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Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are widely used in the construction and operation of charging piles for new energy vehicles worldwide and stipulate that governments grant charging pile operators franchises for a certain period of time to invest in the construction and operation of the charging piles. The charging piles are then transferred to governments when the concession expires. To encourage charging pile operators to build and operate charging piles, governments usually provide two kinds of subsidies, namely construction and operating subsidies.

The authors establish a typical game model to study the optimal BOT contract between a government and a charging pile operator and their preferences for the two kinds of subsidies.

First, the authors show that there are substitution and complementarity effects between the concession period and the subsidy level. Second, the operator prefers the construction subsidy (operating subsidy) when the additional operating cost is low (high). The government prefers the operating subsidy (construction subsidy) when consumer sensitivity to the number of charging piles is low (high) and the concession period is short or long (moderate). Finally, the adjusted joint subsidy can not only improve social welfare but also that the charging pile operator can obtain the same profit as under the operating subsidy at a lower subsidy amount.

This work develops the first analytical model to study two subsidies in the construction and operation of charging piles and investigate the optimal BOT contract and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the charging pile operator but also for policymakers in practice from a circular economy perspective.

The regulatory framework affects airlines’ marketing. As liberalisation proceeds marketing activity can be more widely based than under previous regimens, and now includes more possibilities in the product mix and price differentials. Cost issues and competitive pricing practices still prompt regulatory concern where monopolistic features arise. Such is the case with slot restrictions and the formation of alliances that may ultimately restrict consumer choice. Specialisation by sector and segment allows market entry for emergent airlines with lower costs, of which labour predominates. Pressure for cost reduction raises the possibility of the virtual airline but customer orientation suggests an overriding concern for safety and the integrity of the airline brand. The article complements another on developments in airline marketing.