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Purpose – In this chapter, we examine individual- and country-level differences in perceived job insecurity in the 27 European Union countries (EU27) within a multilevel framework.

Design/methodology/approach – We primarily focus on cross-national differences in perceived job insecurity in the EU27 and consider several possible explanations of it, including flexible employment practices, economic conditions, labor market structure, and political institutions. We examine both individual- and country-level determinants using multilevel partial proportional odds models based on individual-level data from the 2006 Eurobarometer 65.3 and country-level data from a variety of sources.

Findings – We find that European workers feel most insecure in countries with high unemployment, low union density, low levels of part-time and temporary employment, relatively little social spending on unemployment benefits, and in post-socialist countries.

Research limitations/implications – The findings from this study suggest that flexible employment practices do not necessarily cause workers to feel insecure in their jobs. This is likely due to the different nature of part-time and temporary employment in different institutional contexts.

Originality/value – This study is one of the most comprehensive accounts of perceived job insecurity in Europe given the focus on a larger number of countries and macro-level explanations for perceived job insecurity.

This chapter explicates the logic of a computational agent-based model bearing on the willingness of perpetrator agents to conduct genocidal actions against Jewish people during World War II. Given realistic distributions of benefits and costs and sufficient time, as a joint consequence of these distributions and interpersonal influence the model readily creates agents who are avowed anti-Semites, Nazis, and perpetrators of the genocide, even transforming agents characterized initially by lower levels of anti-Semitism. Although many agents initially exhibit dissonance (i.e., a disjunction) between their attitudes and choices, toward the end of this period their anti-Semitic attitudes and choices become consonant (i.e., internally consistent). Experiments and parameter studies using this model indicate that different distributions of benefits and costs, changed legitimacy of authority, and different values of anti-Semitism of influential agents can modify the growth of prejudice, Nazism, and genocidal choices in these random-number-based Monte Carlo trials. The results clarify the conflicting interpretations of Goldhagen and Browning concerning the genocidal actions of a battalion of perpetrators and the role of propaganda in reducing moral costs. Six hypotheses that focus the testing of the model can be generalized creating insights about other genocides.