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This chapter focuses on the conflicts that have accompanied the development of Germany’s largest airport at Frankfurt/Main and examines how these conflicts are embedded in regional governance and airport planning. In the German context, the governance discourse is understood as a multi-faceted framework of actors, institutions and legislation that structures the actions of involved people.

The conflicts within this framework are structured by two aspects: the spatiality of the contested object, which results in tactical descriptions of the space involved, and an understanding of airports as parts of large technological systems which strongly influences the discourse of airport expansion. As spatial conflicts regarding large infrastructures develop over a long period of time, the chapter charts the historical evolution of the expansion conflict from the 1980s until today. It analyses the governance structure and the actor’s constellations throughout time to shed light on the use of narratives and the stability and change of pro and contra coalitions. It concludes with a critical reflection on the role of airports in the German planning system and the problems of governance in the multilevel, multi-actor environment of airports.

The chapter highlights the necessity of examining the environmental impact of airports at different scales, from neighbouring cities to the large labour market stretching up to 100km from the airport.

Airline travel is composed of business and nonbusiness travelers, each with different preferences that give rise to differences in demand elasticities and substitution not only across airlines but also airports. In this study, we develop and estimate a model of airline wherein consumers choose which airports and airline to use that allows for unobserved differences between travelers (e.g., business and nonbusiness travelers). The results point to the role that airports themselves play in the ultimate selection of a flight, and that there are strong interactive effects between the airlines’ networks and the consumers’ preferences across airports.

The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.

This chapter considers time-differentiated airport noise surcharges that occur in addition to general noise fees at an airport. In practice, an essential problem of such surcharges may consist of setting the price for a social policy goal, such as airport noise reduction, by shifting a number of critical flights away from sensitive times-of-day in the presence of an additional, competing economic policy goal in terms of fostering the network hub function and connectivity of that airport. In such a case, additional noise surcharges aim at balancing the socioeconomic noise costs against economic prosperity, to achieve a net benefit for society by inducing a particular airline scheduling behavior, such as shifting non-hub-relevant flights only. As a result, they differ from the well-known economic concepts for the internalization of externalities. We address this problem by offering a shift from an economic welfare view to a business administration perspective with the airlines as stakeholders, in order to describe the different rationales that need to be accounted for when searching for a pricing scheme that achieves one of the distinct steering effects in terms of airline scheduling behavior. In addition, we offer a tentative, generic guideline to determine the appropriate dimension of time-differentiated noise surcharges depending on the steering effect.

This chapter evaluates the operational efficiency of major airports in the United States. The airport is defined as a major point of contact in the aviation industry, and on-time operations is regarded as a core service factor. We develop a bounded data envelopment analysis (DEA) model that evaluates the punctuality of airports and proposes a three-stage approach that analyzes not only current operations performance but also efficiency changes over time. We classify airports into several classes according to Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) definitions and compare their class efficiencies through decomposed efficiency scores. We find significant differences in efficiency scores between classifications.