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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationships between company business strategy type and tax aggressiveness for companies listed on the Brazilian Bovespa stock exchange.

Following the concepts of Miles and Snow (1978, 2003), we classified company strategies into four types, analyser, defender, prospector and reactor, using data from 2012 to 2016. The authors excluded financial companies due to a differential tax regime. Next, prospector and defender companies were identified, and the relationship of these strategies with tax aggressiveness assessed using regression analysis; analyser and reactor types were not included as these are defined as a combination of the prospector and defender type, or non-strategic, respectively. To assess aggressiveness, the authors used effective tax rates on corporate profits, as well as a metric that captures tax burden in terms of all taxes paid by a company.

Most Brazilian companies were analysers (76.66 per cent), with prospector companies being a minority, and defenders representing a little over 21 per cent. Unlike the findings of Higgins et al. (2015), the authors found that defender companies also have a tendency to practice aggressive tax planning.

The authors found the Brazilian defender companies similar to prospectors, tended to be more tax aggressive or to take higher tax risks. Thus, findings in economies such as the USA may not be generalizable to other countries, such as Brazil, Russia, India or China (i.e. the BRICs), for example. The particularities of each country, such as ease of access to the capital market, tax deductibility of investment in research and development and legal issues must be considered before applying generalized prognostics.

This paper offers original empirical evidence from Brazil of the relationship between company strategy type and the tax aggressiveness, offering a clear result that differs in part from results from American companies. It therefore encourages further studies on this topic.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies that donate to winning electoral campaigns are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than companies that do not make these contributions. The relationship between politicians and companies may be signaled by political connections in which companies try to get political benefits in exchange for providing politicians with campaign financing. The hypothesis is that a quid pro quo occurs in which these companies benefit from favorable tax treatment that reduces their relative tax burden.

The focus of this study is donations that were made in the presidential elections of 2010 and 2014. The sample covers the period between 2010 and 2016 for companies listed on the B3 Stock Exchange, using proxies for tax aggressiveness computed based on value-added reporting. Through linear regressions, the authors have tested whether the companies that made these campaign contributions tend to have a lower tax burden.

The proposed hypothesis was confirmed, revealing that a political connection between campaign donations reduces the tax burden for donating companies during the years following the election. These donations appear to depict an environment characterized by an exchange of favors in which the donating companies exhibit greater tax aggressiveness than non-donating companies.

The current study deals with a subject that has not yet been examined empirically in Brazil and reinforces the position adopted by the Supreme Court in prohibiting campaign donations to inhibit quid pro quo practices. The study offers additional arguments for the criminalization of the so-called “second set of books” used to record electoral campaign contributions.