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This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

This study aims to investigate the effects of board characteristics on the cost of debt for non-financial companies in the Turkish capital markets.

Using a sample of 211 non-financial companies listed on Borsa Istanbul, this study examines how chairperson gender and board characteristics affect the cost of debt by using panel data analysis over the period of 2016–2020. A system generalized method of moments model is also applied to test the endogeneity issue.

The findings show that the presence of female chairperson and female directors on board reduces the cost of debt and the perceptions of default risk by fund providers, while board independence and board size do not have a significant impact on the cost of debt. The results provide insightful information for companies and policymakers. Companies can alter board composition through gender diversity, while policymakers can introduce new policies in encouraging the presence of female directors on boards.

This study primarily enriches the literature on the effect of board diversity on debt financing cost in a leading emerging market, enabling companies in emerging markets to better mitigate agency costs and finance their investment through effective board composition. Second, it provides evidence that financial institutions consider companies with chairwomen and women directors on the boards less risky and charge them less for debt financing than they do for companies with man chairperson. Finally, the results support policymakers to take actions to increase female presence on board.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between executive pay disparity and the cost of debt.

The authors use a sample of syndicated bank loans granted to United States (US) listed firms from 1992 to 2014 and adopt the loan yield spread (Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay slice) as the main proxy for the cost of debt (executive pay disparity). The authors also use the Heckman two-stage model to address the sample selection bias and the two-stage least squares and propensity score matching methods to control the potential endogeneity issues. To test different views about executive pay disparity, the authors adopt the cash-to-stock ratio to proxy for managerial risk-shifting incentives.

The authors find that the cost of debt is significantly higher for firms with larger executive pay disparity, which is robust to sample selection bias, endogeneity concerns, alternative measures and various controls. This positive relationship increases with the risk-shifting incentives of CEOs instead of other top executives, which supports the managerial power view, and is stronger for firms with higher levels of financial distress. The findings suggest that creditors view executive pay disparity are associated with higher credit risk and CEO entrenchment.

This paper reveals one “dark” side of executive pay disparity: it increases the cost of debt and identifies a significant role played by CEOs' risk-shifting incentives. The authors provide direct evidence of the relevance of pay differential to corporate credit analysis.

The authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.

Using a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.

The authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.

The study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.

The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.

The results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.

Corporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an effective tool to control excessive risk and deter risky corporate strategies. In this study, the authors draw on behavioral agency model to put these well-established assumptions to the test in a different setting and argue for the context-specific effects of CEOs' long-term compensation.

Focusing on corporate mergers and acquisitions in a post-crisis period (2011–2017), the authors cast doubt on agency theory predictions on debt-like compensation, point to the more realistic assumptions of behavioral decision models, and call for more contingency approaches in theoretical arguments.

An analysis of more than 4000 observations reveals that neither CEOs nor shareholders react significantly to inside debt after the economy recovers. Firm risk is also influenced only marginally by long-term compensation in a normal period of time.

While extant literature is rather unanimous on risk-reducing impact of inside debt, the study periods span the financial crisis of 2007. This research is the first conducted in regular times to demonstrate that previous findings are biased and heavily influenced by an exogenous shock.

The aim of this research is to examine the effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial performance and the role of agency costs and business risk in determining this effect.

This study uses the data of 83 non-financial Turkish firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange during the period 2014–2021. Two-step system GMM models are applied to examine the study’s hypotheses.

The results indicate a positive effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial performance, and that this effect is significant only for firms that are more likely to suffer agency costs of equity, firms with R&D expenditures and firms with lower business risk.

The results of this study confirm the importance of regulations introduced by regulators to support the sustainability initiatives for firms that have less ability to access funds required for their investments. In addition, the findings provide important insight into the role of the persistence of corporate sustainability performance in enhancing financial performance through mitigating managers' opportunistic behavior.

To the author’s knowledge, this research is one of few that examine the effect of agency costs and business risk on the corporate sustainability–financial performance relationship in emerging markets.

This paper aims to empirically investigate the moderating role of corporate governance (CG) in the capital structure-performance relationship.

The analysis is based on top Business Today-500 companies and covers a time span of 10 years. The fixed effect panel regression model is used to examine the impact of CG mechanisms on the relationship between capital structure and firm performance.

The core findings of the study indicate significant positive moderating role of board independence, board size and family ownership on the relationship between leverage and performance.

The results enable the managers of Indian firms to comprehend the significance of CG framework while taking financing decisions. The findings encourage managers to raise debt funds in those firms that adhere to good governance norms.

Unlike extant studies that emphasize on the moderating impact of single CG variable in leverage-performance relationship, the current work comprehensively examines the role of many CG factors that moderate the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first of its kind with respect to India.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between restrictive covenants and accounting conservatism. More specially, the authors try to explain how the use of restrictive covenants of public debt may affect accounting conservatism.

The sample is composed of non-financial firms and for each firm one debt contract is considered. The authors have used the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) models to test the relationships. All variables were retrieved from Mergent Fixed Investment Securities and COMPUSTAT Databases.

The findings of this study show that the more the firm relies on bond covenants, the higher is the degree of conservatism. The authors found also that these firms also exhibited a widely significantly increased level of conservatism in the years following the issuance of debt.

The results should be interpreted with caution because the use of covenants does not take into consideration the tightness of their inclusion in the public debt contract.

This paper makes a timely contribution to the debate of timely loss recognition by confirming the complementarity between the inclusion of restrictive covenants in the debt agreement and the accounting conservatism before and after the emission of public debt.

Capital structure is an important corporate financing decision, particularly for companies in emerging economies. This paper attempts to understand whether the pandemic had any significant impact on the capital structure of companies in emerging economies. India being a prominent emerging economy is an ideal candidate for the analysis.

The study utilizes three leverage ratios in an extended market index, BSE500, for the period 2015–2021. The ratios considered are short-term leverage ratio (STLR), long-term leverage ratio (LTLR) and total leverage ratio (TLR). A dummy variable differentiates the pre-epidemic (2015–2019) and pandemic (2020–2021) period. Control variables are used to represent firm characteristics such as growth, tangibility, profit, size and liquidity. Dynamic panel data regression is employed to address endogeneity.

The findings point out that Covid-19 has had a significant, negative effect on LTLR, while the impact on STLR and TLR was insignificant. The findings indicate that companies based in a culturally risk-averse environment, such as India, would reduce the long-term debt to avoid bankruptcy in times of uncertainty.

The study covers the impact of the pandemic on Indian companies. Hence, generalization of the findings to global context might not be valid.

To maintain economic growth in the post-crisis period, Indian policymakers should ensure accessibility to low-cost capital. The findings provide impetus to deepen the insignificant corporate bond market in India for future economic revival.

Developing countries are struggling to revive the economies postpandemic. This is particularly true for Asian economies which are heavily reliant on banks for survival. This research finds evidence to utilize bond market as a source of raising capital for economic revival.