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This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.

The purpose of this study is to investigate (1) how managers respond to stock price crashes, (2) why they respond and (3) how their responses affect shareholders.

This study employs a panel regression with various firm-level controls and firm- and year-fixed effects. The sample is comprised of 101,532 firm-year observations with 11,727 unique firms from 1950 to 2019. Using mutual fund flow redemption pressure as an exogenous variable to stock price crashes, the paper provides further evidence of the causality of documented findings.

Management becomes more focused on improving transparency, raising investment efficiency, reducing agency conflicts and regaining the trust of shareholders by investing in social capital and employee welfare. These actions increase firm value. This study also suggests that management undertakes these actions out of concern for their tenure of employment.

The catalysts of stock price crashes are well documented, but much less is known about what happens following stock price crashes. This study provides more insights into the understanding of corporate crisis management practices following adverse events.

This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

The literature has dealt with the relationship between board characteristics (BC) and firm performance (FP) on a large scale. However, it yielded inconsistent results. Thus, this paper aims to examine the indirect relationship between BC and FP through the mediating role of the capital structure (CS).

This study used a sample of 528 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2015 to 2019. Also, a two-step system generalised method of moments estimation technique was applied.

The results show that board diversity and the frequency of board meetings positively affect financial performance, and it is negatively influenced by board turnover, size and independence. Also, the results indicate a positive relationship between the independence of the board and all CS variables. Importantly, the findings support the policy-setting role of the board of directors where CS (measured by total debt and short-term debt) suppresses some governance mechanisms’ detrimental effect on FP. Hence, the board of directors, apart from the monitoring function, introduce various policies (financial and non-financial) that enhance the overall performance of companies.

These results are consistent with the agency’s perspective that management practices in selecting the optimal capital reduce agency costs and improve performance. The findings contribute to developing a broader theoretical framework that accounts for the policy-setting role of the board of directors. The current study model of corporate governance offers insight for policymakers into the role of corporate governance other than monitoring functions in organisations and how CS should be taken into consideration with corporate governance and FP association.

This study aims to investigate the mediating role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the link between board independence, board diversity and dividend payouts underpinning the agency theory perspective. As boards are ultimately responsible for decision-making, it includes CSR, dividend payouts and other strategic decisions.

Board independence and board diversity (female director, female independent director) are used as explanatory variables, CSR scores as a mediator and dividend payout explained variables. The relevant data were collected from 159 listed firms of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 2013 to 2019, consisting of 1,113 year-firm observations. For empirical estimation, the study used the Tobit regression analysis and Sobel test to check the significance of the mediation to confirm the hypothesis.

The results confirm that independence and diversity on the board are positively related to dividend payouts. Further, CSR partially mediates the link between independence and diversity on board-dividend payouts, which confirms the argument that firms with involvement in CSR practices are also associated with dividend payouts.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is novel to address whether CSR mediates the link of the board’s independence and diversity and dividend payouts in Pakistan’s setting. The results of this study have restricted generalizability due to the specific nature of the sample characteristics; future researchers can extend the research scope.

Theoretically practically, the results imply that CSR spending also enhances the distribution to firms' shareholders, thus becoming attractive to investors. This study enriches the literature on board attributes-dividend policy nexus, which strengthens through CSR practices and is relevant to practice in line with sustainable development in an emerging context.

CSR practices are an understudied but significant factor that links stakeholders' beliefs about firms' decision-making strategies, enhancing dividend announcements. In doing so, this study's findings contribute to the literature, regulators, shareholders and investor at various levels.

This study aims to examine the influence of ownership structure and board composition on the probability and intensity of stock repurchases. The study’s sample comprises 3,744 firm-year observations, consisting of 53 repurchasing firms with 96 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2019.

Probit and fixed-effects regression models are used to obtain empirical results. Moreover, a probit model with a continuous endogenous regressor (IV-probit) and an instrumental variable method with two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) estimation are used to address endogeneity.

Corporations with high family or state ownership tend to inhibit stock repurchases to hoard excess free cash flow, supporting agency theory. Conversely, firms with high board independence tend to repurchase their stocks at least once to distribute free cash flows to shareholders, confirming agency theory. Nonetheless, corporations with more female directors on the board or CEO duality tend to conduct stock repurchases at least once but do not repurchase stocks with high values. Interestingly, more female directors on the board may send false signals about undervalued stocks.

This is the first study to reveal that firms with CEO duality repurchase their stocks at least once but avoid repurchasing shares with high values. It is also the first study to explore whether women on a board may cause false signaling about undervalued stocks. Furthermore, this study reveals that family and state ownership are potential determinants of stock repurchases in countries with high ownership concentration. This is the first study to address this issue in Thailand.

This study aims to exploit Tobin’s Q model of investment to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green innovation.

The study is based on a sample of 3,896 firms from 2002 to 2021, covering 45 countries worldwide. The authors adopt Tobin’s Q model to conceptualize the relationship between corporate governance and investment in green research and development (R&D). The authors argue that agency costs and financial market frictions affect corporate investment and are fundamental factors in R&D activities. By limiting agency conflicts, effective governance favors efficiency, facilitates access to external financing and encourages green innovation. The authors analyzed the causal effect by using the system-generalized method of moments (system-GMM).

The results reveal that the better the corporate governance, the more the firm invests in green R&D. A 1%-point increase in the corporate governance ratings leads to an increase in green R&D expenses to the total asset ratio of about 0.77 percentage points. In addition, an increase in the score of each dimension (strategy, management and shareholder) of corporate governance results in an increase in the probability of green product innovation. Finally, green innovation is positively related to firm environmental performance, including emission reduction and resource use efficiency.

The findings provide implications to support managers and policymakers on how to improve sustainability through corporate governance. Governance mechanisms will help resolve agency problems and, in turn, encourage green innovation.

Understanding the impact of corporate governance on green innovation may help firms combat climate change, a crucial societal concern. The present study helps achieve one of the precious UN’s sustainable development goals: Goal 13 on climate action.

This study goes beyond previous research by adopting Tobin’s Q model to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green R&D investment. Overall, the results suggest that effective corporate governance is necessary for environmental efficiency.

This study aims to investigate whether auditors compromise their independence for economically important clients in family business settings.

The authors empirically examine the research question based on China for the years 2011 to 2020. The dependent variable is the auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions, which is a proxy for auditor independence. The authors use relative client audit fees as a proxy for client importance. To address endogeneity issues in the selection of family firms, the authors use the two-stage least squares regression model and, subsequently, the propensity score matching and Hausman firm fixed effect modeling.

This study reveals that the propensity to issue modified audit opinions is positively correlated with client importance. Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for their economically important family firm clients, whereas such evidence is not found for non-Big-N auditors. Results are consistent and robust to endogeneity test and sensitivity analysis.

This study enriches the literature on auditor independence and the effect of family firms’ ownership structure factors on audit reporting behavior for their economically important clients. Findings may prove useful for managers and practitioners interested in family business.