Search results

While national public policies such as performance contracts and disinvestment affect the dynamics of large- and medium-scale state-owned enterprises in emerging market economies, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the performance of India’s public sector undertakings (PSUs) and suggest options to improve their outcomes.

Using firm-level data on India’s 235 PSUs with total assets of around $500 billion over the past two and half decades (1990-2015), the study empirically tests the effect of performance contracts, measured by memorandum of understanding (MOU) and disinvestment, measured by private equity share, on PSUs performance indicator such as return on capital (ROC). Data were collected from the Public Enterprises Survey Reports released by the Department of Public Enterprises under India’s Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Department of Disinvestment, Bombay Stock Exchange and Capitaline database. By controlling firm-, industry- and macro-level factors in regression models, the results were presented in several aspects like service sector, non-service sector and individual and joint effects.

Empirical estimations indicate that performance contracts such as MOUs have had a positive impact on PSU performance by increasing their ROC by 8-9 percent. This result holds more strongly for the non-service sector (manufacturing, mining) but less so for service sector firms. In the case of service sector firms, partial privatization (share sales) has a significant impact on performance, making them ideal candidates for more aggressive disinvestment. Larger PSUs (Maharatnas) appear to perform better than smaller PSUs and even better than private firms of similar size. Smaller PSUs (Navratnas and Miniratnas) perform worse than private companies and should be good candidates for strategic disinvestment (privatization). PSUs that do not have Ratna status – and are loss makers – should be disposed of their asset value.

The study recommends that India should change the public sector balance sheet by raising capital through strategic disinvestment (privatization), disinvestment and liquidation of PSUs and re-investing it, in public infrastructure through the National Infrastructure Investment Fund and not into the budget as a revenue-raising measure. It should also transform Maharatnas into world class companies with greater commercialization.

The paper makes significant contributions to the academic literature on the changing dynamics of state-owned enterprises in emerging economies by examining the effect of performance contracts and disinvestment on India’s PSUs performance. It is one of unique longitudinal-empirical studies on India’s PSU performance in several dimensions.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the cross‐country variation in the growth elasticity of poverty across a sample of developing countries during the period from 1990 to 2000.

In order to identify variables that may explain the cross‐country variation in the growth elasticity of poverty, the paper sets up a theoretical framework. Subsequently, the explanatory power of these variables is tested empirically by panel data econometric analysis.

For a sample of 52 low and middle income countries, it is found that the level of initial income inequality, credit available to the private sector, literacy, the extent of business regulations and trade openness are important determinants of the growth elasticity of poverty.

Countries that reduce regulatory burdens, improve literacy, increase access to finance, undertake land reforms (asset redistribution), and provide safety nets while liberalizing trade can create more growth and ensure that it is pro‐poor.

The paper identifies variables (at a cross‐country level) that may guide the conscious policies which create pro‐poor growth.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the special issue on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the contemporary global business scenario. Against the theoretical background of and the invited themes for the special issue, the paper presents a summary of key findings and practical implications of the accepted papers and suggests future research directions.

The paper is conceptual, which organized through utilitarianism or legitimism; SOEs scenario 1 – hungry fox, hunting bears; SOEs scenario 2 – dancing elephant, flying bears; what do we know and what we wish to explore; what have been examined; what we need to study further; closing note by bears’ well-wishers; and protocol of the special issue.

By deeply looking into emerging economies (China, India), developed economies (Denmark, Italy, Sweden), transition economies (Tunisia) and diverse sectors (public transport, space), coupled with cross-country sample data, the nine accepted papers have discussed several interesting findings and recommended numerous implications for the policymakers and SOEs’ managers. Drawing upon the interdisciplinary literature, empirical and qualitative papers would deepen the understanding of the growth strategies and performance of SOEs, and the application of management theories such as institutional theory, agency theory, social exchange theory, managerial grid theory, incomplete contracts theory and public governance view, among others. The issue also brings a review-cum-citation analysis paper on the impact of privatization on the performance of SOEs.

The papers have made unique contributions to the public economics, new public management, international business and organizational development literature by critically analyzing the burgeoning phenomenon of the changing dynamics and globalization of SOEs.

This paper is a response to the doctrine that capital is incompatible with public ownership. The fundamental characteristics of modern productivity determine the co-existence of the market economy and capital relations.

Socialism can neither bypass the market economy nor “go beyond capital”; capital appears in two historical forms, including the private capital and the public capital. Public capital is the inevitable outcome of the inherent contradictions of public ownership in a socialist market economy.

It represents an economic relationship that compels individual labourers to provide surplus labour for the society. The combination of the strong accumulation function of public capital and the improvement of people's welfare is the main cause of China's development miracle.

The innovation impetus of the public capital and its “immunity” to the capitalist crisis highlight the tremendous power of socialism with Chinese characteristics in breaking free of the shackles of capitalism and continuously developing productive forces. Public capital demonstrates and will continue to demonstrate the historical legitimacy of socialism.