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To analyze the U.S, Supreme Court’s decision in Liu v. S.E.C., 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) and its potential implications for insider trading cases.

Provides context on the history of disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings; discusses factual and procedural background underlying the Liu decision; summarizes the Court’s opinion and rationale, with a particular focus on the Court’s pronouncements regarding the permissible scope of SEC disgorgement as an equitable remedy; identifies and explores three possible issues in insider trading cases that may be affected by the Court’s narrowing of SEC disgorgement.

In Liu, the Supreme Court narrowed SEC disgorgement by stating that, as a general matter, SEC disgorgement is not permitted where: (1) the proceeds are not remitted to investors; (2) one defendant is made to disgorge profits that were received by someone else; or (3) the amount of disgorgement fails to deduct legitimate business expenses, in each case subject to possible exemptions as outlined by the Court.

This rule may call into question whether courts may: (a) order disgorgement against insider traders, given the difficulty of identifying investors who have been harmed; (b) order insider traders to disgorge profits earned by others on account of their violations; or (c) order insider traders to pay civil penalties under Section 21 A of the Exchange Act based on profits earned by others.

Expert analysis and guidance from experienced securities enforcement lawyers with expertise in insider trading.

Describes how HIV and AIDS are carried and spread, particularly for high‐risk groups, but adds that it is not only behavioural but also those behaviours in conjunction with others. Employs figures and tables for added explanation and emphasis. Chronicles some individual case studies showing different “risk” behaviours and types of “unsafe” practices. Makes clear that the use of varied types of education are of major importance in the fight against ignorance and nonchalance in the battle against AIDS.

An interview with Milton Friedman in 1996 ‐ presents his reflections on some of the important issues surrounding the evolution of, and currrent debates within, modern macroeconomics. A world‐renowned economist and prolific author since the 1930s, Milton Friedman has had a considerable impact on macroeconomic theory and policy making. Associated mostly with monetarism and the efficacy of free markets, his work has ranged over a broader area ‐ microeconomics, methodology, consumption function, applied statistics, international economics, monetary theory, history and policy, business cycles and inflation. In the interview discusses Keynes’s General Theory, monetarism, new classical macroeconomics, methodology, economic policy, European union and the monetarist counter‐revolution.

In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of material poses problems for the researcher in management studies — and, of course, for the librarian: uncovering what has been written in any one area is not an easy task. This volume aims to help the librarian and the researcher overcome some of the immediate problems of identification of material. It is an annotated bibliography of management, drawing on the wide variety of literature produced by MCB University Press. Over the last four years, MCB University Press has produced an extensive range of books and serial publications covering most of the established and many of the developing areas of management. This volume, in conjunction with Volume I, provides a guide to all the material published so far.

In speeches and testimonies, Alan Greenspan claimed intellectual links between his financial policies and the ideas of Milton Friedman and Joseph A. Schumpeter on banks, central banks, and financial crises. As the financial crisis deepened in 2008, Greenspan admitted that his policies had been shockingly wrong. The purpose of this paper is to explain why his claims of intellectual links between those policies and the ideas of Friedman and Schumpeter were also wrong.

Beginning with representative examples of Greenspan's citations of Friedman and of Schumpeter as supporting his financial policies, the authors review the economic ideas of Friedman and Schumpeter on banks, central banks, and financial crises. In each case, we contrast Greenspan's financial policies with those ideas, demonstrating the spurious nature of his claims of intellectual links.

While expanding the role of the Federal Reserve in the financial markets, Greenspan's financial policies were based on the declaration that deregulation and financial innovations were providing flexibility and stability for the entire financial system. In his financial policies, Greenspan rejected Friedman's recommendations for changes in the powers and functioning of the Federal Reserve that featured a monetary policy rule and the 100 percent reserve requirement for deposits that would involve the separation of depository banking from loans and investments. From a Schumpeterian perspective, Greenspan's policies encouraged and facilitated the massive “reckless” finance that was responsible for the financial crisis of 2007‐2009.

Greenspan's legacy as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is one of policies that first contributed to recurring financial crises of increasing severity and were then followed by an extraordinary policy expansion of the Federal Reserve in attempts to cope with the crises. On that basis, it is important to have a clear understanding of the lack of intellectual support for those policies from the influential economists with whom he claimed intellectual links.

As we indicated in the first part of this study, the second part was to be a cost analysis of cataloguing and classification, comprising a picture of the activities in the libraries—the division of labour, the distinction, if any, between professional and non‐professional work, the grades and salaries of staff employed on the various tasks, and the amount of time spent on each. It should be made clear at the outset that no detailed cost analysis was attempted, but we hope to have given a general picture of the amount of time spent on cataloguing and classification in relation to certain other tasks in the libraries covered by our survey.

Calls for corporate social responsibility are widespread, yet there is no consensus about what it means; this may be its charm. However, it is possible to distinguish the fi duciary obligations owed to shareholders, as expressed by Milton Friedman, from all other paradigms of corporate responsibility. Friedman maintains that: “ ...there is one and only one social responsibility of business‐to‐use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.” All other paradigms argue that corporations have social responsibilities that extend beyond the pursuit of shareholder benefits to stakeholders. The list of cited stakeholders is ill‐defined and expanding, including non‐human animals and non‐sentient things. This paper defends the intellectual and ethical merits of fiduciary duties, and compares and contrasts it to the stakeholder paradigm. The fiduciary duty to firms’ owners is the bedrock of capitalism, and capitalism will wither without it.

The study of birth defects has increased in importance in recent years because the rate of infant mortality due to other causes (such as infection and nutritional disease) has decreased more quickly than has the rate of deaths due to birth defects. Today, abnormalities are detected in approximately 3 percent of newborn humans, and twice as many prenatally acquired defects are found in children after infancy as are discovered at birth. In addition, many of the more than 500,000 miscarriages and stillbirths that occur each year in the United States are due to abnormal fetal development.

During the Greenspan‐Bernanke era, the responses of Federal Reserve officials to financial crises resulted in an extraordinary involvement of the US central bank in the non‐banking financial sector. The purpose of this paper is to examine the informal and evolving conceptual framework that allows Federal Reserve officials to pursue a strategy of “constrained discretion” in responding to financial disturbances.

Behavioural economics relies on designed psychological and economic experiments to predict behavioural biases at the group level. As an analogue applicable to understanding biases in the intuitive judgments of individual policymakers, a naïve behavioural economics approach relies on intuitive or naive psychology and the interpretation of historical events as natural experiments to explain why intuitive judgments of Federal Reserve officials will contain biases.

Under the Greenspan‐Bernanke conceptual framework, Federal Reserve officials exercise “constrained discretion” in responding to disturbances arising from macro structural changes in the financial sector. The two key concepts are the Greenspan‐Bernanke doctrine on how the Federal Reserve officials respond to financial asset price bubbles and their collapses, and Bernanke's financial accelerator. Several examples are cited in which policy errors made by Alan Greenspan were attributable to identifiable biases in his intuitive judgment. In addition, Bernanke's response to the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 was based on his interpretation of the Great Depression as a natural experiment. But that interpretation was heavily biased by the influence of Milton Friedman on Bernanke's intuitive judgment. While Federal Reserve officials will need to exercise discretionary judgment in responding to financial crises, the potential for errors due to biases in that judgment can be reduced through regulatory reforms that lessen the potential for financial crises to occur.

While quantitative analyses of the effects of the Federal Reserve's actions on non‐bank financial institutions and the financial markets are ongoing, little attention has been given to the psychological aspects of the intuitive judgment that influences the discretionary decisions of the policymakers.

Traditional inventory replenishment decisions in distribution systems have been reactive, but the availability of information throughout the distribution system means that other methods should be considered.