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The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that it remains feasible for terrorists to use the banking system to transfer funds to finance their activities.

Based upon a qualitative content analysis of 15 informal interviews with financiers of terrorism and 15 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers, concrete methods of financing terrorism through the banking system can be described.

Even though banks have implemented strict control mechanisms, they often do not give the same attention to terrorism financing as they do to money laundering. Recently, refugees and “tourists” may have been involved in terrorism financing. When it comes to transferring larger amounts of money, terrorists do not necessarily act in their own name, but rather hire “straw men”. Some terrorists have proceeded to set up real companies in Turkey. Terrorists can explain why funds need to be transferred from Europe to Turkey through “charitable contributions”. Transfers of large amounts of money can also be facilitated by lawsuits.

The findings are based on semi-standardized interviews limited to the perspectives of the 30 interviewees.

The identification of gaps in current terrorism-financing prevention mechanisms provides both compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights.

Whilst the existing literature focuses on understanding the channels terrorists can use to finance their activities and on developing prevention mechanisms, this paper emphasizes that terrorists can still use the banking system to accomplish their goals. This paper illustrates ways terrorists can transfer funds through banks.

There is a significant focus today on the deficiencies of the financial system as the sector continues to boom while facing the growing pains of financial scandals, money laundering and the financing of terrorism around the world. Here, this study aims to investigate past research and the development of knowledge and practice in the area of countering money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, we draw attention to the gaps in the preventive mechanisms adopted by countries to fight against anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorism financing (ATF) and to highlight areas for possible future research.

This study was carried out through a systematic literature review of the existing work on AML and ATF.

The general findings of the reviewed papers show the deficiencies in the laws, acts and preventive measures meant to fight money laundering and terrorism financing and support the need for more research in this area in terms of law, regulations and technological matters.

Providing a concrete understanding of the concept of AML and terrorist financing and contributing the theoretical development in the area.

The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize the concept of terrorism, terrorism financing, the relationship between money laundering and terrorism financing and the governance of terrorism financing.

This paper adopts a doctrinal, content analysis and secondary data, of which the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 and the Penal Code are the primary sources. The secondary sources for this paper include articles in academic journals, books and online databases.

Several methods are involved in the commission of terrorism financing such as raising, moving and using of funds. The activities relating to terrorism financing under the Penal Code are broader than such activities. Despite the adherence by Malaysia to international policies established by the Financial Action Task Force, terrorism financing has remained a threat that must be addressed by the relevant authorities.

This paper could be a useful source of information for the practitioners, academicians, policymakers and students studying this particular area of crime.

This paper contributes to a discourse on terrorism financing in the Malaysian context.

This paper aims to focus on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper shows the ongoing feasibility of laundering money and financing terrorism undetected. It, thereby highlights that the current anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-financing mechanisms can be easily circumvented.

A three-step research process, including both qualitative and quantitative methods, was used. The empirical findings are based on qualitative content analysis of 35 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 35 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers.

During those interviews, concrete and specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of being prosecuted were discussed. To assess compliance officers’ awareness of those methods, a quantitative survey of 190 compliance officers was subsequently conducted to determine what leads to investigations.

The findings only convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees and 190 survey participants.

The practical implications include suggestions for financial regulators, financial institutions and compliance officers on how to more effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.

Dynamism of digital economy requires innovation in the mobile payment system to provide for the free flow of information to facilitate electronic transactions. However, regulations and standards were introduced at the global and country levels to impose limitations on mobile payment system to protect consumers’ interests. The Malaysian government introduced the Anti-money Laundering, Anti-terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (Act 613) (AMLA) to protect the people from being involved in offences both locally and internationally and an unlawful activity carried out physically or by using virtual mechanisms. It is argued in this study that AMLA has hindered the innovation of the digital economic system that is promoted by the government in line with global developments. The research method adopted is personal interview with selected respondents to gather their views on the challenges posed by the restrictions imposed by AMLA that has had the impact of limiting innovations in the mobile payment system sector.

The purpose of this paper is to give a better insight to the legal society, practitioners and legislators of the working mechanisms of money laundering activities, as well as the functionalities of the Anti‐Money Laundering and Anti‐terrorism Financing Act 2003 (AMLATFA) in Malaysia, in curbing money laundering and terrorism funding activities. At the same time, the paper provides an overview on the applicability and practicability of the enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia by exploring legislations from different jurisdictions that are more developed.

The paper achieves this by having a cross‐sectional analysis onto the legislation in Malaysia such as AMLATFA and also similar legislations found in countries such as the UK. A complete insight is further gained by having interviews with experts in the judiciary, Bank Negara, as well as the experts from the Attorney General's Chamber in Malaysia regarding their insight into the subject matter. Last but not least, the authors also surveyed into the different points of view from journal articles in Malaysia and globally.

Malaysia has a legal framework for curbing money laundering but the current AMLATFA provisions are considered to have failed to be effectively enforced. A more comprehensive, specific and well elaborated legal framework will have to be laid down in order to create a better platform for the prosecutors to bring a good case against these money launderers.

This paper will give a deeper insight to the legal society of the capability of AMLATFA and the lack of it, in curbing money laundering in Malaysia and, at the same time, creating awareness among policy makers of the difficulties faced by the enforcement bureaus in prosecuting these money launderers due to the lacunas in the current law.

This paper could be useful source of information for practitioners, academics, policymakers and students and a guide for any possible future amendments to the current insufficiency.

This study aims to investigate the Federal Government’s failure to combat money laundering and terrorism financing and the various hurdles to enforce the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2012 (as amended), effectively, which prohibits illegal earnings criminally induced investments in and out of Nigeria. This has had an impact on the country’s economic potential and its image in the international community. Despite many anti-corruption laws criminalising money laundering and terrorism financing, it is rated among the nations with the highest poverty index despite its immense natural resources.

This study uses a conceptual legal method to help a doctrinal library-based investigation by using existing material. This study also makes use of main and secondary legislation, such as the Constitution, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amended) Act 2012 and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2013 (as amended), as well as case law, international conventions, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications. A comparison of anti-money laundering legislation in Canada, the UK, Hong Kong, China and Nigeria was conducted, with lessons learned for Nigeria’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing laws. According to the findings, the Act is silent on the criminal use of legitimate earnings to fund terrorism and cultism.

There is no well-defined legal framework for asset recovery and confiscation. In Nigeria’s legal system, this evident void must be addressed immediately. To supplement existing efforts to prevent money laundering, the research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

One of the limitations of this study is the paucity of literature and data on money laundering and terrorist financing in Nigeria due to the secrecy around the crimes, which do not give room for the collection of statistical data and due to the transactional nature of the crimes. This is not to submit that no attempts have been made in the past or recent times to quantify the global value of money laundering and its effects on Nigeria’s economy. Such attempts have been inconclusive and inaccurate.

The dearth of records on the magnitude of money laundering in Nigeria has limited generalising the research findings due to the limited access to some required information. However, this study is suitable for adoption in other sectors of the economy in dealing with clandestineness in money laundering and terrorism financing. Future researchers are commended to use the quantitative assessment method to appraise the effects of money laundering and terrorist financing laws and policies in Africa to supplement the current literature in the field.

The research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

Whilst the existing literature focuses on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper aims to demonstrate the ongoing feasibility of money laundering and financing terrorism undetected. This study thereby reveals that the current anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-financing mechanisms can easily be circumvented.

A three-stage research process was used, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. The empirical findings are based on a qualitative content analysis of 50 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 50 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers.

During these interviews, specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of being prosecuted were discussed. Hence, specific methods of money laundering and terrorism financing have been analyzed.

The findings thus convey only the perspectives of the 100 interviewees, such that generalizability is limited.

The practical implications include suggestions for financial regulators, financial institutions and compliance officers on how to more effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Although the empirical findings are limited to Europe, the results could be applied globally.

This paper reveals new insights about criminals’ actions, which help to develop more effective compliance mechanisms.

Reporting suspicious transactions under anti‐money laundering (AML) laws creates a major dilemma for banks. On the one hand, failure to report suspicious transactions is an offence under the laws. On the other hand, if they report the transaction, they may breach their duty of confidentiality to their customer or could be liable for tipping off the suspected customer. More importantly, it can also undermine customers' trust. The purpose of this paper is to look into these issues and analyse them against the background of the Malaysian AML laws.

This paper mainly relies on statutes as its primary sources of information. As such, the relevant Malaysian AML that affect the reporting obligations will be identified and analyzed. It will be necessary to examine not just the provisions of the Malaysian Anti‐Money Laundering and Anti‐Terrorism Financing Act, but also its regulations and guidelines which affect banks in detail, as this is the most important legislation for the purpose of this paper.

It is apparent that the reporting suspicious transactions regime has had a significant impact on the operations of banks in Malaysia. While the regime is based on sound principles, the effectiveness of the regime is still unknown. As such, only time will tell whether the banks will be able to cope sufficiently with the increased AML obligations. Obviously, it is critical at this stage, to establish effective coordination between legislators, regulators and the banking industry, in order to minimize problems faced by the banks and thereby to ensure effective implementation of the regime.

This paper provides an examination of the impact of the reporting suspicious transactions regime on Malaysian banks. It is hoped that the study would provide some insight into this particular area for academics, banks, their legal advisers, practitioners and policy makers, not only in Malaysia but also elsewhere. In view of the international nature of money laundering and banking, there will be significant interest in how the AML laws affect banks operating in Malaysia.

The aim of this paper is to examine some of the recent changes to the old anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing law, which is now known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The paper will highlight the newly consolidated money laundering offences and the newly created offences including structuring of transactions or “smurfing”. Also, the transgression of cross-border movement of cash and negotiable instruments and tipping off about a money laundering disclosure will be assessed.

The paper uses a doctrinal legal research and secondary data, with the new AML/CFT legislation as the primary source. For comparative analysis, legislations in the UK, Australia and New Zealand are also examined. Secondary sources include case law, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.

The review of the AML/CFT law is timely and indicates the Malaysian government’s efforts to adhere to international standards set by the financial action task force. However, it is imperative that the Malaysian government addresses the remaining instrumental and normative deficiencies in the AML/CFT law to ensure that the recent legal changes are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent and regulate money laundering and terrorist financing within Malaysia.

This paper is a useful source of information for legal practitioners, academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, researchers and students.