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Understanding how leaders make foreign policy and national security decisions is of paramount importance for both the policy community and academia. It is our assertion that decisions in these domains can be explained best by tracing the cognitive process leaders go through in formulating and arriving at their decisions, using the applied decision analysis (ADA) method.

Consequently, this chapter introduces readers to Applied Decision Analysis (also see Mintz, 2005; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010), which is utilized throughout the chapters comprising this volume. We describe the methodological and theoretical implications of the research findings presented in this edited volume. Specifically, the range of leaders analyzed in this volume using ADA (namely, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Khaled Mashal, Mao Zedong, and Saddam Hussein) substantiates this method’s capacity to provide robust analysis of decisions made by leaders from diverse nations and cultures. We conclude this introduction by providing a brief summary of the chapters that are included in this volume.

This volume is the second of two volumes analyzing decision-making, policy, and strategy of 12 prominent political leaders from the East and West through the lens of ADA. The chapters comprising both volumes seek to uncover how political leaders make decisions: their decision calculus and the motives and factors affecting their crafting of foreign as well as national security policies. The concluding chapter outlines the empirical and analytic contributions of ADA and poliheuristic theory to analysis that should be undertaken in national security and foreign policy affairs. Specifically, the chapter underscores ADA’s policy relevance and ramifications vis-à-vis intelligence analysis, international security analysis, as well as cross-cultural decision-making studies of rivals and allies.

Understanding how leaders make foreign policy and national security decisions is of paramount importance for the policy community and academia. It is our assertion that decisions in these domains can be explained best by tracing the cognitive process leaders go through in formulating and arriving at their decisions, using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method (Mintz, 2005; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

Consequently, this chapter summarizes the Applied Decision Analysis method which is utilized throughout the chapters comprising this volume. We then discuss the findings presented in this volume, while demonstrating the merit of both ADA and the poliheuristic theory of decision (Mintz, 2004), in the robust analyses of decisions made by Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Benjamin Netanyahu, Winston Churchill, Mao Zedong, Barack Obama, Saddam Hussein, Khaled Mashal, Muammar Gaddafi, Pieter Botha, and Frederik de Klerk. We conclude by providing a brief summary of the case studies which are included in this volume.

This chapter offers an analysis of the decision code of Khaled Mashal, the former leader of the Hamas organization. Using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method, it examines five decisions made by Mashal in 2011–2017. The analysis suggests that Mashal tends to use mainly the poliheuristic decision rule in these decisions, and considers the political-organizational dimension of Hamas as non-compensatory. Thus, Mashal made these decisions by first eliminating any alternative which risked his organization’s political status, and only then he rationally chose the alternative with the greatest expected utility from the remaining ones.

This chapter uses the poliheuristic theory of decision-making to analyze the decisions of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The study examines a series of Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the peace process during 1996–2014. Using Applied Decision Analysis (ADA), this study demonstrates that Netanyahu ruled out alternatives that failed to satisfy alternatives on the non-compensatory decision dimension – his political survivability. The prime minister’s final choices were made from the remaining options according to their ability to maximize net benefits with respect to Netanyahu’s ideological concerns.

It is generally believed that Middle Eastern countries are homogenous. Although this belief holds some truth, Middle Eastern countries have more differences than similarities. They differ in language, race, psychology, perception of threats, historical and colonial backgrounds, and political and economic developments. Realizing these differences, I expect that these countries have varying perceptions and interpretations of external threats and different methods of dealing with those threats. It is theoretically implausible to contemplate a general trend in defense spending across Middle Eastern countries; however, it is theoretically sound to view several broad trends within the region.

In this chapter, I explain the key trends in defense spending and arms procurement in the Middle East and test whether those trends were subject to Louis F. Richardson's action-reaction model. I assessed the “guns-versus-butter” trade-off and the future prospects for peace in the region in light of these trends. I explained the danger of transferring weapons knowledge and technology to non-state actors in the Middle East. I investigate the trend in defense spending based on Richardson's action-reaction model by considering rival pairs in each subregion: Algeria–Morocco in North Africa; Egypt–Israel, Jordan–Israel, and Syria–Israel in the frontline states; United Arab Emirates–Iran in the Arab–Persian Gulf; and Pakistan–India in the Indian subcontinent. I used ordinary least squares (OLS) method in testing those dyads. I used military expenditure data from the SIPRI Yearbook: World Armament and Disarmament published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. I conclude the study with policy implications and recommendations for achieving permanent peace in the region.

This chapter attempts to uncover the decision code of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, based on 12 decisions he made concerning the Middle East during his third term as president, from 2012 until October 2015.

The study was carried out to understand Putin’s line of thought and decision-making, in light of Putin’s increasing importance throughout the last decade, globally and in the Middle East, in particular. After understanding the decision calculus of Putin, it might also be possible to predict his future decisions concerning the region.

Decision rules can be inferred by analyzing a set of decisions. Analysis of such decisions is made in this chapter using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method that uncovers historic decisions, and aims to peer into the mind of the decision-maker.

The results show the main decision rule for each of Putin’s decisions. The work proves that when it comes to foreign issues, the decision code which leads Putin in his decisions is rational. The results also reveal Putin’s strong desire to promote Russia and himself, while using holistic, maximizing, and compensatory processing, as long as his political survival is not compromised.