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This study aims to theoretically investigate the effect of activating corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the association between adopting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance (TA). Based on the analyzing of the previous studies, the authors support the results of studies that found a positive effect for activating CG on the adoption of CSR. Also, they found that there is a negative impact of activating CG mechanisms on TA, as CG includes controls and procedures that contribute to limiting opportunistic behaviors of management and ensures making decisions that maximize value for shareholders. To the best of the authors' knowledge, it is the only chapter that examines the effect of activating CG mechanisms on the association between CSR and TA.

Effective internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) should either prevent or enable correction of any material misstatement in a firm’s financial statements. Independent auditors, guided by professional standards, prepare an ICFR audit report, which provides a gauge by which the public can evaluate the reliability of a firm’s financial information. A firm manager may be tempted to misstate financial statements if he/she perceives a substantial reward for doing so. This study examines whether managers and firms are rewarded for misstating their financial statements in situations where there are incentives to do so, specifically, when an industry-leading peer is fraudulently inflating its reported earnings. The authors test to see if managers experience an increase in compensation as a result of misstatement. The authors also test to see if their firms benefit from misstating via changes to their cost of capital. Results suggest that neither managers nor their firms benefit from managing earnings by misstating financial statements. These findings are important, because a manager who ex ante understands that misstating will not lead to benefits personally or his/her firm is less likely to misstate in the first place.