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1 – 4 of 4Yue-tang Bian, Lu Xu, Jin-Sheng Li and Xia-qun Liu
The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolvement of investors’ behavior in stock market dynamically on the basis of non-cooperative strategy applied by investors in complex…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolvement of investors’ behavior in stock market dynamically on the basis of non-cooperative strategy applied by investors in complex networks.
Design/methodology/approach
Using modeling and simulation research method, this study designs and conducts a mathematical modeling and its simulation experiment of financial market behavior according to research’s basic norms of complex system theory and methods. Thus the authors acquire needed and credible experimental data.
Findings
The conclusions drawn in this paper are as follows. The dynamical evolution of investors’ trading behavior is not only affected by the stock market network structure, but also by the risk dominance degree of certain behavior. The dynamics equilibrium of trading behavior’s evolvement is directly influenced by the risk dominance degree of certain behavior, connectivity degree and the heterogeneity of the stock market networks.
Research limitations/implications
This paper focuses on the dynamical evolvement of investors’ behavior on the basis of the hypothesis that common investors prefer to mimic their network neighbors’ behavior through different analysis by the strategy of anti-coordination game in complex network. While the investors’ preference and the beliefs among them are not easy to quantify, that is deterministic or stochastic as the environment changes, and is heterogeneous definitely. Thus, these limitations should be broken through in the future research.
Originality/value
This paper aims to address the dynamical evolvement of investors’ behavior in stock market networks on the principle of non-cooperative represented by anti-coordination game in networks for the first time, considering that investors prefer to mimic their network neighbors’ behavior through different analysis by the strategy of differential choosing in every time step. The methodology designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment.
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Keywords
Leilei Shi, Xinshuai Guo, Andrea Fenu and Bing-Hong Wang
This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market equilibrium price, in which traders' momentum, reversal and interactive behaviors play roles.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors select intraday cumulative trading volume distribution over price as revealed preferences. An equilibrium price is a price at which the corresponding cumulative trading volume achieves the maximum value. Based on the existence of the equilibrium in social finance, the authors propose a testable interacting traders' preference hypothesis without imposing the invariance criterion of rational choices. Interactively coherent preferences signify the choices subject to interactive invariance over price.
Findings
The authors find that interactive trading choices generate a constant frequency over price and intraday dynamic market equilibrium in a tug-of-war between momentum and reversal traders. The authors explain the market equilibrium through interactive, momentum and reversal traders. The intelligent interactive trading preferences are coherent and account for local dynamic market equilibrium, holistic dynamic market disequilibrium and the nonlinear and non-monotone V-shaped probability of selling over profit (BH curves).
Research limitations/implications
The authors will understand investors' behaviors and dynamic markets through more empirical execution in the future, suggesting a unified theory available in social finance.
Practical implications
The authors can apply the subjects' intelligent behaviors to artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning and financial technology.
Social implications
Understanding the behavior of interacting individuals or units will help social risk management beyond the frontiers of the financial market, such as governance in an organization, social violence in a country and COVID-19 pandemics worldwide.
Originality/value
It uncovers subjects' intelligent interactively trading behaviors.
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This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Abstract
Purpose
This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Design/methodology/approach
The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.
Findings
The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.
Originality/value
The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.
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