Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether characteristics of French organizations can be found in the Airbus Group, ancient European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) Group, and how these characteristics have evolved over time in comparison to German ones.

This article presents an in-depth case study by using a contextual approach, considering influential factors which are likely to influence the evolution of organizations.

The analysis shows that the Airbus Group reflects characteristics of French organizations: the importance of strategy, the principle of honour, centralization of decision and power, the role of the state in the capital and its influence via professional networks of its elite coming from the Grandes Ecoles. These findings confirm a relative continuity of national peculiarities over time. The recent evolution of the company also highlights the German influence, notably in terms of shares and management positions.

The case study demonstrates that the Airbus Group has become a multinational company where contextual elements and organizational structures regulate intercultural relationships of interests, influence and power.

Five contextual factors are proposed, which allow to understand and structure the peculiarities of French organizations, in comparison to German ones as well as power distribution within the Airbus Group.

Boeing Company has been the world's leading producer of large commercial airplanes for several decades. However, in the late 1990s, Europe‐based Airbus Industrie competed with Boeing aggressively and captured almost fifty percent of the over‐100‐seat airplane market. This paper examines the battle between Boeing and Airbus, including a concise report on Airbus' launch of its A380 superjumbo project. The paper also contains the authors' recommendations to Boeing and the U.S. government.

At this year's Farnborough Air Show Airbus Industrie exhibited on its stand one‐twentieth scale models of its entire aircraft family — the A300–600, A310, A320, A321, A330 and A340.

Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into very-large-aircraft (VLA) markets. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due to the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing's development cost: to what extent would Boeing's experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point is that Boeing's strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first-mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.

To introduce some of the strategic issues arising in natural monopoly industries in which the winner takes all, and focus on the issues of credible preemption and signaling.

This paper aims to address the questions of different outsourcing strategies between Airbus and Boeing and point out the theoretical limits of the resource-based view (RBV) approach that must be broadened with a finance perspective. Owing to the complexity of systems, the aircraft industry is nowadays structured around a well-organised value chain of product development and manufacturing. However, according to the RBV, capabilities attached to some systems and components are strategic resources and must be kept in house to maintain competitive advantage. In commercial aircraft avionics, critical systems such as flight controls fall directly under this rule, due to substantial risks of passenger safety they deal with.

This study is based on two comparative studies concerning the A330/340 and A350 programmes at Airbus and their equivalents at Boeing, the B777 and the B787. The data are both primary (financial and patent data) and secondary (semi-structured interviews and documentation.

The main result highlights the limits of the RBV model to understand why Airbus has chosen to re-internalise the development and production of flight control systems contrary to Boeing. For both, cost reduction is the main objective of outsourcing, but European firms are more careful with critical resources. The financialisation of aircraft manufacturers’ strategies is another explanatory factor relevant to understand why Boeing outsources strategic resources such as flight controls.

The authors demonstrate the potential of multiplication of research methods to address a question. Second, they try to bring together different theories in a preliminary effort, which gives them some promising stuffy perspective for future works.

By addressing both the RBV and the financialisation perspectives, the authors provide an interesting view of the COmplex Products and Systems (CoPS) challenges.

The findings of this research must provide key of interpretation for business managers, which may consider the two faces, knowledge management and financial, to explain corporate performance.

Several originalities are relevant in this work. From a methodological point of view, the authors offer a comparison between the two main players of commercial aircraft manufacturing, an oligopolistic industry. Second, the data they choose to rely on are both qualitative and quantitative to strengthen the results. Third, at a micro level, this study is original in its approach of linking outsourcing to financialisation.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Boeing and Airbus, the leading manufacturers of large aircraft, were locked in a battle for market share that drove down prices for their new planes. At about the same time, the two industry heavyweights began developing new aircraft families to address the future market needs they each projected.

Aircraft take many years to develop, so by the time the new planes made their inaugural flights, significant changes had occurred in the global environment. First, emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere were growing rapidly, spawning immediate and long-term demand for more aircraft. At the same time, changes to the market for air travel had created opportunities for new products. These opportunities had not gone unnoticed by potential new entrants, which were positioning themselves to compete against the market leaders.

In October 2007, the Airbus superjumbo A380 made its first flight. The A380 carried more passengers than any other plane in history and had been touted as a solution to increased congestion at global mega-hub airports. Four years later the Boeing 787, a smaller long-range aircraft, was launched to service secondary cities in a point-to-point network.

The case provides students with an opportunity to analyze the profit potential of the global aircraft manufacturing industry in 2002 and in 2011. Students can also identify the actions of participants that weakened or intensified the pressure on profits within the industry.

Audio format (.mp3 file) available with purchase of PDF. Contact cases@kellogg.northwestern.edu for access.

Set in 1999, this case allows students to put themselves in the positions of both Airbus and Boeing as Boeing considered how to respond to Airbus's decision to announce its plans to proceed or not with the $10 billion development of the world's first commercial superjumbo jet, the Airbus A3XX. Boeing was considering a development effort to “stretch” its 747 jumbo jet into a larger superjumbo version, the 747-X. At the time, the two companies’ widely available 20-year forecasts for jumbo- and superjumbo-jet demand were particularly divergent. In light of this very public “agreement to disagree,” Boeing could pursue several alternatives, all of which were related to Airbus's decision about whether or not to develop the A3XX. This case presents an opportunity for students to make a real downstream decision. It was prepared as a final exam for an introductory decision analysis course involving subjective probability assessment, decision tree modeling, simulation, real options, and game theory. In the analysis of this case, a student is expected to utilize ideas from all five of these areas.

In their respective market outlooks, both Boeing and Airbus forecast strong growth in intercontinental passenger traffic until 2029. However, they differ substantially with respect to their assessment of the future development of airline (and alliance) networks. These deviating projections have, in turn, massively influenced their product range. Boeing, having long predicted a major growth in intercontinental point-to-point operations – based on the so-called fragmentation (dehubbing) hypothesis – has consistently opted for the development of the B787 (Dreamliner) family of midsized, and extremely efficient, wide-body aircraft. Airbus, on the contrary, is forecasting a substantial increasing demand for hub-to-hub traffic, which according to the company, will require airlines to purchase a large number of very large aircraft (VLA), especially its Airbus 380. Though both manufacturers did not put all their money where their mouths are – Boeing has reacted to the Airbus 380 challenge with an updated derivative of its Boeing 747 flagship, the Boeing 747-8 Intercontinental, while Airbus is targeting its proposed Airbus 350 family against both the Boeing 787 and Boeing 777 – the fragmentation hypothesis remains one of the most controversial issues in the civil aviation community today. Regardless of which scenario will eventually turn out to be more realistic, either will impact tremendously on aircraft manufacturers, on the airlines' route and fleet planning decisions as well as airport operators.

Boeing has been a pioneer in the utilization of strategic alliances with the Japanese in the design and production of aircraft. This strategy has been driven by the escalating costs of airframe and engine design and manufacture, and the significant competition of Airbus as well as domestic competitors in the global aircraft market. Boeing's alliances with Japan have worked well with several families of aircraft and appear to have produced a loyal customer; however, there have been sharp criticisms of Boeing for the closeness of its association with Japan. These criticisms have largely been aimed at the danger posed by unintentional and unavoidable transfer of aerospace technology. This paper examines the history of Boeing's Japanese coalitions, the benefits, and the dangers posed by Boeing's continued aerospace partnership with one of America's largest economic foes.