Search results

This chapter examines the role of phrónēsis in the context of research ethics, noting how it is often contrasted with the proceduralist approach associated with ethical regulation. The meaning of the term in the writings of Aristotle is outlined. This is followed by an examination of some of the ways in which the concept has been applied more recently, for example in relation to professionalism and professional ethics. Here, it is often combined with similar ideas, such as Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowing. These more recent applications of the concept involve some deviation from the original sense of the term, but it is argued that there are good reasons for this, arising from changes in prevailing values and social conditions since the time of Aristotle. Furthermore, there are complexities with which he did not deal, notably the Machiavellian idea that in some circumstances unethical actions may be necessary to achieve desirable goals. The chapter ends by considering whether phrónēsis always leads to good ethical judgements. This seems to be true by definition on Aristotle’s formulation, but he assumes a greater degree of harmony amongst virtues or values than seems to be the case. And this is a particular problem in the case of social research, since its goal is in dispute.

The virtuous character and the ethical agent represent mutually inclusive terms, neither of which independently, in the Aristotelian tradition, is considered an innate quality. Virtues, if not innate, are contingent; but what makes each instantiation recognisably general? Normative ethics in this sense is a dynamic process and similarly process philosophy is based on the principle that existence is dynamic and that it should be the primary focus of any philosophical account of reality. I argue that the transformative process is equally as important as the end result of realising the virtuous dispositional traits. An important criticism of virtue ethics is the focus on character and not rules such as industry practices and codes found in the professions. The criticism however is less worrisome than usually accepted. The reasoning herein developed to overcome this criticism rests on the presupposition that no one exists in isolation and virtues are developed in a social context and not simply given. Using process philosophy as a methodological approach to examine virtue ethical agency and the transformative process involved in its realisation elicits insights that allow the conceptual development of a more robust account of virtue ethics. I extend this nuanced rendition, in ways already commenced by others, into areas of organisational, environmental and intergenerational ethics.

Within both Western and Eastern traditions of virtue ethics, there is a Doctrine of the Mean, suggesting that errors may lie either in excess or in deficiency. The need to avoid both excess and deficiency in the allocation of finite resources is a concern in many sorts of business decisions, some with ethical implications. One finite resource is the resource of attention, and ethical problems can arise from failures to attend to important things. Both Aristotle and classical Confucianism accept the importance of paying attention to circumstances rather than following fixed rules or blindly maximising value. For organisations to give appropriate attention to different things requires suitable intra-organisational reporting and communication. Then there is still need for awareness that resources are finite, and for activity that is sustainable, highlighting the related idea of harmony, especially salient in the Confucian tradition.

Theoretical reconstruction for the sake of deeper and clearer understanding of an important theme in classical philosophy (aporia/euporia)

Logical critique (and reconstruction); aporetic and euporetic logic.

Using key texts by Plato and Aristotle on aporia and euporia, I attempt to show that Derrida’s, and more broadly deconstructive, readings are problematic and require careful and critical reconsideration.

A full account of aporia in the work of Derrida is beyond the scope of the paper – so too is a full account of aporia and euporia in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

The paper has important implications in terms of our reading and interpretation of important classical texts such as Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

The paper builds on important research by philosophers like Matthews and on the nature and role of aporia in classical philosophy, just as it extends the author’s own critique of deconstructive appropriations of aporia. It argues for the importance of reconstructing our understanding of aporetic and euporetic thinking in order to see it more clearly especially in its classical forms, contexts and frameworks.

The chapter proposes that higher education researchers descriptively analyze and evaluate practices regarding university leadership and management through the lens of phronēsis (understood as “practical reasonableness”). It elaborates and develops an emerging orientation, coming from a range of social and organizational theorists, for a “philosophical” or “moral sociology” that derives neo-Aristotelian insights into agency and social practices.

Tourism recovery after the pandemic has failed to take the path leading to sensitivity and humaneness at destination level. This chapter argues that to open this path, we need to confront the belief that tourists are self-centred, fun-driven and cheating individuals. This view on tourists and more generally human beings is central to the neoliberal understanding of consumers. It has moreover taken a strong grasp on the mind of economists, politicians, academics and the public at large.

To counteract this idea, I call upon Aristotle's discussion of friendship. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between three forms of friendship: of utility, of pleasure, and of goodwill. Utility implies a relationship where people befriend each other in virtue of some good or service that they get or expect to get from each other. Friendships of utility, therefore, imply reciprocation. Friendships of pleasure can also be understood as a form of reciprocal altruism. However, friendships of goodwill are different because they are felt for others for their own sake and not in expectation of a favour in return. Friendships of goodwill include therefore others who may not be able to reciprocate, such as tourists staying only a short time at a destination. Looking through the lens of friendships of goodwill, one could argue that all tourists, including short-stay visitors, will be friendly and caring towards their hosts.

This chapter explores the soundness of friendships of goodwill in the light of more recent research on human nature. It also discusses its implications for our understanding of human beings, the relationship between hosts and guests, and ultimately the opportunity to steer tourism along a more sensitive, human and sustainable path.

Ethics is fundamentally a science of social and collective responsibility. Ethics concerns human behavior as responsible or accountable. Because of the nature of social interaction, certain members of the society will bear greater authority, and hence, greater individual and social responsibility than others. In our world, personal responsibility and social responsibility are hardly separable. Personal responsibility becomes responsibility for the world because the person and the world are inseparable. In this chapter, we use the term responsibility from a legal, ethical, moral, and spiritual (LEMS) standpoint as some promise, commitment, obligation, sanctioned by self, morals, law, or society, to do good, and if harm results, to repair harm done on another. Hence, responsibility from a moral perspective is trustworthiness and dependability of the agent in some enterprise. Its inverse is exoneration – the extent to which one is excused from commitment and repairing the harm done to others by one’s actions. We apply the theories and constructs of executive responsibility to two contemporary cases: (1) India’s Super Rich in 2014 and (2) the Fall and Rise of Starbucks. After exploring the basic notion of responsibility, we present a discussion on the nature and obligation of corporate responsibility into three parts: Part I: Classical Understanding and Discussion on Corporate Responsibility; Part II: Contemporary Understanding and Discussion on Corporate Responsibility, and Part III: A synthesis of classical and contemporary views of responsibility and their applications to corporate executive responsibility.

Chris Provis (2017) has discussed Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean and its counterpart in Confucianism. The Doctrine of the Mean informs an agent that ‘acting as a virtuous person will often be constituted by avoidance of choosing excess or deficiency’ (Provis, 2017, p. 118). Indeed, Provis (2017) argues against any act ‘oriented towards maximisation’ (p. 127). Provis’s (2017) focus is the encounter ‘between European and East Asian ethical traditions’ (p. 116). Our chapter is a response to Provis (2017). We respond to Provis (2017) by exploring a debate amongst Jewish scholars which originated in North Africa. Some of these scholars advocated Aristotle’s Mean. But others advocated forsaking that Mean and pursuing the extreme.