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We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the role that both monetary incentives and nonmonetary motivations may play in corruption decision-making, and, hence, in the fight against corruption.

The paper aims to explore the links between corruption and accounting in the public procurement setting. In particular, it investigates how accounting can fight or facilitate corruption

The study takes a qualitative approach, analyzing one of the worst recent Italian cases of corruption, the “MOSE” trial. Documents produced during the trial are analyzed.

The findings contribute to our understanding of how the (mis)use of accounting can help to build a “sustainable” corruption network, and be used to create, maintain and share corruptive cash flows. Participating actors can use accounting tools to coordinate their actions and organize their misconduct. Accounting may also reveal the existence of such networks, however, by enabling the fiscal police to discover tax fraud, and by reconstructing how a corruption network functions from records kept to manage internal cash flows and the provision of other benefits.

Because corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, a better understanding of how it functions may lead (among other things) to the identification of more effective prevention measures. Particular attention should be paid to events that favor corruption, such as extraordinary occurrences, huge amounts of public resources and new institutional structure without appropriate control and balance tools.

Given the specific features of episodes of corruption, qualitative studies on this topic are scarce. Little is known about corruption processes, and even less about the part that accounting can play in them. The MOSE case offers some intriguing insight, showing how accounting can be used to build a “sustainable” corruption network by collecting slush funds and facilitating benefit-sharing among individuals.

This chapter argues that reciprocity provides a key to understanding corrupt behavior and its limitations. It allows for an understanding why agents not only are guided by explicit incentives but also serve those to whom they owe gratitude. It allows to observe how citizens disregard their narrow-minded interests and engage in altruistic punishment, potentially exercising negative reciprocity toward a corrupt leadership. It shows how reciprocity is at the center of criminal networks and how reform sometimes enhances rather than inhibits this dismal form of reciprocity. It finally reveals how humans are at risk of reciprocating toward their own self-image, which may inhibit them from impartially assessing their misdeeds. A thorough understanding of the power of reciprocity can inspire novel avenues for reform, some of which are presented here.

Lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This chapter begins with a discussion of nonexperimental work in this area and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. We sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (i.e., through institutions and social norms) and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or due to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anticorruption measures.

The Internet and digital technologies have become part of our life, essential for a lot of daily activities and new powerful means of communication as well, able to invigorate the traditional forms of interaction between citizens and public institutions. The chapter examines their spread across the European Union, and particularly in Romania, and their potential to promote transparency and accountability within the public institutions, to fight against corruption and to expand citizens’ social mobilization. Even if Romania has much to do to provide quality online public services, to increase the efficiency in public administration, and to improve the communication between citizens and institutions, the examples and best practices mentioned in the chapter highlight the potential of ICT both as anti-corruption and participatory tools.

This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by empirically investigating the impact of digital competitiveness and technology on corruption under the moderating effect of some cultural and economic control variables and providing evidence on the links between corruption and various cultural dimensions at the country level.

The cross-sectional sample covers 61 countries (41 high-income and 20 lower-income countries) during the 2016–2020 period, and the analysis was carried out for both the full sample and the subsamples.

The results provide clear evidence supporting the hypothesis that digitalisation and technology significantly affect the perceived level of corruption under the moderating role of cultural framework and economic development. Furthermore, the most significant cultural dimensions of corruption are individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint, even if, in some cases, its influence might be felt differently when the results are estimated on subsamples. Thus, in the case of indulgence versus restraint, high-income countries with higher indulgence scores would register higher scores for the corruption perception index and thus a better control of corruption, while for lower-income countries, the more indulgent these countries are, the weaker the corruption control will be. Furthermore, our results validate a powerful and significant correlation between the index of economic freedom and corruption in both digitalisation and technology.

This study may have relevant implications for policymakers who need to recognise the role of digitalisation and technology in the fight against corruption but considering the cultural and economic characteristics specific to each country.

To the authors' knowledge, the relationship between digital competitiveness, technology and corruption within an economic and cultural framework, while highlighting the differences between high-income and lower-income countries, has not been previously documented in the literature. Thus, this article argues that the level of digital competitiveness and the adoption of technology would significantly impact the level of perceived corruption, although this impact could be felt differently by countries in the high-income category compared to countries in the lower-level income category.