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This article highlights current research at the Leatherhead Food Research Association which is relevant to shelf‐life assessment of food products. One area is to improve the quality and safety of fish ‐ both fresh and cold‐smoked. Food MicroModel, a computer software package which aids in the prediction of the microbiological safety and spoilage potential of food products, is described. New methods capable of predicting the stability of oils and fats to oxidation, which can be a significant cause of reduced shelf‐life in fat‐containing foods, are described. Novel analytical instruments, known as electronic noses, have been shown to have potential, as has a total antioxidant activity test. Temperature control in factories is often a compromise between product safety and the need to maintain reasonable employee working conditions. This is no longer a problem with the development of glove box technology, which separates the two environments. The final study discussed in this article is the development of accelerated shelf‐life tests for chocolate products.

Our focus is on the use of narrative in ethics education in organisations. The effectiveness of stories as a basis for executive education and organisational development has been described in other chapters in this book and elsewhere. Many writers provide examples linking stories and ethics, but the examples are drawn most often from overtly ethical stories. We offer a more expansive and inclusive view, suggesting that all stories are valuable for teaching ethics. We use Booker’s (2004) finding that all stories belong to one of seven basic plots – overcoming the monster; rags to riches; the quest; voyage and return; comedy; tragedy; and rebirth – to show that no major category of narrative need be omitted from those which can provide examples or links to the development of virtue in organisations. We provide examples of how stories can be used to encourage the development of specific virtues including courage, integrity, hope, inquisitiveness, humour and prudence. Six further aspects are considered – whether only moral stories are useful, the value of complexity, the benefit of familiarity, stories of failure, the selection of appropriate stories and whether non-fiction can be included.

The purpose of this paper is to address the need to understand how younger music festival-goers use and engage with a music festival’s Facebook page, and how they perceive this social networking service (SNS) as a potential on-line platform for value co-creation.

Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 young adults who attended an annual New Year’s Eve music festival, Rhythm and Vines, in Gisborne, New Zealand.

Analysis of the interview data revealed that the majority of participants did not actively engage with this platform and could be categorised as passive viewers or information-seekers. In addition, participants perceived five types of value from using this SNS: functional, social, emotional, interactive and aesthetic value. Even though participants were not segmented due to the small sample size, patterns in their levels of engagement with Facebook, attendance status, reasons for attending the festival and the combinations of forms of value that they perceived were identified.

Future research should use a large-scale survey method to obtain a representative sample that is generalisable to a specific population of music festival-goers.

Dominance of features on Facebook providing festival-goers with functional value suggests they prefer a passive or co-optation approach to value co-creation in this context. Due to the limited extent of participants actively co-creating value on this platform, alternative means of encouraging interaction to co-create value with festival-goers should be investigated.

This study demonstrates that this SNS provides this group of young adults with a means to connect their real-time festival experience, with their on-line Facebook social network during the year.

This chapter examines the differing ways in which the criminal responsibility of children has been understood in English and Australian common law. The doctrine of “doli incapax” has for many centuries worked to establish a presumption in law that children between the ages of around 10 and 14 are incapable of forming criminal intent, unless it can be shown that they are capable of ‘guilty knowledge’ about their actions. In this approach, children are presumed to be ‘naughty’ until it can be shown that they are ‘bad’. However, events such as the murder of James Bulger in 1993 have led to the abolition of the doctrine in the UK, and its questioning in Australia. The chapter will outline how and why the law’s distinction between adults and children in relation to crime has become unstable, and explain the implications of the legal conception of childhood for the sociology of childhood more broadly. It will also explore how a closer look at the history of the doli incapax presumption sheds considerable light on the central and active role played by the judiciary and the legal profession, as opposed to other social and professional groups, in the development of a particular legal construction of childhood.

These substances, resulting from the constant building‐up and breaking‐down of living tissues, have most friendly relations with their host, although antagonists—antimetabolites—appear now and then and disrupt their functions. In some of the inborn errors of metabolism, the antagonism is permanent and unless replacement therapy occurs at a very early stage, it interferes with physical and/or mental development. That metabolites from other sources introduced into a host could be extremely toxic was amply illustrated when a metabolite of certain strains of Aspergillus flavus, a fungus commonly found in peanuts and other vegetable seeds, caused severe losses to turkey breeders a few years ago. In 1960, it was discovered that the toxic principle was aflatoxin, which had a number of components and that all farm and laboratory animals, with the exception of sheep, were sensitive to it. Now, it has been confirmed that pure aflatoxin added to a normal laboratory diet is carcinogenic. (J. H. Butler and J. M. Barnes, 1963, Brit. J. Cancer, 17, 699.) Cows fed on highly toxic meal secreted a milk factor which proved to be toxic to ducklings. (H. de Iongh, R. O. Vles, and J. G. van Pelt, 1964, Nature, 202, 466.)

The decision of the Wolverhampton Stipendiary in the case of “Skim‐milk Cheese” is, at any rate, clearly put. It is a trial case, and, like most trial cases, the reasons for the judgment have to be based upon first principles of common‐sense, occasionally aided, but more often complicated, by already existing laws, which apply more or less to the case under discussion. The weak point in this particular case is the law which has just come into force, in which cheese is defined as the substance “usually known as cheese” by the public and any others interested in cheese. This reliance upon the popular fancy reads almost like our Government's war policy and “the man in the street,” and is a shining example of a trustful belief in the average common‐sense. Unfortunately, the general public have no direct voice in a police court, and so the “usually known as cheese” phrase is translated according to the fancy and taste of the officials and defending solicitors who may happen to be concerned with any particular case. Not having the general public to consult, the officials in this case had a war of dictionaries which would have gladdened the heart of Dr. JOHNSON; and the outcome of much travail was the following definition: cheese is “ coagulated milk or curd pressed into a solid mass.” So far so good, but immediately a second definition question cropped up—namely, What is “milk?”—and it is at this point that the mistake occurred. There is no legal definition of new milk, but it has been decided, and is accepted without dispute, that the single word “milk” means an article of well‐recognised general properties, and which has a lower limit of composition below which it ceases to be correctly described by the one word “milk,” and has to be called “skim‐milk,” “separated milk,” “ milk and water,” or other distinguishing names. The lower limits of fat and solids‐not‐fat are recognised universally by reputable public analysts, but there has been no upper limit of fat fixed. Therefore, by the very definition quoted by the stipendiary, an article made from “skim‐milk” is not cheese, for “skim‐milk” is not “milk.” The argument that Stilton cheese is not cheese because there is too much fat would not hold, for there is no legal upper limit for fat; but if it did hold, it does not matter, for it can be, and is, sold as “Stilton” cheese, without any hardship to anyone. The last suggestion made by the stipendiary would, if carried out, afford some protection to the general public against their being cheated when they buy cheese. This suggestion is that the Board of Agriculture, who by the Act of 1899 have the legal power, should determine a lower limit of fat which can be present in cheese made from milk; but, as we have repeatedly pointed out, it is by the adoption of the Control system that such questions can alone be settled to the advantage of the producer of genuine articles and to that of the public.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides: