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The purpose of this chapter is to study the essence and specifics of the process of establishment and development of information economy in Asian countries and to create its conceptual model.

The process of establishment and development of information economy is studied based on the indicators that were systematized according to the basic elements of information economy. The indicators of technosphere (technological support) are the information and communication technologies (ICT) development index according to the International Telecommunication Union and labor efficiency in the ICT spheres according to the OECD. The indicators of sociosphere (social core) are the Internet level of society according to the World Wide Web Foundation and employment of specialists in the ICT spheres according to the OECD. The indicators of economic sphere (economic pinnacle) are added value of the ICT spheres and contribution of investments to the ICT in the growth of GDP according to the OECD, as well as the Index of Digital Economy according to digital single market. The indicators of the target result (efficiency of information economy) are expenditures for innovations in the spheres of the ICT according to the OECD, share of high-tech export according to the World Bank, and the index of innovational development according to the INSEAD, WIPO, and Cornell University. The research is performed by the leading countries (as per the socio-economic development index) of the Asian regions – China, South Korea, and Japan – on global economic system (according to 2017 data).

The authors concluded that the leading countries of Asia made progress in information economy’s formation, and the process in these countries has been unique, but common peculiarities allowed defining the Asian model of information economy.

It is recommended to use the offered conceptual model for studying the process of information economy’s formation in Asian countries and its comparison with the process in other regions of the world.

The introduction of the 22 member countries of the 4+10+2+6 model of the Asian economy is the immediate task. Japan, Korea, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar constitute the now-famous 4+10 model. Following the principle of inclusion, Mongolia, Chinese Taipei, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, as they belong to the regional map of the continent of Asia, are the eight remaining member countries (see Chapter 1). An overview of Asia's 22 member continental economy the AE-22, with its 3.6 billion people (2006) who have made the region of Asia their home in a land area of 20.5 million km² should be welcome. To put these figures in perspective, the AE-22 comprises only 13.7 percent of the world's land area, but is home to over half the world's population. Tables 2.1–2.4, presented below, illustrate the various figures relating to population, land area, GDP, and GDP per capita of the member nations of the AE-22.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama continues to actively promote his party's East Asian Community (EAC), which he had as a centrepiece of his coalition government. This chapter supplements an earlier one where I compare the EAC with that of the late South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's Northeast Asian Community (NEAC) and examine the impediments that have been the cause of friction in the region, the removal of which is fundamental to the creation of these communities, and show that that they will be around for a very long time. This chapter concentrates on what the EAC can learn from the European Union experience since both Hatoyama and Roh have stated that it is the EU that has been the source of their inspiration. It argues that the basic requirements for a ‘customs union’, let alone a ‘common market’ or ‘economic community’, will not be realised by the EAC in the foreseeable future. This suggests that the best that can be hoped for is a ‘preferential trade and investment arrangement’, between China, together with Hong Kong and Taiwan, Japan, both the Koreas and the United States, otherwise one must wonder why the EAC or NEAC is needed, rather than the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 that are presently in the making. The problem is that both Hatoyama and Roh have ruled out the United States as a full member while at the same time they want it to continue to provide security for the region when full membership would enhance that. Nevertheless, the vision is admirable and should be desired by the whole world, not just the parties directly involved, so should receive our full support.

Historically, Asia was known for its history of ancient civilizations, philosophies and religions, performing arts and exotic lifestyles, and of course, spicy culinary specialties. The rest of the world made tremendous efforts to discover this land of charm and mysticism. Asia, however, was not known for its economic scores. In general, the Asian economies were preindustrialized, traditional, and agricultural. The share of gross domestic product (GDP) from the agricultural sector was relatively large as the industrial revolution had yet to reach Asia. People farmed with primitive indigenous tools and the marginal productivity of labor was low. Hence, the income of the individual farmer, man or woman, remained insignificant and poverty was the overall end product. As late as the 1970s, ranking economists questioned if Asia beyond Japan could ever industrialize (Krugman, 1994; Lau and Kim, 1994). The doubt is no more. The historic success of the import–export-led growth model in the context of Asia has been robustly explained (Klein, 1990). The world now marvels at the success of Asia's industrial revolution.

Literature on economic cooperation among sovereign nation state economies has been extensive. In the post-WWII decades, the two Breton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, each with 184 member states, have been instituted to sustain the global financial system for the noncommunist free-market economies. Under the umbrella of the UN, the institutions such as the UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNITAR, the WHO; and the World Food Organization (WFO) have their respective economic assignments. The WTO, currently with 148 sovereign nation state members, plays a large role in the negotiation of global trade agreements; an international regime of free and competitive trade has been a subject of numerous substantive negotiations. In 2008, the WTO failed to bridge the gap between the developed nations led by the EU and the USA, and the developing nations led by China, India, and Brazil, leaving the Doha Agreement still unsuccessful. Negotiations may resume in 2009.

The success of the European Union is without comparison. With the inclusion of the European Free Trade Association, as well as much of Eastern Europe (a likely inevitable event by the turn of the century) it will have a population, GNP, economic and political force second to none among the world′s great powers. The tripartite NAFTA between the USA, Canada and Mexico may be only the precursor to a North American Common Market. Countries in the Pacific are taking notice of these economic pairings and wondering what they might have to do to compete against either or both. The inevitable conclusion to these two Common Markets appears to be efforts towards the creation of a Pacific Rim Common Market (PRCM). Examines the factors behind the success of the European Common Market, compares them with the present situation in the Pacific Rim, provides a set of prerequisites necessary before a successfully operating PRCM can develop, offers several alternatives to what an eventual PRCM may look like, and discusses the current likelihood of a PRCM. Concludes that any PRCM must include the USA to offer balance and offset potential Japanese economic hegemony. The likelihood for a PRCM in the near future is dim, owing to immense differences between the potential member nations and the lack of experience in working together for mutual, regional interests instead of national interests.

This introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.

This study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.

This study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.

Many Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.

The strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

The term success in this paper is measured by the yardstick of both material and non‐material ones. This study attempts to examine the success story behind Malaysia's development with evidences drawn from both the conventionally used criteria together with the Islamically motivated universal values and ethos. Of the conventional factors, political consolidation of the first Prime Minister in the presence of dynamic enterprising ability of the Chinese as well as South Indian Community based on family values played a pivotal role in creating a foundation for development. The majority Malays, on the other hand, being the victim of colonial legacies and multi‐farious historical phenomenon were by‐passed. Subsequently, the big bargain of 1957, the year of independence by way of securing Malay special rights in the constitution laid the foundation for new strategy of development based on distributive justice. The New Economic Policy with the twin objetives of eradicating poverty and restructuring society could not have been implemented in the absence of universal values such as loyalty, tolerance, sympathy, caring and sharing being demonstrated by all the races regardless of socio‐economic and political superiority. This paper thus argues that from the very beginning the committed and pragmatic leadership, policy continuation, policy dynamism and policy flexibility, among many others, acted as a catalyst for the success story behind Malaysia's development.

This paper is focused on my search over nearly 60 years for an understanding of marketing – not just as a management technology, but as a social discipline which gives meaning and purpose to the technology.

This paper illustrates my life as an academic in context, which began with a strong focus on marketing in contemporary management and went on to conclude that marketing is much more than management. It was my travels across the world to widely differing markets and marketplaces that led me to this conclusion. I saw individuals, groups and organizations linking with each other in the voluntary exchange of economic and social value, self-organizing into increasingly complex networks that in the end become the institutions that frame marketing action.

I gradually came to see marketing in a much wider, intensely human setting, and to realize some of the complexities of the networks that marketing activities generate.

My story may be of assistance to younger scholars beginning a career in marketing.

Marketing is much more than management and if re-framed should/could stand alongside other social sciences in considering social and economic policy.

To build on my recollections of an unplanned life spent in search of marketing to highlight the need for younger scholars to think about marketing in a dynamic ever-changing systems setting.