Search results

The Central Bank of Argentina began its activities in May 1935 surrounded by controversy. The Bank was created as a result of a mission led by the expert from the Bank of England, Sir Otto Niemeyer. The foreign involvement in the origins of the bank was not welcome to a good part of the Argentine society. Finally, the project for a central bank approved by the Argentine Congress was not the one proposed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, but a version of it that contained crucial modifications introduced by Raúl Prebisch. The aim of this work is to highlight Prebisch’s ideas on monetary and banking matters by analyzing the differences with the ideas of Sir Otto Niemeyer around monetary policy and the characteristics of the future Central Bank of Argentina. Even if there were almost no direct debates between them, there were different visions and indirect contentions that can be traced in the writings of both, which on the side of Prebisch were published in the Revista Económica del Banco de la Nación Argentina and some government documents, and on Niemeyer’s side can be traced in some writings and correspondence regarding his visit to Argentina, held in the archives of the Bank of England.

Traditionally, monetary policy in Latin America followed the recommendations of the missions of the monetary “doctors” who defended an independent central bank and a pro-cyclical monetary policy, adhering to the automatic adjustment of the gold standard. A key function of central banks was to support fiscal stability. The effects of the Great Depression and its aftermath in the periphery countries questioned these recommendations and gave way to a shift in monetary policy. An illustrative example is provided by the creation of the Central Bank of the Argentina Republic (BCRA) under the auspices of Raúl Prebisch, and the technical assistance missions of the United States Federal Reserve to several Latin American countries some of which were led by Robert Triffin. Prebisch actively participated in mission to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic bringing the experience he had acquired as director of the BCRA and the tools devised to adapt monetary policy to a changing external context and circumstances. The use of the discount window and exchange controls, among other instruments, was seen in this new view as necessary to pursue counter-cyclical policies and to provide support for industrialization and full employment in the periphery.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between performance and some macro and micro variables in the Argentine commercial banking industry. Included are the profitability and interest variables; return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM) over the period of 1994 to 2011.

The empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking performance that employ an industrial organization framework and two dependent variables (with identical control variables) to assure robustness and comparability in findings. The variables for the panel estimated generalized least square (panel EGLS) are constructed using income statements of 62 commercial banks (firm‐level data) as well as a number of industry‐specific and macroeconomic indicators.

Factors such as expense management (operating cost efficiency/inefficiency), leverage and liquidity appear to be important forces behind the net interest margins (NIM) and profits (ROA) in the Argentine banking industry. Higher return on assets (ROA) is associated with banks carrying less leverage and therefore displaying a lower ratio of debt to total assets. Higher interest margin (NIM) is associated with higher operating expenses. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, inflation negatively affects profitability but is positively and significantly related to net interest margin. Banking environment has a positive effect on performance, reflecting the complementarity between banking performance and stock market capitalization.

The paper's value lies in showing that a firm's specific variables reveal better insights when analyzed in relation to banking environment. Indirectly, some of the value of this work lies in highlighting the Central Bank's accommodative monetary policy that has been driving Argentina's economic recovery and credit boom arising in an inflationary environment.

Aims to review the potential risks associated with the separation of banking regulation from the orbit of the central bank in Latin‐American and Caribbean countries (LAC).

Sets out information on the banking regulators in LAC and on the current degree of involvement of the central bank in banking regulation; the main monetary policy issues connected to the separation of banking regulation from the central bank; and the main banking regulation issues involved.

The separation of banking regulation from the central bank would not present any great danger to LAC currently. However, the need to conduct the move in accordance with best principles must be emphasized.

Given the fertile ground offered by the countries of LAC, this paper presents arguably the most comprehensive examination to date of this “hot potato”.

Following a successful debt-renegotiation process in the mid-2000s, Argentina consolidated a path of growth and debt relief. The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007–2009 and other domestic imbalances altered the economic scenario. In this context, the authorities tried to return to global financial markets, but legal conflict with vulture funds made that option unpalatable. In 2015, the triumph of a right-wing political coalition restored the dominance of neoliberal economic policies, including the return to debt and equity markets. The subsequent cycle of indebtedness and capital flight faced by Argentina not only unleashed a major crisis but also caused the return of the International Monetary Fund, which granted the largest lending arrangement to a single country in its history. The aims of this chapter are to analyze the winding cycle of debt reduction and overindebtedness experienced by Argentina between 2001 and 2022; to examine the set of structural factors as well as the role of certain domestic and foreign actors; and to consider the long-term effects of external indebtedness and some lessons that can be drawn for other countries in the Global South.