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The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.

To compare the profitability and technical efficiency of firms in a monopoly industry, airports, operating with different degrees of market power and under differing regulatory regimes, minimalist in New Zealand and interventionist in Australia.

Unlike previous privatisation studies, this study measures efficiency and profitability separately. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), the technical efficiency of privatised airports is assessed, and this independent measure is used in regression analyses to determine whether efficiency, regulation or privatisation is related to airport profitability.

For firms with monopolistic characteristics operating under minimalist regulation, profitability is related to market power, not efficiency improvements. For firms operating in a regulated environment, profitability is related to regulation, which constrains market power but does not impede efficiency.

This study is limited by its small sample size and its generalisability due to its single industry and regional focus. However, the findings support assertions that the impact of privatisation cannot be assessed independently of industry structure and regulation.

Policy makers considering SOE privatisation in non‐competitive markets should introduce either competition or regulation if firm efficiency is a desired outcome.

Academics and policy makers should be aware that privatisation and competition are not only complementary, as per the extant literature, but they are essential bedfellows. In the absence of competition, regulation is required to control for market power.

While airports traditionally have been seen as classic examples of public enterprises, the government’s role in airport management has been changing throughout the world. This study explores airport governance models with a focus on stakeholder issues. Relatively little is known empirically about how public, private, or public–private partnership (PPP) provision of airport services affects different stakeholders. The main aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of the impact of airport governance forms on stakeholders. For this purpose, a theoretical background focused on identifying airport stakeholders and their conflicting interests is followed by a qualitative content analysis using past studies on airport management. The results suggest that a balanced approach is required to deal with stakeholder interests detached from their governance structures.

The case study helps students to understand how public-private partnership (PPP) airports runs their business, how regulatory policies impact their business. The case also explains why the Cochin International Airport business model is so unique compared to any airport in India.

In 2016, Airport Economic Regulatory Authority released a new tariff regime for Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL).CIAL has undergone challenges because of the tariff changes (changes every five years), which were implemented in 2017. This has impacted their business model. The CFO of CIAL was under pressure to share the impacts with the shareholders and to provide a way forward for the business. Cochin International was known to be one of the cheapest aeronautical tariff charging airports. The case discusses the issues of a public utility when it is under a regulatory price regime. The case explains different regulatory mechanisms (single till: the whole commercial revenue is cross-subsidized). The case discusses issues regarding Cochin International Airport, which is a public utility under PPP mode. Since 2016, regulator has changed the price regulatory regime from light touch (no price regulation only monitoring) to hybrid till regulation (a percentage of commercial revenue is cross-subsidized). The case explains what made Cochin International Airport so unique. It explores the challenges because of the regulatory regime, how it affects Cochin airport’s strategy for business. How should the management of CIAL to act on the above issue? What will be the impact? Will they need to change their business models?

The case is basically focused on MBA level students who are in their final year. There are various MBA courses in which this can be taught, which can be infrastructure management, infrastructure regulation, domain courses such as airport management. The student should have basic knowledge of economics, public utility and business strategy. The case helps them understand the impact of regulation, the role of the regulator and its impact on business strategy.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS: 10 Public Sector Management.

Airport economics literature has recently included the supply of concession services among the factors that might affect airport pricing. In particular, there is only little empirical analysis on whether: (i) the supply of airport concession services can stimulate the demand for travel (two-side complementarity) and (ii) the demand for airport concession services is independent of traveling activities (welfare neutrality). In this chapter, we survey papers that have addressed two-side complementarity and welfare neutrality in airport concessions. Our goal is to discuss the different assumptions that have shaped the models and to collect evidences, facts and empirical findings that may support analytical hypotheses. We argue that the notions of two-side complementarity and welfare neutrality might be interrelated – especially when airports invest in concessions in the area accessible to non-passengers. Welfare gains should be assessed on a case by case basis, depending on the type of airport in terms of ownership, size (and the relative mass of connecting passengers compared to origin–destination passengers), and the source of concession revenues. Our arguments might be particularly relevant to policy makers who need to understand (i) whether the supply of concessions reduces or increases the benefits of airport (aviation) price regulation and (ii) whether the effective control of market power may require the regulation of the prices of both the businesses.

With significant changes in the aviation industry, various airport–airline arrangements have been formed to achieve alternative objectives. However, no consensus has been reached on such arrangements’ economic effects and the associated optimal public policy. This chapter aims to provide an interpretive review of the common types of airport–airline arrangements, the different modeling approaches used and key conclusions reached by recent studies. Our review suggests that airport–airline arrangements can take diverse forms and have been widely used in the industry. They may allow the airport and its airlines to internalize demand externality, increase traffic volume, reduce airport investment risks and costs, promote capacity investment, enhance service quality, or simply are a response to the competition from other airport–airline chains. On the other hand, such vertical arrangements, especially for those exclusively between airports and selected airlines, could lead to collusive outcomes at the expenses of non-participating organizations. The effects of such arrangements are also significantly influenced by the contract type, market structure and bargaining power between the airport and airline sectors. While case by case investigations are often needed for important economic decisions, we recommend policy-makers to promote competition in the airline and airport segments whenever possible, and demand more transparency or regulatory reporting of such arrangements. Policy debates and economic studies should be carried out first, before intrusive regulations are introduced.

This chapter reviews the effects of air transport liberalization, and investigates the roles played by airport-airline vertical arrangements in liberalizing markets. Our investigation concludes that liberalization has led to substantial economic and traffic growth. Such positive outcomes are mainly due to increased competition and efficiency gains in the airline industry, and positive externalities to the overall economy. Liberalization allows airlines to optimize their networks, and thus may introduce substantial demand and financial uncertainty to airports. Vertical arrangements between airlines and airports may offer a wide range of benefits to the parties involved, yet such arrangements could also lead to airline entry barriers which reduce the effects of liberalization. Three approaches have been developed to model the effects of liberalization in complex market conditions, which include the analytical, econometric and computational network methods. These approaches should be selectively utilized in policy studies on liberalization.

With the liberalization of air transport and the enlargement of air traffic, airports face insistent requests from airlines to perform and improve both service quality and cost efficiency. As a result, airport ownership, governance, and regulations are debated and sometimes have already been changed. Airport pricing under different governance structure is a central issue in this context.

An estimate of the fair rate of return on capital is a critical input into tariff regulation. A too high estimate will lead to high tariffs for consumers; a too low estimate will not provide adequate incentives for investment. The Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India has issued a consultation paper for finalizing the norms and procedure for estimating the fair rate of return. It now needs to reconcile the differing view and approaches of different stakeholders.