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On October 22, 2004, junior trader Mary Lucas was browsing through the recent trading activities of a few convertible bonds the firm held. First Convergence Inc. was a hedge fund specializing in convertible arbitrage founded by three Wall Street traders in 2002. Prior to starting at the firm, she had known little about convertible bonds. Now she stayed late almost every day in order to learn as much about the business as possible. Suddenly, she noticed something unusual about the trading of a convertible bond issued by Countrywide Financial Corporation (NYSE:CFC). Although the average daily trading volume on this bond had been only three thousand during the previous month, it had shot up to fifty thousand in the last three days. Lucas remembered this particular bond. In fact, First Convergence was actually holding a slightly different convertible bond (known as the liquid yield option note or LYON) issued by the same company. On August 20, Countrywide had offered to exchange the new convertible bond for the original LYON. First Convergence had accepted the exchange offer, thus ending up with the new convertible bond. At that time, Lucas was asked to help evaluate the offer, so she was familiar with the features of both bonds. “What's happening?” she asked herself. She quickly checked the recent price movement on Countrywide's stock. The stock had plunged 11.5 percent on Wednesday, October 20, after the company announced earnings below analysts' expectations. On the same day, trading on the convertible shot up. These two events must be related. But how? Is there a potential investment opportunity?

Understanding various features of a convertible bond; identifying and exploiting an arbitrage opportunity

The case introduces students to the nature of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and the CDO origination process, with emphasis on the corporate structure of the special purpose vehicles, cash flows to various CDO tranches, and motivation behind CDO origination. Students will learn to quantitatively evaluate the risk-return profile of CDO tranches with emphasis on the equity tranche (also known as “toxic waste”). This is ideal for MBA and advanced undergraduate level courses on financial markets, financial institutions, and investments. In the case, an associate at the Debt Capital Markets desk of Lehman Brothers prepares a CDO issuance for Western Asset. Western Asset had been contacted by a group of commercial banks eager to sell senior secured bank loans and high-yield corporate bonds to lower their capital requirements and free up capital for additional lending.

The case presents a context of irrational pricing in a stock and demonstrates the possible role of investor heuristics operating in the financial markets. The case is ideal in a course on behavioral finance to teach topics like the limits to arbitrage or the influence of various heuristics in financial markets.

In January 2012, Ellen Kullman, CEO and chairman of DuPont, must decide whether to retain or sell the company's Performance Coatings (DPC) division. This is an introductory case on valuing a leveraged buyout. The case focuses on a publicly listed corporation's decision to divest a large division and asks students to compare the division's value if it remains under DuPont's control or is sold to an outside party. The transaction size of approximately $4 billion is too large for potential strategic buyers in the industry, making private equity (PE) firms the most likely bidders. The case provides a base-case adjusted present value (APV) model of DPC as a stand-alone company and gives students specific assignments to adjust it to reflect the division's potential value under PE ownership (e.g., EBITDA growth, multiple arbitrage, and increased leverage).

The case is designed to illustrate and discuss the differences between a public company's valuation based on unlevered free cash flows and a PE sponsor's valuation based on residual (levered) cash flows.

This case has been successfully taught in a second-year elective course covering entrepreneurial finance and private equity and in an advanced undergraduate course on corporate finance. It is appropriate for use in classes on private equity, advanced corporate finance, or deal valuation.

At three o'clock in the morning on September 10, 2001, Thierry Hautillac, a risk arbitrageur, learns of the final agreement between Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA (“PPR”) and LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA (“LVMH”). After a contest for control of Gucci lasting over two years, PPR has emerged as the winner. PPR and LVMH have agreed for PPR to buy about half of LVMH's stock in Gucci for $94 per share, for Gucci to pay an extraordinary dividend of $7 per share, and for PPR to give a two and a half year put option with a strike price of $101.50 to the public shareholders in Gucci. The primary task for the student in this case is to recommend a course of action for Hautillac: should he sell his 2% holding of Gucci shares when the market opens, continue to hold his shares, or buy more shares? The student must estimate the risky arbitrage returns from each of these choices. As a basis for this decision, the student must value the terms of payment and consider what the Gucci stock price will do upon the market's open. The student must determine the intrinsic value of Gucci using a DCF model as well as information on peer firms and transactions. The student must consider potential synergies between Gucci and PPR and between Gucci and LVMH. The student must assess the likelihood of a higher bid, using analysis of price changes at earlier events in the contest for clues.

Freeport-McMoRan's acquisition of Phelps Dodge created the world's largest publicly traded copper company. JPMorgan and Merrill Lynch advised the acquirer and arranged $17.5 billion in debt financing and $1.5 billion in credit facilities. In addition, these two firms underwrote $5 billion in equity capital through simultaneous offerings of Freeport-McMoRan common shares and mandatory convertible preferred shares. These financings created an optimal capital structure for the company that resulted in stronger credit ratings. The activities of the equity capital markets and sales groups at the underwriting firms are explored and the structure and benefits of mandatory convertible preferred shares is explained.

To understand the role of investment banks in advising a large corporation regarding an acquisition and related financings in the capital markets. As part of this, the activities of an investment banking firm's equity capital markets group and their underwriting risks are analyzed. Finally, the structure of a mandatory convertible security is reviewed in terms of benefits to both issuers and investors.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

Within 18 months of exiting bankruptcy, Kmart's position was sufficiently strong to launch an acquisition of Sears, once the nation's largest retailer and also a core holding of ESL. Looks at a number of compelling issues related to Kmart's bankruptcy, restructuring, and rebirth under the control of ESL, a large hedge fund. Presents some of the key metrics that Eddie Lampert, head of ESL, had available to him as he made two decisions: first, in 2002, to amass a controlling stake in Kmart's defaulted debt during the restructuring; and second, in 2004, to launch a takeover of Sears. The first deal illustrates the decision-making process for a financial buyer, including the downside protection of Kmart's real estate holdings, whereas the second deal represents a traditional strategic acquisition. Illustrates the innovative use of real estate as a “hedge” for ESL in the event that the retail combination does not produce the required financial results. Also focuses on the role of investment bankers and the increasingly important position that hedge funds and LBO funds have carved out in the M&A market.

To outline the explosive growth in assets and influence of alternative investment managers, particularly LBO funds and hedge funds, and the transition of some larger hedge funds from shorter term trading strategies to longer term plays on distressed debt, restructurings, and turnarounds.

On March 1, 2001, Jessica Gallinelli, managing director of Bancroft Capital Management, heard surprising and somewhat disturbing news about the proposed bid by General Electric Company (GE) for Honeywell International Inc. Despite recent public assurances about the deal from GE's chairman and chief executive officer (CEO), John F. “Jack” Welch Jr., the antitrust regulatory authority of the European Commission (EC) announced it had initiated a review of the proposed merger. Gallinelli, whose fund owned a large stake in Honeywell, considered this major development and wondered whether Bancroft should alter its investment. Immediately, Gallinelli instructed her associate to provide background material on the merger, an assessment of the probability the merger would be approved by antitrust regulators in the U.S. and Europe, and valuation analyses to assist Gallinelli in assessing Bancroft's investment in Honeywell. She would need to decide quickly whether to hold or sell her fund's 10 million shares in Honeywell and short position of 10 million shares in GE. As a risk arbitrageur, she thought prices would respond rapidly to the EC's announcement. She remembered Jack Welch's confidence of five months earlier that this was the “cleanest deal you'll ever see,” and she wondered whether that was still the case.