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United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s creation of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in 1999 inspired great hopes. As we explain, however, the noble initiatives of the UNGC are undermined by the arms industry. Arms are expensive. The expenditure on arms diverts a nation’s “resources from ‘productive’ to ‘unproductive’ ends.” The arms industry is a major employer in most arms manufacturing nations. It generates much needed revenue for those countries. Therefore, attempts at thwarting the supply of arms are doomed to failure. Instead of halting the supply of arms, we argue as to the advantages of restraining the demand for arms. Michael Walzer is the only moral philosopher who has considered the ethics of appeasement. We explore Walzer’s arguments for appeasement and consider how a United Nations Secretary-General could appease those nations demanding arms. In doing so, the UN Secretary-General would make it possible for the UNGC to achieve what was initially envisaged for the UNGC.

In a 1977 publication Alfred Chandler singled out the Springfield Armory as the site where single‐unit management was pioneered in the United States, crediting Superintendent Roswell Lee (1815‐1833) with establishing a first “managerial” approach to work discipline and labour accounting. However, as economic breakthrough came only in 1841/2, it has since been argued that Lee′s role has been overestimated. Re‐examines archival evidence to show that: the changes of 1842 at Springfield were not due to external economic pressures, but to pressure exerted by West Point graduates in the Ordnance Department; Lee, as the dominant arms manufacturer in the 1820s, was not “held back” by economic factors from implementing any changes he desired; and his system of work organization was never even potentially managerial, with his accounting system in particular having been fundamentally misinterpreted. The evidence reinforces the case for viewing the invention of modern business and managerialism as primarily a disciplinary breakthrough.

The popularity of arms embargoes makes sense on the one hand but can be puzzling on the other. Since arms are a type of good often linked directly to war and peace as one of the central objects of international politics, stemming the flow of arms to a country or group accused of acting against international peace and security is a logical response. However, while this reaction is frequent, it is not generally regarded as being effective. In fact, arms embargoes have a reputation of not functioning well. One can find many references, in academic literature and policy papers alike, which state that arms embargoes “do not work” that they are “ineffective” or that they are “not worth the paper they are printed on.” The paradox that sanctions are deemed to be of little consequence but are still popular among policy-makers (Baldwin, 1997) is particularly striking.

This historical example of the creation of the arms industry in the Connecticut River Valley in the 1800s provides new insights into the value of government venture capital (GVC) and government demand in creating a new industry. Since current theoretical explanations of the best uses of governmental venture capital are still under development, there is considerable need for further theory development to explain and predict the creation of an industry and especially those industries where failures in private capital supply necessitates governmental involvement in new firm creation. The purpose of this paper is to provide an in depth historical review of how the arms industry evolved spurred by GVC and government created demand.

This study uses abductive inference as the best way to build and test emerging theories and advancing theoretical explanations of the best uses of GVC and governmental demand to achieve socially required outcomes.

By observing this specific historical example in detail, the authors add to the understanding of value creation caused by governmental venture capital funding of existing theory. A major contribution of this paper is to advance theory based on detailed observation.

The relatively limited research literature and theory development on governmental venture capital funding and the critical success factors in startups are enriched by this abductive investigation of the creation of the historically important arms industry and its spillover into creating the specialized machine industry.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, through the example of the Springfield Armory and its role in the development of interchangeable parts, the critical role of government in establishing a cluster of organizations that evolved into an innovation ecosystem primarily located in the Connecticut River Valley in the 1800s. Using the Springfield Armory example, we use the related but largely unjoined concepts of ecosystem and networks to show that these organizational forms are effective in driving innovation.

The design uses an in-depth analysis of the role of the Springfield Armory to explicate the joining of network and ecosystem theory as an early example of the importance of governmental funding and support for innovation.

The development of interchangeable parts in the American arms industry in the 19th century transformed manufacturing worldwide. At the heart of this transformation was the network of arms makers that developed in the Connecticut River Valley as a direct result of US Government investment and support. This network of arms makers evolved into an ecosystem of mutually reinforcing relationships as machine tool manufacturers benefited from an environment of free-flowing intellectual property, information and growing governmental demand for arms. The Armory illustrates the government’s role in initiating and sustaining clusters of innovation that otherwise might not have developed as quickly.

Much of the research on the role of government in creating innovation ecosystems and organizational networks is based on modern organizations. This use of the Springfield Armory in the early 1800s broadens the knowledge on how innovation ecosystems in conjunction with networked organizations can be created by governments serving the public good.

Purpose – To argue for the use of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) proves far more useful in assessing arms makers’ limits of responsibility in a different way altogether. By focusing on the negative ‘externalities’ – that is impact on society – we are able to examine the practice in the context of constitutive and regulatory norms (i.e. the accepted rules), as opposed to norms that are merely evaluative (i.e. moral) or practical (i.e. what's possible).

Methodology/approach – This chapter examines the investment policies, practices and procedures of a handful of Australian pension and sovereign wealth funds in relation to investment in the development and production of cluster munitions – a class of weapon banned under international law since August 2010.

Findings – The chapter finds that the negative externalities inherent in armaments manufacturing demand that institutional investors view such firms through a ‘CSI lens’, especially when tasked with identifying and developing strategies to account for emerging social norms such as the prohibition of cluster munitions.

Practical implications – The investor is advantaged by having at its disposal a roadmap for managing – though not necessarily predicting – emerging social norms. This is so for ethical, responsible and mainstream investment approaches, although is most readily compatible with investors who have pre-established exclusionary policies as well as effective implementation procedures.

Social implications – A CSI approach to investment in cluster munitions as outlined in this chapter benefits society by inducing economic actors, such as pension and sovereign wealth funds, to direct their capital in such a way as to minimize humanitarian and environmental harm.

Originality/value of chapter – Proponents of the social responsibility of business and investment have seldom assessed the makers of conventional armaments such as machine guns, attack helicopters and battle tanks. Fewer still have attempted to devise and implement such programs within firms. Simply put, the prevailing argument is that arms makers and their financers are not capable of being socially responsible.

Arms embargoes in themselves are not able to achieve political goals. At least in the past, they neither stopped wars, nor did they change the political behavior of the targeted states or groups.

Interchangeable parts were a critical development in the advancement of industry and manufacturing. This paper traces its development, the factors that contributed to it, and answers the question of why did this innovation occur at the Springfield Armory.

This is an illustrative case study.

The fortunate combination of location, key people, government policy, and arms demand combined to enable the development of interchangeable parts at the Springfield Armory. Led by its Superintendent, Roswell Lee, Springfield became the epicenter for the development of this concept as skilled gunmakers captured arms making knowledge unfettered by patent protection. Lee promoted this free interchange of ideas through sharing designs and equipment, his hiring practices, and his willingness to experiment with new tools and technologies. This created a critical mass of factors that led to this important innovation occurring at the Springfield Armory.

The critical drivers of innovative activity seen at Springfield merit further investigation and research, individually and collectively to see if these findings can be used to inform policies that promote innovation.

This case study identifies factors that contributed to the development of interchangeable parts at a particular location at a particular point in time. The value of this is to identity the important interplay of factors that can spur the innovative process and lead to important technological innovation.

This article aims to document and analyze how E. Remington & Sons built a valuable firearms brand through its advertising in the period 1854-1888.

The study uses qualitative methods. Primary source documents include newspapers, journals, and catalogs. The advertising analyzed came primarily from three periodicals – Harper's Weekly, The Army Navy Journal, and American Agriculturalist – that together reached a broad audience of American firearms consumers.

Advertising to both civilian and military markets, Remington used a number of appeals including expert testimonials, fears of robbery and home invasion, and boasts of quality, military contracts, and honors from shooting competitions. Until the late 1870s, Remington used manufacturer's advertising more than its competitors.

Business historians have not seriously addressed Remington or other gun advertising and branding during the nineteenth century, while firearms historians have largely relegated these ads and other promotional ephemera to illustrative accessory roles, not as subjects of independent consideration. By investigating the rise of this important firearms brand, the research sheds light on the evolution of the American firearms industry and the prevailing gun culture.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the international community took vigorous, unprecedented steps to curb Saddam Hussein's military ambitions. The central component of these actions was a set of comprehensive arms, aviation, maritime, and economic sanctions, each imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When the multinational coalition forces ousted Iraq from Kuwait the following year, the UNSC made these sanctions and embargoes a component of the armistice agreement. Over time, these sanctions were subsequently used as leverage to press for Iraqi compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions calling for Iraqi disarmament.¹