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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationships between company business strategy type and tax aggressiveness for companies listed on the Brazilian Bovespa stock exchange.

Following the concepts of Miles and Snow (1978, 2003), we classified company strategies into four types, analyser, defender, prospector and reactor, using data from 2012 to 2016. The authors excluded financial companies due to a differential tax regime. Next, prospector and defender companies were identified, and the relationship of these strategies with tax aggressiveness assessed using regression analysis; analyser and reactor types were not included as these are defined as a combination of the prospector and defender type, or non-strategic, respectively. To assess aggressiveness, the authors used effective tax rates on corporate profits, as well as a metric that captures tax burden in terms of all taxes paid by a company.

Most Brazilian companies were analysers (76.66 per cent), with prospector companies being a minority, and defenders representing a little over 21 per cent. Unlike the findings of Higgins et al. (2015), the authors found that defender companies also have a tendency to practice aggressive tax planning.

The authors found the Brazilian defender companies similar to prospectors, tended to be more tax aggressive or to take higher tax risks. Thus, findings in economies such as the USA may not be generalizable to other countries, such as Brazil, Russia, India or China (i.e. the BRICs), for example. The particularities of each country, such as ease of access to the capital market, tax deductibility of investment in research and development and legal issues must be considered before applying generalized prognostics.

This paper offers original empirical evidence from Brazil of the relationship between company strategy type and the tax aggressiveness, offering a clear result that differs in part from results from American companies. It therefore encourages further studies on this topic.

This study examines whether Brazilian health insurance companies (HICs) engage in earnings management through discretionary accruals or operational decisions by refraining from reporting a low indicator of sustainability in the market (IDSM).

The study used the Jones and Modified Jones models to identify earnings management through discretionary accruals and used the model described by Roychowdhury to estimate the abnormal behaviors of operational decisions. Data covering 2012 to 2018 were collected from the ANS website.

The results show that HICs engaged in earnings management to avoid reporting a low IDSM. The findings should help health insurance clients make decisions regarding the purchase or change of health insurance. The findings should also encourage regulators to improve their evaluation of the economic and financial risks around HICs.

The National Agency of Supplementary Health (ANS) established a qualification program for HICs, monitoring them based on a set of indicators. Managers may have an incentive to use earnings management to obtain indices that meet the requirements of the ANS qualification program in order to avoid showing signs of abnormality.

本研究旨在探討巴西的醫療保險公司，透過避免報導低的市場可持續性指標，是以裁決性應計，抑或是以操作決策來進行盈餘管理。

國立輔助醫療辦事處 (註：此為直譯)(The National Agency of Supplementary Health)為醫療保險公司建立了一個資格檢定機制，基於一套指標來監管這些公司。公司主管或會有鼓勵性的誘因去使用盈餘管理來取得符合國立輔助醫療辦事處資格檢定機制所要求的指標，從而避免顯示異常的跡象。

本研究使用Jones 模型及Modified Jones模型，透過裁決性應計來辨認盈餘管理，研究亦使用羅伊喬杜里 (Roychowdhury) 描述的模型， 來估計操作決策的異常行為。數據取自國立輔助醫療辦事處的網址，並涵蓋2012年至2018年期間。

研究結果顯示，醫療保險公司進行盈餘管理，以求避免報導低的市場可持續性指標。研究結果應可幫助醫療保險客戶在購買或更改醫療保險時作適當的決定。研究結果亦可鼓勵監管者改善他們對醫療保險公司的經濟及財務風險所作的評估。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies that donate to winning electoral campaigns are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than companies that do not make these contributions. The relationship between politicians and companies may be signaled by political connections in which companies try to get political benefits in exchange for providing politicians with campaign financing. The hypothesis is that a quid pro quo occurs in which these companies benefit from favorable tax treatment that reduces their relative tax burden.

The focus of this study is donations that were made in the presidential elections of 2010 and 2014. The sample covers the period between 2010 and 2016 for companies listed on the B3 Stock Exchange, using proxies for tax aggressiveness computed based on value-added reporting. Through linear regressions, the authors have tested whether the companies that made these campaign contributions tend to have a lower tax burden.

The proposed hypothesis was confirmed, revealing that a political connection between campaign donations reduces the tax burden for donating companies during the years following the election. These donations appear to depict an environment characterized by an exchange of favors in which the donating companies exhibit greater tax aggressiveness than non-donating companies.

The current study deals with a subject that has not yet been examined empirically in Brazil and reinforces the position adopted by the Supreme Court in prohibiting campaign donations to inhibit quid pro quo practices. The study offers additional arguments for the criminalization of the so-called “second set of books” used to record electoral campaign contributions.