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Article
Publication date: 23 October 2023

Ahmed Atef Oussii and Mohamed Faker Klibi

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the…

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association.

Design/methodology/approach

The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period.

Findings

The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance.

Practical implications

This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness.

Originality/value

This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

Details

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 29 May 2023

Ahmed Atef Oussii and Mohamed Faker Klibi

This study aims to analyze whether chief executive officer (CEO) duality and financial expertise are associated with earnings management to exceed thresholds. It also investigates…

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to analyze whether chief executive officer (CEO) duality and financial expertise are associated with earnings management to exceed thresholds. It also investigates to what extent and in what direction this association evolves when family ownership is introduced as a moderator variable.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on balanced panel data related to companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange, this study uses the logistic random-effect model to test research hypotheses during the period spanning from 2016 to 2021.

Findings

The results show that CEOs with financial expertise are less inclined to engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses and earnings decline. The authors also provide evidence that CEO duality allows top management to be more powerful and, therefore, manage earnings to report positive profits and sustain recent performance. Furthermore, the authors find that family ownership moderates the association between CEO financial expertise, CEO duality and earnings management to exceed thresholds.

Practical implications

The findings suggest to regulators involved in corporate governance and earnings management issues a reflection on CEO duality power, board effectiveness and family control. The study results are also of interest to auditors and board members as they provide a more in-depth understanding of the impact of CEOs' attributes and family control on financial reporting decisions.

Originality/value

This study extends past literature by providing new insights into the effect of CEO attributes and family control on earnings management practices in weak investor protection countries such as Tunisia.

Details

Journal of Family Business Management, vol. 13 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2043-6238

Keywords

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