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Commentators have claimed that business schools encourage unethical behavior by using economic theory as a basis for education. We examine claims that exposure to agency theory acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reducing ethical behavior among business students. We experimentally test whether economics coursework or a manipulated competitive vs. cooperative frame affects measured ethical behavior in simulated decision settings. We measure ethical behavior using established tasks. We also measure ethical recognition to test whether agency theory reduces recognition of ethical issues. Exposure to agency theory in either prior classwork or the experiment increased wealth-increasing unethical behavior. We found no effect on unethical behavior that does not affect wealth. We found no effect of exposure to agency theory on ethical recognition. Usual laboratory experiment limitations apply. Future research can examine why agency theory reduces ethical behavior. Educators ought to consider unintended consequences of the language and assumptions of theories that underlie education. Students may assume descriptions of how people behave as prescriptions for how people ought to behave. This study contributes to the literature on economic education and ethics. We found no prior experimental studies of the effect of economics education on ethical behavior.

The paper aims to explain how agency theory can be used to inform our understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships.

A structured review of the literature using a three‐stage refinement process is used. The articles were sourced through online databases and keyword classifications, such as “agency theory”, “principal‐agent relationships” and “supply chain management”. The search initially identified over 86 articles. After further screening these were reduced to 19 for final assessment and comparison.

Despite agency theory's prevailing descriptive and predictive qualities there is scarcity in its application to the SCM discipline. The authors posit that agency theory provides valuable insights for relationship engineering within supply chains where social, political, legal and behavioural dynamics dominate.

It is a critical task for managers to understand and mitigate abnormal behaviours across the supply chain. Agency theory serves this need by providing them with a useful tool to respond to transaction cost dilemmas through contractual and non‐contractual remedies.

This is one of the first studies that examines the current state of agency theory application in the SCM literature and suggests potential avenues for future research.

Agency theory suggests that divergences will occur when a principal, e.g. client, and agent e.g. a project manager, interests are different in the execution of a project. The purpose of this paper is to explore if the agency theory can explain the subtleties integral to the behaviours and relationships between players delivering a public-private-partnership (PPP) in the context of an international development (ID) project. The intra-/interpersonal dynamics include governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private commercial service providers. The authors develop a conceptual framework and provide evidence from a case study of the testing of a Road Safety Toolkit in Kenya to explore several propositions.

Extant literature identified application of the agency theory, and the development of a conceptual framework. A case study describing an ID project was used to validate the propositions prior to the expansion of a research instrument for data collection in the field.

Through the lens of the agency theory and the limitations imposed by exploring a series of propositions, several insightful conclusions have been derived from the case. ID projects have particular nuisances that make them unique when compared to the majority of commercial applications. An added dimension and level of complexity is a consequence of the PPP incorporating government, NGOs and private corporations. The case exemplified the need for PPP ID projects to build on partner networks to influence and disseminate outcomes. Some agency problems were far less prominent than would normally be seen in a commercial project.

The methodologies presented in this paper need to be adapted and practiced in different kinds of ID projects in order to get confirmatory analytical results. The limitations imposed by the use of the single case, whilst drawing insightful conclusions, would necessitate greater testing in the field.

Although the problems of the agency theory are well researched in the operations management literature, there is limited application to ID projects and no previous research within the context of a PPP. Therefore, this work is important for greater understanding of the specific issues associated with project delivery of an ID.

Conflicting goals between principals and agents are common for organisations, which in turn affect inter-relationships on an international footing. The agency theory has had little attention in the project management field, yet is fundamental to relationships and communication.

There has been little research that explores the agency theory in the context of a PPP involving governments, NGOs and private commercial service providers, executed as an ID project. This work, therefore, exhibits new and novel findings.

Theories develop over time and are influenced by both events and people. Looking primarily at the applications between contracting principal-agent relationships, the purpose of this paper is to explore how agency theory emerged from a number of economic and social developments. In doing so, the authors explain how this once dominant theory comes up short regarding varying realms of entrepreneurship as well as with multiple modern business phenomena.

The authors first present a brief overview of agency theory. Second, the authors identify major events and people and address how they impacted the development of agency theory. Third, the authors provide insights on agency theory across three contexts (strategic entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, and family business). Implications, limitations, and future research directions are then offered.

The authors provide a deeper understanding of agency theory, thus broadening its underpinnings and enabling readers to more readily understand why agency theory is limited in its explanation of certain and modern business phenomena. The authors find that some of the seminal influences to agency theory are quite dated which has limited its explanatory power in terms of the modern day business and with more recent disciplines such as entrepreneurship.

The authors are limited by their choices of major events that influenced agency theory at the expense of not being able to include everything that may have impacted the theory over time. These limitations, however, are offset by the research implications. As the authors highlight the underpinning of agency theory, the authors subsequently provide scholars and practitioners with five primary boundary conditions, each of which are in need of attention for agency theory to maintain relevant explanatory power.

A deeper understanding of agency theory can be gained by looking at its underpinnings. By presenting numerous principal-agent conflicts and demonstrating areas in which it has fallen short (i.e. entrepreneurship and more recent business phenomenon), we shed light on the obstacles agency theory must overcome in order to maintain its position as a prominent theory.

This paper explores the contextual factors involved in the development and application of paradigmatic theories in general, and the application and development of Agency Theory in the Chinese context in particular.

Referring to four templates for the design of conceptual papers as outlined by Jaakkola (2020), i.e. theory synthesis, theory adaptation, typology and model – we adopt an approach combining theory/literature synthesis and model establishment. Based on a thorough analysis and discussion of the literature on the topics of “context effect “, “interface between theory and context”, “special characteristics of Chinese context” and “invalid application of Agency Theory in a Chinese context”, we use Agency Theory as the lens to discuss the importance of context in applying and developing paradigmatic theory specifically. We start from the contextualization of Agency Theory and then explore approaches to theorizing the Chinese context by developing a conflict coefficient model.

First, the application validity of paradigmatic theories is not sustainable; contextual factors are critical in applying and developing not only propositional but also paradigmatic theories, such as Agency Theory. Second, the Chinese context requires special attention when applying paradigmatic theories originating from Western countries. Third, the traditional application logic of Agency Theory is invalid in the Chinese context due to the coexistence of principal-agent conflicts (PAC) and principal–principal conflicts (PPC), and changeable dominance status of two conflicts according to the contexts. Based on these observations, a model of contextualization theory of PAC and PPC (i.e. conflict coefficient model) is developed from a dynamic perspective, which connects the separated situation states and allows the identification and measurement of the relative severity of the two types of agency conflicts.

Practitioners can also use this model to identify and measure the relative strength of the two conflicts and determine the direction of control and improvement. Moreover, analysis of Chinese context and agency problems of Chinese firms also has great practical significance considering the increased importance of the Chinese market and the increasingly important role played by Chinese firms in the international economy in general, and in specific host countries in particular.

First, in general, this study expands Whetten's (2009) study of the interface between theory and context. It specifically discusses approaches to considering contextual factors in the development and application of the relatively overlooked paradigmatic theories, using traditional and widely used Agency Theory as a lens. Our study suggests that typical Agency Theory, developed based on Western-centric assumptions, does not completely hold in the context of Chinese business practices because of different cultural, legal and governance realities. Second, it improves and extends the application of Agency Theory by proposing the new perspective that PAC and PPC coexist in specific contexts and positing that the relative severity of two types of agency conflicts depends on the context variables. Third, it puts forward a conflict coefficient model offering a more comprehensive, intuitive and quantifiable method for comparing the extent of the two conflicts in different scenarios, providing a reference for empirical studies of corporate governance.

By revisiting the agency theory literature, this paper aims to both incrementally advance historical viewpoints and reveal four prominent influences on agency theory: Weber and Simon, The Great Depression, Cooperation and the Chicago School. This is critical given that understanding the history behind the authors’ major theoretical lenses is fundamental to using these theories to explain various phenomena.

Drawing on a plethora of archival sources and following the influence-mapping approach used by other management history scholars, this manuscript synthesizes historical accounts and archival information to provide a clearer picture of the major historical influences in the formation of agency theory.

We shed light on four areas related to management history that helped propel agency theory. Whereas past scholarship has not recognised them as influencers, we find and show how the industrial revolution, unionization, the stock exchange and other management approaches all played a role in the development of agency theory’s core tenants.

We extend upon the influential people and events that shaped agency theory, thus providing a fuller understanding of the theory’s usefulness. Moreover, we fill in gaps enabling scholars to better understand the context in which the core tenants of agency theory were developed.

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate how agency theory has been used to address the dynamics involved in supply chain management. It is also dedicated to suggesting an agenda for future research.

We performed an integrative literature review, based on the process detailed by Botelho et al. (2011), with search filters. The articles were obtained from the Scopus and Web of Science databases using the keywords “supply chain” and “agency theory”, with a subsequent analytical filter for “management”. The search initially identified 205 articles. After two screenings, 56 articles were selected for analysis.

Despite attempts to infer the importance of research on agency theory in supply chain management, its application to the discipline is scarce. Clearly, agency theory provides valuable insights into the relationships in the supply chain. In the studies analyzed, the dynamics of performance, risk, sustainability, dyadic and inter-firm relationships, and supplier management are predominant.

When considering unwanted behaviors throughout the supply chain, agency theory fills the explanatory gaps for these facts. It also proves to be a useful tool to answer mainly the dilemmas of underlying theories, such as transaction cost theory, resource-based view and network theory. Rare are the studies that examine the current state of the application of agency theory in the supply chain literature in the management field.

The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory.

The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory.

While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory.

The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach.

While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

International retailers are increasingly using franchising as a means of entering foreign markets. However, international retail franchising lacks a conceptual basis from which an explanation of the major elements of this activity can be generated. Agency theory and its major premises of information asymmetry, monitoring costs, moral hazard and opportunism, are introduced in an attempt to provide an initial effort at bridging this conceptual gap. The paper reviews international retailing and franchise research before explaining agency theory. A discussion follows on how agency theory can explain major elements of international franchise activity of retail firms such as the international retail franchise process and the operationalisation of the international retail franchise system.

Agency theorists diagnosed the economic malaise of the 1970s as the result of executive obsession with corporate stability over profitability. Management swallowed many of the pills agency theorists prescribed to increase entrepreneurialism and risk-taking; stock options, dediversification, debt financing, and outsider board members. Management did not swallow the pills prescribed to moderate risk: executive equity holding and independent boards. Thus, in practice, the remedy heightened corporate risk-taking without imposing constraints. Both recessions of the new millennium can be traced directly to these changes in strategy. To date, regulators have proposed nothing to undo the perverse incentives of the new “shareholder value” system.