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This paper aims to explore the extent of anti-bribery disclosures in the annual reports of the banks listed on UAE financial markets by differentiating between Islamic and conventional banks and examine the effect of anti-bribery disclosure on bank’s performance.

This study uses in the first stage the content analysis to explore the extent of anti-bribery disclosure in the annual reports of the banks. In the second stage, the dynamic panel two-step robust system has been applied to study the impact of the anti-bribery disclosure on banking performance.

The empirical results show that the anti-bribery disclosure is at low levels for all banks and that there are no significant differences in overall anti-bribery disclosure between the two banking systems while there are significant differences in “anti-bribery human resources practices” between Islamic and conventional banks. The dynamic panel data results show that the association between the anti-bribery disclosure and the bank’s performance is not significant as this kind of information is not clearly disclosed in the annual reports of the banks.

The study suggests to the UAE central bank and financial markets regulators to design a framework of anti-corruption disclosure by considering the international anti-corruption regime as an effort to respond to the international development of the bribery practices.

Anti-bribery concerns all the banks over the world and this research is the first study that constructs an index to measure the anti-bribery disclosure and helps in providing the status of the banking industry in terms of anti-bribery disclosure within an emerging market in the objective to improve the transparency in combatting the bribery.

The purposes of this paper are to organize historical, solved questions and recent, unsolved questions in a coherent, progressive way; explore the key question to be answered under this systematic framework; and reflect on an alternative analytical perspective to the current “problem-solving-oriented” approach. Transnational bribery regulation, with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention as the central governing legal instrument, is on the top agenda of international governance. However, its complex nature makes theoretical viewpoints on this topic rather fragmented. This fragmentation is used to help understand the wisdom of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) approach in the early years. However, as the FCPA approach was internationalized and evolves to its current phase, in which individual inquiries become path-dependent and interdependent, the fragmentation causes more confusion than makes contribution.

Sections 2 and 3 retrospect the historical trajectory of academic research on the global regulation of transnational bribery, systemizes relevant theoretical insights and illustrates how people’s understandings of the wisdom of the FCPA approach in early years affect their evaluations of the effect of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the contemporary era. Given that, at present, the most popular viewpoint is that the Convention is “ineffective”, Section 4 systemizes the diverse causal attributions of the “problem” in current academic literature, sorts out the roots causes and points out the key question for the next step forward under the version of the “problem-solving-oriented” analysis. Section 5 has a reflection on the inherent limitation of a “problem-solving-oriented” approach for our understanding of the effects of the Convention.

Under the version of a “problem-solving-oriented” approach, the key question to be solved is how to establish a mechanism to cope with the surreptitious nature of transnational bribery and the self-sacrificed nature of the FCPA-style approach simultaneously. The popular “problem-solving-oriented” approach has an inherent limitation to create new knowledge on the multilateral anti-bribery collaboration. A reality-based, historical analytical perspective is a good alternative to it.

The paper presents a personal, original organization of the conventional theoretical insights to the operation of the global anti-bribery collaboration and the underlying logics of these viewpoints. The paper also presents the author’s personal analysis of the “technical omission” and “inherent limitation” of a problem-solving-oriented approach to analyze the performance of the global anti-bribery collaboration, and the power of a historical analytical perspective as an alternative.

This study aims to analyse Rolls-Royce’s (RR) recent corruption case, its 2017 global anti-bribery and corruption (ABC) manual, and its 2017 annual report to assess whether it has put the best corruption prevention strategies into place.

This is a legal case study based on RR’s 2017 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the UK serious fraud office. It uses the new ISO 37001 standard as a theoretical framework.

RR’s DPA suspends an indictment covering 12 counts of conspiracy to corrupt, false accounting and failure to prevent bribery. RR’s ABC manual exhibits significant shortcomings as compared to ISO 37001’s requirements. RR’s ABC manual does not provide any reference to the setting, reviewing and achievement of measurable anti-bribery objectives; does not state that anti-bribery training is provided at planned intervals to employees and external business associates that pose more than a low risk of bribery; does not explain the authority and independence of its head of ethics and compliance; does not state any maximum for gifts and hospitality given or received; does not provide clear assurances that reports made through its main internal channels will be treated confidentially and that complaints about senior management will be investigated by an outside firm; and does not subject its advisers to a formal due diligence process. RR’s annual report notes that it operates in an industry prone to corruption. Finally, internal control failure and compliance fatigue mean that no anti-bribery management system can be completely effective.

This paper extends previous research by analysing the best corruption prevention strategies that organizations can implement. It does not endeavour to certify whether RR is ISO 37001 compliant, and it analyses only publicly available documents.

This study’s prevention strategies will help deter corruption and improve internal controls within organizations.

No previous study has used the new ISO 37001 standard as a framework for such corruption case analysis.

This study aims to investigate the impact of the enforcement of the international anti-bribery legal framework in developing countries.

It uses the PetroTiger case to examine the effects of foreign bribery prosecutions in Colombia, from a bribe-receivers perspective. PetroTiger is a USA-based company that was prosecuted for bribing public officials in Colombia. As a result, the public officials involved were also prosecuted in Colombia for receiving bribes. This case serves to illustrate how international anti-bribery law operates in practice and how it impacts Colombian law enforcement institutions and their capacity to prosecute bribe-receivers. The Colombian response to the international anti-corruption framework is examined in this study through the review of legislative efforts taken to address the problems of bribery and corruption in public procurement.

This study finds that enforcement of foreign bribery laws raise awareness of the situation of corruption in developing countries, generate parallel prosecutions of individuals at the receiving end of bribes and helps developing countries to develop technical expertise to fight corruption.

In practice, due to the transnational nature of foreign bribery, without international agreements, this type of corruption in international business would seldom lead to prosecution. Although the effectiveness of the enforcement of international anti-corruption law is debated, in reality, prosecutions of foreign bribery by developed countries have more positive than negative implications for developing countries.

Assist to continue efforts to deter corruption.

No many studies have looked at the effectiveness of anti-corruption international law in developing countries. As indicated by Mr. Moulette Patrick head of Anti-Corruption Division at organisation for economic co-operation and development more research on the effectiveness of the UN enacted Convention against Corruption, which is what this paper does.

This article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.

To construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

The result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.

This instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.

This article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

Este artículo informa sobre el desarrollo y validación de un índice de medición de soborno para el sector empresarial, que, basado en la teoría institucional, busca superar las limitaciones de las mediciones tradicionales, reconociendo las dinámicas que originan el fenómeno e identificando los componentes del proceso.

Para la construcción del índice se utilizaron técnicas de análisis correlacional y de componentes principales, así como rigurosas pruebas estadísticas, validando el instrumento en una muestra de 2.963 empresas de América Latina, entre ellas Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, México y Perú.

El resultado fue un instrumento compuesto por dos dimensiones: (1) reglas de juego antisoborno, compuestas por conocimiento normativo y esfuerzo antisoborno (2) soborno como hábito percibido, permitiendo una representación objetiva de la realidad debido a su consistencia interna, validez concurrente y discriminante.

Este artículo pone en evidencia empírica diferentes variables que hacen posible el soborno. Los resultados pueden ser útiles en el diseño de estrategias para prevenir este tipo comportamiento, también destaca la importancia de diseñar mecanismos para registrar la información relacionada con la lucha contra el soborno.

Este instrumento es uno de los pocos que se enfoca en medir el soborno en el sector empresarial en términos de prácticas de corrupción, útil para instituciones tanto públicas como privadas para promover mejores reglas de juego en contra del soborno. Adicionalmente el modelo teórico propuesto puede ser utilizado para medir otros fenómenos con características similares.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an updated review of Canadian foreign official anti-bribery policy.

To achieve this objective, seven factors were examined. Several factors have been emphasized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and others are original.

The results indicate that while Canada is making progress towards strengthening its foreign official anti-bribery policy, significant weaknesses still remain.

This study adds to the literature in this area by utilizing several new factors which attempt to gauge the effectiveness of foreign official anti-bribery policy.

This study aims to investigate the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies on analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been identified as a powerful tool to detect fraud and should equally act as a possible tool to reduce corruption.

This study used a negative binomial count regression method on a longitudinal data set of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010-2015. To control for potential endogeneity bias and improve the reliability of the estimation, both country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies variables were instrumented.

After controlling potential endogeneity bias, the results show that the adoption of anti-bribery policies at firm level attracts more analysts to follow a firm. The results for corruption at country level show that analyst coverage increases in less corrupted countries indicating that the costs of corruption exceed its potential benefits. When the variables corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted, the relationship is positive and highly significant.

Given the potential important role played by anti-corruption measures, firms are encouraged to adopt them to reduce the incidence of corruption and to increase analyst coverage, which will reinforce the benign effect of monitoring.

Although the literature on corruption at the country level is rich, it is geared towards the determinants of corruption in contrast to its consequences, and fewer studies have focused on the impact of corruption at firm level because of data limitations. This paper addresses this gap and contributes to the literature on the consequences of corruption at firm level.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the scope of the legal responses to bribery and particularly foreign bribery in the global context. It identifies the corrosive effect of bribery and its negative effect on the economy, before turning to Australia’s mixed response to foreign bribery.

The paper is theoretical in nature as a review of policy, and the literature has been the main method used for analysis. Given the increasingly transnational and organised nature of foreign bribery, this paper adopts a comparative approach using Australia as the home base with some comparisons with the UK and the USA.

This paper finds that Australia’s response to foreign bribery is improving from a low base, and that this is recognised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further improvement could be expected if there were strong government leadership and coordination of law enforcement authorities, including the police, corporate regulators and corruption authorities at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels. This paper acknowledges the work of Australia’s unfinished Senate Foreign Bribery Inquiry, which is due to report by 30 June 2017.

This paper revisits the debate on bribery and the response of law enforcement, highlighting the importance of effective and coordinated law enforcement. The paper will provide background for those analysing the issues with foreign bribery and the solutions for law enforcement.

The paper enables the reader to gain insights into the problems and causes and effects of foreign bribery. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to, and facilitate, further analysis of the most effective way to deal with bribery and the legal response.

The purpose of this paper is to identify mechanisms by which an international obligation to prevent or punish corporate bribery can be enforced by a national law through trade relations.

The UK Bribery Act 2010 is an example of national law which enforces OECD anti‐bribery norms, with a view to effecting an institutional change in the law and morality of other countries. Taiwan is used as a case study to look at how the UK Act may achieve its intended purposes.

The paper identifies three modes of governance in the enforcement of the Act: legal exclusivism, legal inclusivism, and legal pluralism. In the mode of legal exclusivism, the Act disregards the morality of Taiwan so as to enforce the principle of transparency in trade. In the mode of legal inclusivism, the Act allows UK multinational companies to make their own “laws” so that anti‐bribery norms can be more efficiently and effectively diffused. But in the mode of legal pluralism, the Act is forced to acknowledge the law and morality of other countries (e.g. Taiwan), especially when mutual legal assistance is crucial for cross‐border investigation and prosecution.

Although this paper is based on an analysis of how the Act will interact with the law and morality of Taiwan, the model developed provides a lens through which one can show how an international norm enforced by a national law can function in a way that brings about institutional change in other countries.

The paper provides a new insight into how legal norms can be diffused through trade.