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After decades of successful expansion, The Reader's Digest Association's products were mature. With an average readership age for the flagship Reader's Digest magazine of 50.3 in 2004, efforts to develop new products had so far failed to entice a significant number of younger customers. Following a financial downturn in 1996, positive financial results remained illusive. Several major changes instituted by Thomas O. Ryder, CEO since 1998, including acquisitions, re-capitalization, restructuring and systematic re-engineering of the corporate culture, had proven mildly successful, but RDA, as well as the entire publishing industry, faced a persistent decline in profitability. Could RDA fulfill its stated mission to create “products that inform, enrich, entertain and inspire people of all ages and cultures around the world”, and could it do this by continuing to rely on the 80-year old Reader's Digest magazine?

Ann Taylor was founded in 1954, and its classic black dress and woman's power suit were staples for years. In 1995 Ann Taylor LOFT was launched to appeal to a more casual, costconscious consumer. Under Kay Krill's leadership, the division began to outperform the original flagship. When Krill was promoted to President/CEO of Ann Taylor Stores Corporation in 2005, she was challenged with rebuilding the Ann Taylor brand - (i.e., meeting the “wardrobing needs of the updated classic consumer”) while maintaining the image and market share of LOFT. By mid-2008, an additional problem appeared: the macroeconomic climate was posing considerable uncertainty, especially for retail businesses. Krill was firmly committed to long-term growth. However, given the 2008 situation, what could she do to unleash what she believed was the firm's “significant untapped potential”?

This paper aims to focus on formation motivations and processes of R&D consortia to appreciate their differential innovative and learning capabilities.

The paper presents its argument in two separate steps. First, a two‐by‐two framework, comprising four consortium types, is developed based on two formation motivations (i.e. risk sharing and networking) and two formation processes (i.e. emergent and engineered). Four case vignettes are used to demonstrate the practical relevance of the two‐by‐two consortium typology framework. Second, the innovative and learning capabilities of each of these consortia are explored and eight propositions are advanced.

The paper introduces four types of consortia: community builders, gamblers, visible hands, and opportunists. It is argued that visible hands generate greater innovation than community builders and opportunists, and community builders and opportunists generate greater innovation than gamblers. It is also argued that government involvement moderates the relationship between consortia type and innovative capabilities in an inverted U shape. Lastly, relative appropriateness of frequency, outcome, and trait imitations to facilitate organization‐level learning among consortium members is explored.

The main contribution of this paper lies in its two‐by‐two typology of consortium formation contextual conditions. Instead of focusing on evolutionary cycles and performance issues of consortia, this paper draws research attention to contextual conditions surrounding consortia formation. Consortium formation contextual conditions are critically important because they predetermine the life cycle and performance trajectory of consortia. This paper also links innovation and learning dynamics in consortia.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

The librarian and researcher have to be able to uncover specific articles in their areas of interest. This Bibliography is designed to help. Volume IV, like Volume III, contains features to help the reader to retrieve relevant literature from MCB University Press' considerable output. Each entry within has been indexed according to author(s) and the Fifth Edition of the SCIMP/SCAMP Thesaurus. The latter thus provides a full subject index to facilitate rapid retrieval. Each article or book is assigned its own unique number and this is used in both the subject and author index. This Volume indexes 29 journals indicating the depth, coverage and expansion of MCB's portfolio.

The aim of this chapter is to argue that charisma is a collective representation, and that charismatic authority is a social status that derives more from the “recognition” of the followers than from the “magnetism” of the leaders. I contend further that a close reading of Max Weber shows that he, too, saw charisma in this light.

I develop my argument by a close reading of many of the most relevant texts on the subject. This includes not only the renowned texts on this subject by Max Weber, but also many books and articles that interpret or criticize Weber’s views.

I pay exceptionally close attention to key arguments and texts, several of which have been overlooked in the past.

Writers for whom charisma is personal magnetism tend to assume that charismatic rule is natural and that the full realization of democratic norms is unlikely. Authority, in this view, emanates from rulers unbound by popular constraint. I argue that, in fact, authority draws both its mandate and its energy from the public, and that rulers depend on the loyalty of their subjects, which is never assured. So charismatic claimants are dependent on popular choice, not vice versa.

I advocate a “culturalist” interpretation of Weber, which runs counter to the dominant “personalist” account. Conventional interpreters, under the sway of theology or mass psychology, misread Weber as a romantic, for whom charisma is primal and undemocratic rule is destiny. This essay offers a counter-reading.