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To summarize and interpret a Risk Alert issued on April 12, 2018 by the US SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) on the most frequent advisory fee and expense compliance issues identified in recent examinations of investment advisers.

Summarizes deficiencies identified by the OCIE staff pertaining to advisory fees and expenses in the following categories: fee billing based on incorrect account valuations, billing fees in advance or with improper frequency, applying incorrect fee rates, omitting rebates and applying discounts incorrectly, disclosure issues involving advisory fees, and adviser expense misallocations.

In the Risk Alert, OCIE staff emphasized the importance of disclosures regarding advisory fees and expenses to the ability of clients to make informed decisions, including whether or not to engage or retain an adviser.

In light of the issues identified in the Risk Alert, advisers should assess the accuracy of disclosures and adequacy of policies and procedures regarding advisory fee billing and expenses. As a matter of best practice, advisers should implement periodic forensic reviews of billing practices to identify and correct issues relating to fee billing and expenses.

Expert guidance from experienced investment management lawyer.

The paper aims to identify which factors determine (German) retail banking customers' intention to adopt a new remuneration system for financial advice. The new system is a pay‐per‐use advisory model that supersedes existing commission‐based advisory approaches.

The paper develops and tests a comprehensive conceptual framework that includes perceived innovation characteristics, relationship quality, and socio‐demographic and psychographic variables to explain adoption intentions of the new remuneration system. The data come from a survey among clients of a large German retail bank.

Perceived innovation characteristics (i.e. relative advantage) largely determine the intention to adopt the fee‐based advisory model. Consumer and relationship quality variables do not directly impact adoption intentions, but have an indirect effect through influencing perceived innovation characteristics and moderating their relative importance. Relationship quality indicators, such as satisfaction with the current service and trust in the bank or its employees, do not impact customers' intentions to switch to the new remuneration system.

The paper describes a (case) study using data from a large German retail bank. Future research may investigate the findings' (international) generalizability using different datasets and also assess additional drivers of customers' intentions to adopt a fee‐based advisory model.

The results suggest that banks should always explain the relative advantage of financial service innovations to their clients, as existing satisfaction and trust levels are not sufficient to ensure adoption.

This is the first paper examining the adoption of a new remuneration system for financial advice in the retail banking industry. By assessing a variety of variables the authors increase understanding of why customers adopt or reject such complex and difficult to evaluate service innovations.

Part I of this series appeared in the Summer 2002 issue of The Journal of Investment Compliance. It addressed the regulation of wrap fee programs under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) and the requirements of Rule 3a‐4 thereunder, which must be met so that a wrap fee program is not deemed to be an investment company. Part I also discussed certain issues arising under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), including how program sponsors and any third‐party portfolio managers generally are viewed as investment advisers and are subject to the Advisers Act. Part II discusses additional Advisers Act issues such as suitability, fees, and advertising. It also briefly reviews issues arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The information provided in Part II assumes that readers have some basic familiarity with Part I.

To review SEC enforcement action taken against an adviser over: failure to grant advisory fee breakpoint discounts based on the aggregation of related accounts requested by clients and related deficiencies in the adviser’s administration of the account aggregation feature.

Review and summarize the SEC’s finding’s regarding the adviser’s advisory fee breakpoint discount program, deficiencies in the program identified in SEC examinations, resulting violations of the Investment Advisers Act and its rules, the adviser’s remedial efforts and undertakings, and the sanctions imposed.

This settlement provides an important reminder for registered investment advisers of the need to fully address deficiencies identified in SEC examinations and of the attention paid by SEC inspection staff to client fees as a core examination area.

Practical explanation from experienced financial services lawyers.

This study seeks to examine whether there are differences between companies that purchase either recurring or non‐recurring audit services and those that do not, and whether auditors discount their audit fees for either type of non‐audit service.

The study examines associations between audit and non‐audit fees in New Zealand, for the period 1995 to 2001. The advantage of this setting is that data on non‐audit services was disclosed in this period and that the period pre‐dates more recent controversies over whether non‐audit services are permissible.

Companies that purchase any type of non‐audit services from their auditors are larger and more complex than companies that purchase auditing only. Companies that obtain tax services from their auditors usually do so on a recurring basis. In contrast, consulting services do not tend to occur every year. Auditors do not discount their fees for either recurring or non‐recurring non‐audit services.

While useful data is available about the type of non‐audit services provided, there are limitations to the extent to which this information provides a precise measure of whether the services were recurring or not.

The research contributes to understanding the issues regarding auditors providing non‐audit services by providing evidence that neither recurring nor non‐recurring services are associated with a reduction in audit fees. This finding is relevant when considering whether regulation of non‐audit services should permit certain types of services, or should prohibit all non‐audit services.

There has been tremendous focus by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and by other parties, such as the New York Attorney General, on investment advisory fees levied by mutual funds as well as conflicts of interest between portfolio managers and their various types of clients. Sometimes these debates have ended up in Congress where the implied threat to the SEC was “if you don’t act we will.” And some of the congressional proposals, if enacted, would have created far‐reaching consequences for both investors and investment companies by proscribing certain conflicts. The SEC, on the other hand, has used sunlight principally as its preferred antiseptic. Increased disclosure requirements over a variety of activities has been the norm in the its recently adopted rules and regulations. The Commission has proposed amendments to Forms N1‐A, N‐2, N‐3 and N‐CSR calling for enhanced disclosure regarding the three C’s: compensation, composition of the management team, and conflicts of interest.

We examine the relationship between how mutual fund sponsors configure their board(s) of directors and the performance of the funds under a particular board's purview. Fund sponsors utilize either one board to oversee all the funds within a fund family or multiple boards that oversee one fund or a subset of the family's funds. Our results suggest that fund families – that is, sponsors – that use multiple boards have significantly higher objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess returns. But, there are no significant differences in the objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess expenses. These results are consistent with the argument that multiple boards provide superior monitoring.

A hedge fund manager typically falls within the definition of an “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”). Persons who fall within this definition generally must register with the SEC and are subject to all applicable requirements under the Advisers Act and it related rules. However, the Advisers Act and its rules currently provide an exemption from SEC registration that is available to many hedge fund managers. In light of recent suggestions by SEC officials to greatly restrict or eliminate the exemption, this article summarizes the most significant consequences of SEC registration for hedge fund managers.

This study aims to examine the impact of different levels of required book-tax conformity (BTC) on audit clients' demand for auditor-provided tax services (APTS). In addition, the authors also investigate the effects of the European Union (EU) Regulation (2014).

This study utilizes a sample of listed companies from 10 EU countries between 2010 and 2019. The final sample consists of 16,049 firm-year observations from 2,515 unique firms, and the authors use both probit and ordinary least square (OLS) regression models in this study.

The main finding of this paper is that companies listed in countries with a higher level of BTC are less likely to purchase tax services from incumbent auditors and pay fewer auditor-provided tax service fees. Results from further analyses confirm that firms substantially reduced their purchase of APTS after the EU Regulation (2014) was implemented, but these reduced purchases were found to be more pronounced for firms located in countries with low BTC.

This study advances the understanding of the determinants of APTS and the consequences of BTC. Specifically, the authors report that variation in a country-specific feature (i.e. BTC) also affects firms' decision to purchase APTS. Moreover, this paper provides some preliminary evidence of the new regulation and contributes to the literature on APTS regulation. The findings of this study have important policy implications for regulators and are also relevant for various capital market participants.