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Although officially ended in July 2020, China’s dispute about its non-market economy (NME) status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is far from being resolved. The NME status enables China’s counterparts to disregard Chinese prices in antidumping proceedings and instead use the so-called surrogate country methodology. This paper aims to structure and analyze the complex debate, which emerged with the disputes China has filed against the European Union and the USA at the WTO, and therefore provide a point of reference for future analysis of and debates about China’s NME status.

The analysis is based on the existing academic literature on the topic and on the legal WTO-related documents (e.g. multilateral agreements, China’s Accession Protocol, legal findings of the WTO dispute panels).

Four different interpretations of the respective legal documents about China’s NME status are discussed and strong and weak aspects of these interpretations are pointed out. Also, several misunderstandings and mistakes appearing in the debate are clarified.

As the question of China’s position at the WTO and its NME status has not been resolved yet and some authors believe that China will pursue its case again once the WTO Appellate Body revives its functionality, the analysis of the debate can serve as a point of reference for the academic debate and the future research on this topic. Moreover, it offers an introduction to China’s NME position at the WTO for the newcomers to this topic.

Although China’s NME status has been much discussed, there is no literature review that would structure the debate and point out some of the (dis)advantages of the respective arguments and interpretations. Rather than adding to the large corpus of literature about the NME status, this study takes this corpus as the object of its analysis.

This study analyzes the policy initiatives that have been adopted by the US government since the 1930s. We document the institutional bodies responsible for the implementation of trade policy, as well as the objectives and decision making practices that are associated with policy formation. We also examine the new institutional movement of the Trump Administration’s neo-protectionist “America First” trade policy and its potential impact on the Asian region. Finally, our study examines the recent renegotiation of Korea-US FTA from a perspective of each country’s internal decision making process and discusses a number of issues that have relevant applications for Korea. The results from our analysis show that U.S trade policy show that despite a long period of an open and liberalized trade policy focus, recent neo-protectionist measures by President Trump could lead to potential trade wars and a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s. Such an anti-globalization agenda could have dire consequences for export dependent countries in the Asian region.

Korea and China have promoted a bilateral FTA since 2005 to upgrade their economic relationships. If the Korea-China FTA is concluded, then trade between the two countries is likely to involve substantial changes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Offer lists submitted by Korea include steel, petrochemicals and machinery and those by China include some agricultural and marine products as well as nonferrous metals. Korea's interest in the Korea-China FTA has focused mainly on damage to the agricultural sector and there have been a lot of studies on the effects of the FTA on Korean agricultural sector. However, little is known about why China includes the nonferrous metals industry for early voluntary liberalization and its implications for the domestic economy. Nonferrous metals industry is one of China’s national strategic sectors and has a large supply excess in the country. This study targets the survey of Chinese nonferrous metals industry and trade structure and considers the problem of nonferrous metals in the context of negotiations for the Korea-China FTA and its implications for a higher-quality Korea-China FTA.

Economists along with policy makers are generally viewing trade agreements as a “second best” process for trade expansion and economic growth on a global scale. The current surge of preferential trade arrangements on a bilateral basis, particularly in Asia, is somehow challenging such common view. The following paper is based on updated rough facts and put forward that the standard economic approach is a bit flawed. Obviously, the outcomes and prospects for Asian countries seem much more problematic insofar as power asymmetry and discrimination are embedded in these agreements.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the social and political factors as the determinants of antidumping duties against the transition economies. The empirical evidence shows that protectionist pressures tend to be strengthened against them with low labor standards, although protectionist tendencies with respect to social dumping are not so apparent in actual impositions of antidumping duties. There is a weak evidence that the different degrees of democraticness influenced the protectionism against the transition economies during the late 1990s, while such an effect is not found during the period of 2002-2006, as the concerned countries passed the initial stage of transition.

Economic integration in the 21st century is driven largely by market signals, rather than by inter-governmental trading arrangements. It also means much more than “free trade.” Integration needs to consider all of the ways economies are connected in international markets, including trade in goods, services ideas and information, along with essential and complementary international movements of people and capital.

Except for a small number of sensitive products, especially in agriculture, most goods and services face no, or very low, formal trade barriers. Reducing border protection of the remaining sensitive products will certainly require negotiations, but they are no longer the most strategic obstacles to economic integration.

These days, the problems of most concern of those engaged in international commerce are logistics, communications, coping with security concerns and with different regulations in other economies. The effective constraint to designing and implementing cooperative arrangements to reduce such costs or risks of international commerce is the capacity to do so, rather than political resistance. Inter-governmental negotiations are not always necessary to deal with these practical issues.

Therefore, it should be possible to have a logical division of effort between APEC and the WTO in the Asia Pacific with the WTO dealing with those issues that do need to be negotiated; and APEC dealing with the many other issues where negotiations are not needed. In the longer term, an efficient division of labour could also emerge between the G20 and the WTO.