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The last several decades have brought about a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of disability (Fougeyrollas & Beauregard, 2001; Williams, 2001). The traditional medical model considers disability to be a characteristic of the person, situated within the body. In the medical model view, disability, or difficulty functioning in major life domains, results from bodily impairments associated with a medical diagnosis or disorder, and a medical intervention or treatment is required to “correct” the problem of the individual. Alternatively, contemporary social models argue that disability is a social construction. In the social model view, disability is created by social policies, stigma and other barriers within the social and physical environment. Changes in attitudes and policies and the removal of barriers are needed to “correct” these environmental problems.

Significant unemployment among adults with serious mental illness (SMI) is a well-documented problem. Estimates suggest that as many as 85% of adults with SMI are unemployed at any one time (Anthony & Blanch, 1987; Milazzo-Sayre, Henderson & Manderscheid, 1997; Rogers, Walsh, Masotta & Danley, 1991). Recent years have seen advances in the development and dissemination of a variety of supported employment services for adults with disabilities. When people with SMI are enrolled in services with a specific employment focus, they achieve employment outcomes (e.g. job placement rates, job tenure) superior to those achieved by people receiving standard mental health services such as day treatment (Bond et al., 2001; Cook, 2003). Supported employment is now considered an “evidenced-based” practice (Bond et al., 2001). Although supported employment approaches vary, evidence-based services share common principles, including (1) prioritizing client preferences for type and timing of work; (2) providing in-vivo and follow-along supports as long as needed; (3) viewing work attempts as part of a learning opportunity; (4) having a commitment to “competitive” employment as an attainable goal; and (5) not relying on pre-vocational training, day treatment or sheltered workshops (Bond et al., 2001; Mowbray, Leff, Warren, McCrohan et al., 1997; Ridgeway & Rapp, 1998).

The trajectory of François Perroux across the Vichy regime poses about all possible range of methodological issues to the historian of ideas: individual versus collective biography, ideational versus ideological reading, internal versus external analysis, etc. The chapter outlines key elements about Perroux’s trajectory showing the entanglements and boundaries of science and politics in the transition from democratic to authoritarian rule and vice versa. A particular emphasis on uncertainties and adjustments shows, against the tendency to a teleological explanation induced by a linear interpretation of his career, that different paths were considered by Perroux, but that his choices were nevertheless constrained by the forces of both the scientific and political fields.

The aim is to identify Henri Fayol's motivations as an accomplished business manager to publish his management theory at the age of 75.

The authors retrace Henri Fayol's private life using primary sources from various French public archives including civil registry records, military and diplomatic archives, schooling records, publications from learned associations and inheritance declarations. They then use a psychological theory, namely equity theory, to interpret this new information about Fayol's private life and construct an explanation of his efforts to theorise his management experience.

Henri Fayol's schooling and his father's military career respectively influenced his perception of mathematics teaching in management training and the functioning of the army. His motivation to found a science of management was not financial but instead most probably a response to the obstacles his father encountered during his career.

It is rarely known what motivates a manager to collaborate with specialists in management science. This research into Henri Fayol's motivations can be replicated for other managers.

The paper dentifies one major practical implication for managers who wish to contribute to management theory as Fayol did. Before they begin such an undertaking, it is important for them to reflect upon their motivations. Their motivations as managers, based on financial and business success are insufficient. Deeper motivations are needed, that are anchored in their own personal history to drive the considerable intellectual investment that is necessary for them to be successful contributors.

The results encourage managers to contribute to building and improving management science. They can theorize their experiences in dealing with the management of contemporary issues such as sustainable development and social responsibility. They must do so as Fayol did: using scientific method and strongly motivated by personal beliefs.

The research question is original: “What motivated Fayol to build his management doctrine?”. Scholars rarely ask why individuals decide to build and organize knowledge. This question is relevant for managers today as they too can bring original contributions to management thought. The paper reports previously unpublished details about Fayol's life to answer the research question, and in doing so completes and corrects the works of Sasaki Tsuneo and Henri Verney.

The chapter analyzes François Perroux’s institutional and intellectual activities under the Vichy regime (1940–1944) mainly by drawing on archival insights from Perroux’s papers. The authors argue that Perroux used his strategic position as general secretary of the Carrel Foundation (created by Marshal Pétain) to reshape French economics along a twofold trend: unifying economics with other social sciences, on the one hand; and developing its most analytical aspects, on the other hand. Thus, Perroux seized the opportunity to push for the introduction and dissemination of foreign theoretical studies within French economics, quite counter-intuitively to the expected nationalistic fallback accompanying authoritarian rule. In the end, the Vichy regime proved a suitable vehicle for the advancement of Perroux’s ideas and career: he managed in fact to make the best of a highly uncertain situation in 1940 and especially in 1944, with the impending Liberation of France. The authors show that Perroux used different strategies to neutralize those aspects of his work associated to Vichy’s ideology.

The emergence of non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), along with supranational organisations, is probably the most important political development of the post‐Second World War period. Yet it is not easy to explain why they are so numerous today but relatively rare just 50 years ago. By comparing the internal organisation, diversity, brand building and internationalism of NGOs and corporations, this paper shows that NGOs are far more similar to private corporations than to any existing political institution. Moreover, the corporate model has given NGOs important advantages with which they have “out‐competed” traditional political institutions to win greater public influence, awareness and trust. In the increasingly important arena of supranational politics and treaty organisations, NGOs have exploited the flexibility of their corporate structure to become the sole players apart from governments. Thus NGOs are, in effect, the political analogues of that other highly successful late 20th institution, corporations, sharing not only their strengths, but also their weaknesses.

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophical term and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theory and practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s concept of dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional and rational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows the spiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignity is located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) or physics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz also used the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this value and used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as a personality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used it in the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts), regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon. In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for the law, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities. There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was different from Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially the moral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity. The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of it in different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, but in a different context.

AFTER the trenchant paper by Mr. A. O. Jennings, read at the Brighton meeting of the Library Association, and the very embarrassing resolution which was carried as a result, one can only approach the subject of the commonplace in fiction with fear and diffidence. It is generally considered a bold and dangerous thing to fly in the face of corporate opinion as expressed in solemn public resolutions, and when the weighty minds of librarianship have declared that novels must only be chosen on account of their literary, educational or moral qualities, one is almost reduced to a state of mental imbecility in trying to fathom the meaning and limits of such an astounding injunction. To begin with, every novel or tale, even if but a shilling Sunday‐school story of the Candle lighted by the Lord type is educational, inasmuch as something, however little, may be learnt from it. If, therefore, the word “educational” is taken to mean teaching, it will be found impossible to exclude any kind of fiction, because even the meanest novel can teach readers something they never knew before. The novels of Emma Jane Worboise and Mrs. Henry Wood would no doubt be banned as unliterary and uneducational by those apostles of the higher culture who would fain compel the British washerwoman to read Meredith instead of Rosa Carey, but to thousands of readers such books are both informing and recreative. A Scots or Irish reader unacquainted with life in English cathedral cities and the general religious life of England would find a mine of suggestive information in the novels of Worboise, Wood, Oliphant and many others. In similar fashion the stories of Annie Swan, the Findlaters, Miss Keddie, Miss Heddle, etc., are educational in every sense for the information they convey to English or American readers about Scots country, college, church and humble life. Yet these useful tales, because lacking in the elusive and mysterious quality of being highly “literary,” would not be allowed in a Public Library managed by a committee which had adopted the Brighton resolution, and felt able to “smell out” a high‐class literary, educational and moral novel on the spot. The “moral” novel is difficult to define, but one may assume it will be one which ends with a marriage or a death rather than with a birth ! There have been so many obstetrical novels published recently, in which doubtful parentage plays a chief part, that sexual morality has come to be recognized as the only kind of “moral” factor to be regarded by the modern fiction censor. Objection does not seem to be directed against novels which describe, and indirectly teach, financial immorality, or which libel public institutions—like municipal libraries, for example. There is nothing immoral, apparently, about spreading untruths about religious organizations or political and social ideals, but a novel which in any way suggests the employment of a midwife before certain ceremonial formalities have been executed at once becomes immoral in the eyes of every self‐elected censor. And it is extraordinary how opinion differs in regard to what constitutes an immoral or improper novel. From my own experience I quote two examples. One reader objected to Morrison's Tales of Mean Streets on the ground that the frequent use of the word “bloody” made it immoral and unfit for circulation. Another reader, of somewhat narrow views, who had not read a great deal, was absolutely horrified that such a painfully indecent book as Adam Bede should be provided out of the public rates for the destruction of the morals of youths and maidens!