Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine stock price crash risk (SPCR) as a function of meeting or missing three earnings thresholds – reporting a profit (earnings level), reporting an earnings increase (earnings change) and meeting analysts’ forecasts (earnings expectation).

The authors rely upon the research design of Herrmann et al. (2011) to identify the incremental impact of the earnings level and earnings change benchmarks on SPCR, after controlling for the effects of meeting or missing analysts’ expectations.

The authors find that meeting analysts’ expectations is negatively associated with SPCR, and this relationship strengthens with the magnitude of the unexpected earnings. However, the authors find little evidence of incremental threshold effects to suggest that earnings level and earnings change benchmarks are critical thresholds with respect to SPCR. Our results are robust after including a number of control variables.

This study contributes to the literature that investigates determinants of SPCR while simultaneously providing new evidence to conclusions that analysts’ earnings forecast is at the top of the earnings benchmark hierarchy.

Employees, as internal stakeholders, not only play significant roles in a company’s operations but are also important users of a company’s financial information. However, prior accounting research to date has not explored whether employees incorporate a firm’s ability to meet earnings benchmarks in forming and revising their perceptions of firms. This study aims to focus on whether a firm’s ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks impacts employees’ perceptions.

The authors use employees’ perception scores from the 100 Best Companies to Work for from 1998 to 2015. The authors conduct an empirical study to examine the impact of beating earnings benchmarks on the perceptions of employees by estimating regression analyses. The dependent variable is employee perceptions of the firm. The variables of interest are the earnings growth and the analyst forecast benchmarks. The authors control for earnings performance and other determinants of employees’ perceptions.

The authors find that beating the earnings benchmarks is relevant for employees but has different impacts on the employees’ perceptions of firms. Specifically, both level and change analyses suggest that a firm’s ability to beat the earnings growth benchmark affects employees’ perceptions. However, the authors find no associations between employees’ perceptions and the analyst forecast benchmarks.

The authors recognize the amount of variation among the two groups’ perceptions from the binary variable creates an inherent limitation that the authors examine the best firms in terms of employee perceptions compared to the second-best firms. Therefore, the authors create another measure, EMPLOYEE_PERCEPTION2, which equals one if the firm’s ranking is within the top quartile and zero if the firm’s ranking is within the bottom quartile. This new variable increases the variation of employees’ perceptions in the sample to address the inherent limitation by allowing us to compare the best firms to the worst firms in the sample.

The study highlights the importance of beating earnings benchmarks for employees as a broader group of stakeholders. The study contributes to accounting benchmarks literature by exploring a different group of earnings benchmarks users. The authors also contribute to psychology studies by providing empirical evidence on the previously untested, intuitive prediction that employees’ views depend on a firm’s ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the properties of analysts’ cash flows from operations (CFO) forecast generated for Australian listed firms as a productive activity, within the wider processes of financial disclosure in Australia.

Two categories of criteria are adopted: first, basic predictive statistical performance relative to a benchmark model and earnings forecasts; and second, relevance for equity pricing, as indicated by the market reaction to cash flow or forecast error reactions. The final sample comprised 2,138 observations between 2001 and 2016 and several regression models are estimated to determine the relative performance and market reaction.

Analysts’ consensus cash flow forecasts demonstrate poor predictive performance relative to earnings forecasts. Cash flow forecasts are typically naïve extensions of earnings forecasts. Furthermore, cash flow forecasts appear to be of minimal use for equity market participants in complementing earnings forecasts’ role in informing firms’ equity pricing.

While analysts’ earnings forecasts are useful for making predictions, the role of analysts’ cash flow forecasts in capital market functional efficiency appears quite limited.

This study is one of few that examines comparative usefulness of analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecasts and their predictive power using the Australian setting. Additionally, it enriches the sparse international literature on such forecasts.

The purpose of this paper is to assess management earnings forecasts in a continuous disclosure environment.

A large sample of hand checked Australian management earnings forecasts are examined. These data are analysed using a series of logistic regressions. Hypotheses are proposed and tested based on Skinner's litigation cost hypothesis. Increases in non‐routine management earnings forecasts post‐2000; and increases in the proportion of such forecasts that contain bad news are predicted. The relationship between forecast specificity and forecast news content is investigated.

It was found that, post‐2000, legislative changes and increased enforcement action by ASIC were followed by increased disclosure of non‐routine management earnings forecasts. For routine forecasts, no significant increase in forecast disclosure is observed. This result is consistent with Skinner as is the finding that the increased disclosure is only apparent for bad news non‐routine forecasts. For the second objective, evidence was found that the larger the gap between market expectations and actual performance the more specific the forecast, but only for bad news forecasts.

The study extends the small amount of research investigating the characteristics of management earnings forecasts. It also provides an assessment of the effectiveness of efforts by ASIC to ensure that management meet their continuous disclosure obligations.

Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of long horizon institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

Using a sample of 10,565 firm-year observations in the USA, the paper examines the extent to which long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast.

After controlling for the general performance-turnover relation, this paper finds that long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast. This finding is stronger when CEOs focus on long-term value creation and do not sacrifice long-term value to boost current earnings and is stronger when the monitoring intensity by long horizon institutional investors is greater.

The results suggest that long horizon institutional investors serve a monitoring role in alleviating CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between long horizon institutional ownership and attenuated managerial short-termism. The literature is silent about why long horizon institutional investors alleviate managerial short-termism. This paper fills this void in the literature by documenting that long horizon institutional investors mitigate CEO career concerns for managerial short-termism. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on the monitoring role of institutional investors by documenting the incremental effect of institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

This study aims to test the effects of forecast specificity on the asymmetric short‐window share market response to management earnings forecasts (MEF).

The paper examines a large sample of hand‐checked Australian data over the period 1994 to 2001. Using an analyst news benchmark, it estimates a series of regressions to investigate whether the short‐term impact from bad news announcements is greater in magnitude than from good news announcements and whether this differs between routine and non‐routine MEFs. Additionally, it examines whether (after controlling for news content of MEF) there is a differential market impact conditional on specificity: minimum versus maximum versus range versus point.

The results indicate that an asymmetric response is evident for the overall sample and a sub‐set of non‐routine forecasts. Contrary to predictions, the results show that forecast specificity, minimum, maximum, range and point MEFs make no additional contribution to the differences in the market reaction to bad or good news.

The study extends the research investigating the short‐run market impact of MEFs. The main element of innovation derives from the interaction between specificity and news content, as well as distinguishing between routine versus non‐routine cases. Notably, it found little support for the view that more specific forecasts elicit greater market responses. What the results do suggest is that managers appear to choose the form of the forecast to suit the news being delivered. In particular, bad news delivered in a minimum forecast seems to be ignored by the market.

Managers generally have discretion in determining how components of earnings are presented in financial statements in distinguishing between “normal” earnings and items classified as unusual, special, significant, exceptional or abnormal. Prior research has found that such intra‐period classificatory choice is used as a form of earnings management. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards mandated that unusually large items of revenue and expense be classified as “abnormal items” for financial reporting, but this classification was removed from accounting standards from 2001. This move by the regulators was partly in response to concerns that the abnormal classification was being used opportunistically to manage reported pre‐abnormal earnings. The purpose of this paper is to extend the earnings management literature by examining the reporting of abnormal items for evidence of intra‐period classificatory earnings management in the unique Australian setting.

This study investigates associations between reporting of abnormal items and incentives in the form of analyst following and the earnings benchmarks of analysts' forecasts, earnings levels, and earnings changes, for a sample of Australian, top‐500 firms, for the seven‐year period from 1994 to 2000.

The findings suggest there are systematic differences between firms reporting abnormal items and those with no abnormal items. Results show evidence that, on average, firms shifted expense items from pre‐abnormal earnings to bottom line net income through reclassification as abnormal losses.

The paper's findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the “abnormal” classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. With the removal of the standardised classification of items outside normal operations as “abnormal”, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how family firms affect analyst forecast dispersion, accuracy and optimism and how earnings smoothness as the moderating factor, affects these relationships in an emerging market context.

This paper uses the population sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2010 as the research sample, which includes 963 firm-year observations.

The findings show that analysts following family firms are more likely to have more dispersed, less accurate and more optimism biased forecasts than those following nonfamily firms. Earning smoothness is mainly used by nonfamily firms as a signaling strategy to improve analyst forecast quality. In contrast, earnings smoothness is mainly used by families as a garbling strategy, stimulating forecast optimism. Only earnings smoothness in family firms with a high level of family ownership concentration is likely to be signaling-oriented to improve analyst forecast accuracy and mitigate analyst optimism biases.

Emerging markets are not only featured by prevailing principal-principal conflicts but also have multiple levels of agency conflicts among large shareholders, minority shareholders and professionally hired managers. This research reveals the multiple governance roles of family owners in affecting analyst forecast quality, including their entrenchment role in extracting private benefits of control through opaque environments and market discipline distortion role in aligning interests between managers and families without prioritizing meeting or beating analyst forecasts, both at the cost of minority shareholders. This research further disentangles the intertwined signaling oriented and garbiling oriented incentives associated with earnings smoothness under family governance.

Prior literature has revealed three key earnings benchmarks: earnings level; earnings change; and analysts’ expectations. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors seek to establish which earnings benchmark induces the largest extent of earnings management. Second, the authors explore the implications of earnings management on firm future performance. Both of these purposes are investigated for Chinese listed companies during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era.

The authors rely upon the unique regulations and incentives for Chinese listed companies in order to develop four testable hypotheses. Next, the authors employ both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to test the hypotheses.

The results suggest that Chinese listed firms have the highest level of income increasing discretionary accruals around the earnings level benchmark, followed by the earnings change benchmark. The authors do not find any evidence of earnings management to beat analysts’ expectation. In addition, the authors find evidence that Chinese listed firms with relatively high level of earnings management and low earnings exhibit relatively weak future stock performance.

The findings are the first to document an earnings management benchmark hierarchy with respect to the extent of income increasing discretionary accruals, while simultaneously establishing a link between earnings management and firm future stock performance, for Chinese listed companies. The findings are valuable for regulators and investors by suggesting that management intervention in the reporting process during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era may act to circumvent delisting regulations and cloud earnings signal for firms that beat certain earnings benchmarks.