risks and resilience strategies. Study 2, using quality function deployment (QFD) technique, determines the most important resilience strategies corresponding to highly significant risks. Study 3, on the other hand, adopts a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to determine the best recipe of resilience strategies and risks to make the tourism supply chain performance sustainable.

The findings reveal that sustainable tourism performance during an extreme disruptive event (e.g. COVID-19 health crisis) depends on the combined effect of tourism resilience strategies and risks instead of their individual effect.

The research findings offer significant managerial implications. Managers may experiment with multiple causal conditions of risks and resilience strategies to engender the expected outcome.

This research extends current knowledge on tourism supply chain and offers insights for managers to mitigate the risks and ensures sustainable performance in the context of extreme disruptive events.